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ABSTRACT 
 
A company’s board of directors is ultimately responsible for putting effective corporate 
governance (CG) structures in place as mechanisms to enhance its accountability to 
stakeholders. An audit committee (AC), which is a subcommittee of the board, is one 
component of the company’s CG structures. In South Africa, legislation, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirements, and the King code and 
report of Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) deal with the composition and 
responsibilities of ACs. As the shares of AltX listed companies, which are categorised 
as high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed companies, are traded publicly, 
they are required to comply with the Companies Act and to establish an AC according to 
the Act’s composition requirements to fulfil mandatory responsibilities. In terms of the 
JSE listing requirements, AltX listed companies must appoint an AC or explain their 
reason(s) for not doing so. As the total market capitalisation of AltX listed companies 
has increased by 87% over the past three years, greater numbers of stakeholder groups 
are being affected. Since stakeholder groups are protected when companies implement 
effective CG processes, the purpose of this study is to understand the way in which the 
AC of an AltX listed company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to 
medium-sized listed company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders. 
Attributes that contribute to the value added by ACs were identified as being the 
characteristics of AC members; the fulfilment of responsibilities through optimised 
activities; and the fulfilment of responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships with 
the board and information providers. An explorative qualitative case-based research 
design was applied in terms of which a single AltX listed company was selected 
according to predetermined selection criteria. Data were collected using individual semi-
structured interviews, field notes and company documents. Descriptive open coding 
techniques were used for data analysis with the findings of the study subsequently 
being presented in terms of a theoretical framework of the attributes that influence the 
extent to which the AC adds value. The findings of the study confirm that these 
attributes of the AC facilitate its ability to add value to the AltX listed company 
investigated and its stakeholders in terms of enlightened shareholder theory. 
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Programme; high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed company; 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
A company’s board of directors (board) is ultimately responsible for putting effective 
corporate governance (CG) structures in place (Rossouw, Van der Watt & Malan, 
2002:289; IOD, 2009a:12). An audit committee (AC), which is a subcommittee of the 
board (Spira, 1998:30; Spira, 1999a:231; Spira, 2003:182; Brennan & Solomon, 
2008:888; IOD, 2009a:28, principle 2.23; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:110), is a CG 
structure used by the board to improve its accountability (Brennan & Solomon, 
2008:888) to the company’s stakeholders in terms of financial, risk control and audit 
matters (Marx, 2009:33), to provide assurance on compliance aspects, and to serve as 
an advisory function (Magrane & Malthus, 2010:427). There are a number of benefits 
that derive from an AC, which operates as a value-adding component for the company 
and its stakeholders (Vanasco, 1994:38). These benefits include enhancing the quality 
of the annual financial statements (AFS), improving the company’s risk management 
and preventing fraudulent activities (IIARF, 2011:xi). As a result of these benefits, the 
AC has been described as the “panacea of the corporate world” (Marx, 2008:1), “the 
financial watchdog of the shareholders specifically, and all stakeholders at large” (Marx, 
2009:31), and the “most reliable guardians of the public interest” (Levitt, 1998). 
 
In South Africa, the Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 (Companies Act), the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) listing requirements, and the King code and report of 
Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) deal with the composition and 
responsibilities of ACs. The JSE listing requirements also deal with requirements 
applicable to companies listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX). AltX listed 
companies form part of the AltX market, a section of the JSE Limited (JSE Limited, 
2012c), which was established in October 2003 after a partnership was entered into 
between the JSE Limited and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (SA.info, 
2006). This market provides high-growth potential, upcoming, small to medium-sized 
companies with an opportunity to access capital (JSE Limited, 2012c) in order to 
advance their listing on the JSE main board (JSE Limited, 2010a; JSE Limited, 
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2012a:par. 21.2(b); JSE Limited, 2012d). The AltX market is focused on black economic 
empowerment companies, family-owned companies, small mining companies (SA.info, 
2006) and companies run by entrepreneurs (JSE Limited, 2010c). As the shares of AltX 
listed companies trade publicly (RSA, 2009:s 8), they are required to comply with the 
Companies Act and establish an AC according to the composition requirements of the 
Act in order to fulfil mandatory responsibilities (RSA, 2009:s  94). In terms of the JSE 
listing requirements for AltX listed companies, such companies are also required to 
apply King III principles, which recommend the appointment of an AC or require the 
entity to explain the reason(s) for not applying this principle (IOD, 2009a:22, principle 
2.6; JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(i)–(ii)). 
 
An AC faces many challenges as it depends on individuals and entities (e.g. 
management) to supply it with information (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:29), only meets at 
certain intervals, is challenged with complex information, and consists of members who 
are not familiar with the day-to-day operations, controls and reporting aspects of the 
company (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & Reed, 2002:41). The ACs of AltX 
listed companies may also face unique challenges such as not having the same levels 
of access to resources to assist them in dealing with complex financial issues that larger 
companies may enjoy. As a result, more responsibilities are placed on the shoulders of 
the AC (Gazzaway, 2006). AltX listed companies are also in a growth phase; as 
companies grow, they are exposed to additional risks and thus the expectation that the 
AC will address these risks increases (Gazzaway, 2006).  
 
Such challenges may influence the value that an AC adds to the company and its 
stakeholders, with a lack of value being added by the AC being evidenced by financial 
scandals occurring notwithstanding the AC’s presence in an organisation (Lublin & 
Macdonald, 1998). Hence, Sommer (1991:91) points out that the mere existence of an 
AC does not guarantee its effectiveness, Marx (2008:205) states that ACs might “be 
formed for compliance and window-dressing purposes only”, whilst The Wall Street 
Journal has labelled ACs as “toothless tigers” (Lublin & Macdonald, 1998). As such, the 
value of an AC is something that has stimulated much debate (KPMG, 2005:1; Gendron 
& Bédard, 2006:211–212), as well as various studies on the value being added by ACs 
(e.g. Spira, 1998; Gendron, Bédard & Gosselin, 2004; Magrane & Malthus, 2010).  
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In South Africa, the value of ACs has been studied at the largest JSE listed companies 
(Marx, 2008) and in the public sector (Van der Nest, 2006). However, these findings 
cannot be generalised to small and medium-sized companies such as AltX listed 
companies. The question thus arises: How do the ACs of high-growth potential, small to 
medium-sized listed companies, such as AltX listed companies, add value to companies 
and their stakeholders? 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Publicly trading companies, including high-growth potential, small to medium-sized 
listed companies, such as AltX listed companies, impact various stakeholder groups. As 
the total market capitalisation of AltX listed companies grew by 87% over the three-year 
period 2012 to 2015, from R14 billion to R26 billion (Cheyne, 2012; Maluleka, 2015), it 
would imply that an increasing number of stakeholder groups are being affected by their 
operations. These stakeholder groups are protected by compliance with legislation and 
regulations, and by implementing effective CG practices (IOD, 2009a:12). Since an AC 
is regarded as a “critical component in the overall corporate governance process” 
(KPMG, 2005:1), the problem arises that if an AltX listed company was to have an 
ineffective AC, the company’s CG practices would not be enhanced, which in turn would 
mean that the company and its stakeholder groups would not receive the required 
protection. 
 
1.3 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed 
company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed 
company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
To achieve the purpose of the study, the following objectives are pursued: 
 
 to investigate the characteristics of AC members that enable them to add value 
 to investigate the way the AC fulfils its responsibilities through optimised activities 
 to investigate the way the AC fulfils its responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers 
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1.5 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
As previously mentioned, the way in which value is added by ACs of high-growth 
potential, small to medium-sized listed companies has not been researched. This study 
accordingly aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the AC as an 
integral component of CG practices and specifically with regard to understanding the 
way in which the ACs adds value to high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed 
companies, such as AltX listed companies, and its stakeholders. 
 
In view of the fact that executive and non-executive directors (which include AC 
members) of AltX listed companies are required to attend a Directors Induction 
Programme (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.3(d)) to improve their knowledge of aspects 
such as the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies and 
CG practices (JSE Limited, 2012c), the findings of this study could be used to inform 
this programme and thereby contribute to the development of AC members. 
 
1.6 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study was to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed 
company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed 
company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders. In this regard, the study is 
confined to the AC of a specific AltX listed company. Therefore, given the scope of the 
study and the research method deployed, the findings presented cannot be generalised 
to other ACs. 
 
1.7 DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
 
In this study the following key terms are used. They are listed together with their 
definitions: 
 
Audit committee (AC): An AC is a subcommittee of the board (Spira, 1998:30; Spira, 
1999a:231; Spira, 2003:182; Brennan & Solomon, 2008:888; IOD, 2009a:28, principle 
2.23; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:110) and is regarded as an extension of the board 
(BRC, 1999:7) to which the board delegates certain of its oversight responsibilities 
(Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:27; Menon & Williams, 1994:122; DeZoort et al., 2002:40; 
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Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:100, 112) with the intention of improving the board’s 
accountability (Brennan & Solomon, 2008:888) relating to these delegated 
responsibilities (Marx, 2009:33) to the company’s stakeholders. 
 
AltX listed company: An AltX listed company forms part of the AltX market which in 
turn is a section of the JSE Limited (JSE Limited, 2012c). 
 
Assurance providers: Assurance providers refer to internal and external assurance 
providers. These internal and external assurance providers include, but are not limited 
to, the internal and external auditors (IOD, 2009b:62, par. 48–49). 
 
Combined assurance model: The combined assurance model refers to the integration 
of the company’s assurance processes (managed by the company’s management and 
assurance providers), which involve risk and CG oversight, as well as the 
implementation of controls that are set in accordance with the company’s risk appetite 
(IOD, 2009b:62, par. 46–47). 
 
Corporate governance (CG): “CG is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992:par. 2.5; Worldbank, 2013:1). 
 
Designated advisor: The designated advisor is the caretaker of the AltX listed 
company’s compliance with JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies and 
other applicable legislation and regulations (JSE Limited, 2012b). 
 
Information providers: Information providers are individuals who provide the AC with 
information and guidance so as to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993:29). In this study, information providers refer to management, the 
external auditor, the company secretary and the designated advisor. 
 
Stakeholders: Stakeholders include persons, groups, or organisations that have direct 
or indirect interests in an organisation because they can affect or be affected by the 
company's actions, objectives and policies (Business Dictionary, 2012).  
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1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A qualitative explorative research design and a case study approach were chosen for 
this study as they enabled the researcher to address the research objectives. Case 
study research is deemed appropriate for exploring and understanding the uniqueness, 
dynamics and eccentricity of a particular case in detail (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 
2005:193), thus allowing the researcher to familiarise him/herself with the research 
subjects’ worlds and look for patterns in their lives, words and activities (Fouché & 
Schurink, 2011:320). The case study approach facilitated an understanding of the 
manner in which the AC fulfilled its responsibilities (formal and informal) and adopted 
acceptable behaviour (Turley & Zaman, 2007:768; Magrane & Malthus, 2010:434). 
Such an approach also enabled the researcher to understand the way in which the AC 
of an AltX listed company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-
sized listed company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders, which was the 
purpose of the study. 
 
Owing to the sensitive nature of the information being dealt with and the AC 
responsibilities, it was important to find an AltX listed company that would be willing to 
participate in the study. Furthermore, it was considered important that this company 
should have been listed for at least the average listing duration of 7.59 years (Maluleka, 
2015). The reason for this was that a company with a longer listing timeframe would 
probably provide rich data, as the company had had ample opportunity to shape and 
establish the characteristics and responsibilities of its AC. 
 
Data were collected through semi-structured individual interviews with research 
participants, as well as the use of field notes and company documents. Data obtained 
from the semi-structured interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder (Greeff, 
2011:359) and subsequently transcribed (Greeff, 2011:360; Saldaña, 2011:44). First 
and second-coding were performed on the transcribed interviews, field notes and 
company documents using descriptive open coding techniques (Myers, 2011:110; 
Saldaña, 2011:104). As such, this approach uncovered new information about the 
phenomena being studied (Saldaña, 2011:89). Computer software, namely ATLAS.ti 
(Saldaña, 2011:137), assisted the researcher when coding the transcribed interviews. 
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In this study, an inductive reasoning process was followed during the analysis and 
interpretation of data obtained during the data collection phase (Creswell, 2007:17). The 
researcher made observations during the data collection phase which were aligned to 
the theories about the value added by a specific AltX listed company’s AC to the 
company and its stakeholders (Bendassolli, 2013:2). 
 
A study is considered to be trustworthy when the data collection and analysis phases 
have been properly conducted and the findings accurately presented (Yin, 2011:78). 
The four pillars for establishing the trustworthiness of qualitative research, as suggested 
by Lincoln and Guba (1999:398), were used in this study. These pillars include truth 
value (credibility), applicability (transferability), consistency (dependability) and 
neutrality (confirmability). 
 
1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Research ethics govern the manner in which research is done and reported on 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008:62, 65), and protect the rights of the research participants 
being studied (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008:68). Trust in the research community is 
built if all researchers adopt ethical principles during their studies (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008:63). In this study, ethical clearance was obtained from the Research 
Ethics Review Committee of the College of Accounting Science at the University of 
South Africa (UNISA) before participants were approached for the interviews. 
 
Informed consent was obtained from the AltX listed company selected for the study. 
Participants were provided with an information sheet (Appendix C) and were requested 
to sign an informed consent form (Appendix D) (Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:40) 
prior to conducting the interviews. The participant information sheet provided 
information about the objectives of the study, the research process, the benefits of the 
study, the right of withdrawal from the study at any point and the fact that participation in 
the study was voluntary (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 1978:11, 14). It also confirmed that the 
information obtained during the interviews would be kept confidential and that the 
participants’ anonymity would be protected. The researcher also reiterated the 
importance of maintaining confidentiality and anonymity before the interviews 
commenced. The identities of both the AltX listed company and the research 
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participants were protected and information was handled in a confidential manner. To 
further protect the participants, quality research was produced by applying a recognised 
research design and approach in the study (Maritz & Visagie, 2011:14). Findings were 
also presented in a manner that was accurate and objective and would not deceive the 
readers of this dissertation. 
 
1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
This dissertation comprises six chapters, each of which contains a detailed description 
of the activities that were carried out in this study. The chapter content is indicated 
below: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and highlights the problem statement. The purpose and 
research objectives of the study are described and the importance and delimitations of 
the study are discussed. In addition, the key terms used in this study are listed and 
defined and the research methodology and ethical considerations are highlighted. 
 
Chapter 2 is the first chapter of the literature review. An overview of CG is provided with 
reference to the definition, origin and models of CG. CG practices adopted by various 
countries and companies, as well as the importance of CG and AC practices, are 
reflected upon. The review then moves on to CG in South Africa, with a discussion of 
the CG model followed and relevant legislation, codes and reports, as well as the JSE 
listing requirements governing CG and AC practices. 
 
Chapter 3 is the second chapter of the literature review and focuses on identifying the 
attributes influencing the AC to add value to an AltX listed company and its 
stakeholders. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the research design and approach that were used. It sets out the 
method applied in terms of the selection of a research site and research participants, 
data collection, data analysis and data management. Measures to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the study, as well as the ethical considerations adhered to, are also 
highlighted. 
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Chapter 5 presents the research findings which were based on the analysis of data 
obtained from the semi-structured individual interviews with research participants, field 
notes and company documents. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the conclusion of the study. This chapter reflects on the significant 
findings that relate to the purpose and objectives of the study, as well as the limitations 
of the study, and subsequently makes recommendations for further research. It ends by 
highlighting the importance of the study. 
 
1.11 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the study and provided background information which 
subsequently led to the purpose statement, namely, to understand the way in which the 
AC of an AltX listed company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small to 
medium-sized listed company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders. By 
obtaining an in-depth understanding of the value added by the AC of a specific AltX 
listed company at a particular point in time, the current study will contribute to the 
existing body of knowledge on ACs of high-growth potential, small to medium-sized 
listed companies as a component of CG practices. This study could also serve to inform 
the Directors Induction Programme and thereby provide a vehicle for developing AC 
members. Consequently, a qualitative research design and case study approach were 
deemed appropriate for addressing the research objectives. Within this context, the 
researcher highlighted the fact that the findings of this dissertation could not be 
generalised to other ACs owing to the fact that this study focused on just one case. 
Mention is also made of the measures applied to ensure the trustworthiness and ethical 
soundness of the research. 
 
In the next chapter, an overview of CG will be provided. This chapter will also deal with 
CG practices within a South African context. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the study, described the purpose of the study and highlighted the 
research objectives. In attempting to achieve these objectives, it is important to provide 
an overview of CG by firstly defining the concept and then outlining its history. CG 
models and practices and the importance of implementing CG practices will also be 
dealt with (§1 2.2). South African CG practices will be described by explaining the CG 
model adopted and by referring to legislation, codes and reports, as well as the listing 
requirements (§ 2.3). 
 
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OVERVIEW 
 
This section provides an overview of CG by defining the concept and discussing its 
origin. Thereafter, CG models are discussed with reference to the agency, shareholder, 
enlightened shareholder and stakeholder theories, as well as the stakeholder groups of 
relevance to CG models. The reasons for adopting CG models are also explained. 
Lastly, the diversity of CG practices adopted by companies and the importance of such 
practices are discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Defining corporate governance 
 
CG has been defined both broadly and narrowly by different codes (Committee on CG − 
SEBI, 2003:2, par. 1.1.10; Worldbank, 2013:4) and scholars (Fligstein & Freeland, 
1995:22; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:737; Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:305). 
These definitions can be divided into two categories. The first category of definitions 
focuses on the actions of the company itself, such as the company’s performance, 
capabilities, growth rate and relationships with its stakeholders. The second category 
refers to the legislation and/or regulations that regulate companies, such as listing 
requirements, the laws managing insider trading and the protection of minority 
shareholders (Worldbank, 2013:2).  
                                            
1
 The symbol “§” refers to the specific section in this dissertation. 
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Despite the number of definitions, the following definition of CG by Sir Adrian Cadbury is 
deemed appropriate for this study: “CG is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992:par. 2.5; Worldbank, 2013:1). By implication, this 
definition defines CG as operating tools available to companies whereby there is a 
separation between the principals of the company and its agents (Worldbank, 2013:1). 
The responsibility for implementing these operating tools rests on the shoulders of the 
company’s agents (Rossouw et al., 2002:289; IOD, 2009a:12), as they are the 
guardians of CG in a company (IOD, 2009a:21, principle 2.1). One such operating tool 
is the use of subcommittees which perform a support function for the agents (IOD, 
2009a:28, principle 2.23). The AC is one such subcommittee (Spira, 1998:30; Spira, 
1999a:231; Spira, 2003:182; Brennan & Solomon, 2008:888; IOD, 2009a:28, principle 
2.23; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:110) and is regarded as an extension of the agents 
(BRC, 1999:7) to which the agents delegate certain of their responsibilities (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993:27; Menon & Williams, 1994:122; DeZoort et al., 2002:40; Mohiuddin & 
Karbhari, 2010:100, 112) in order to improve the agents’ accountability (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008:888), relating to these delegated responsibilities (Marx, 2009:33), to the 
company’s stakeholders. 
 
South Africa’s CG code (IOD, 2009a), like many other codes, fails to include a definition 
of CG (Committee on CG − SEBI, 2003:2, par. 1.1.10; Worldbank, 2013:1). In these 
codes, where the definition of CG is omitted, CG is dealt with as a concept and 
reference is made to the value of incorporating good CG practices (Worldbank, 2013:1). 
However, a uniform definition for CG is not important, as long as the characteristics of 
good CG (§ 2.3.3.3) are embraced to allow companies to build and maintain the 
confidence of their stakeholders (Worldbank, 2013:1).  
 
2.2.2 Origin of corporate governance 
 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, companies were run in such 
a way that the owner also acted as the manager of the company. However, during the 
Industrial Revolution, high-growth businesses appeared which were characterised by 
the investment of funds in these companies by the community. This resulted in large-
scale investors appointing agents to act on their behalf (Khan, Ghosh & Akter, 2006:9–
10), which in turn resulted in a separation between the principals of the company and its 
agents (Berle & Means, 1967:4). To avoid mismanagement of the company by its 
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agents, the concept of CG was introduced (Fama & Jensen, 1983:312; Eisenhardt, 
1989:59; Rossouw et al., 2002:289; Barac & Moloi, 2010:19). 
 
A renewed focus on CG practices occurred during the twentieth century after the 
Second World War. Before the Second World War, countries seldom did business 
across their borders. However, after the war, countries were forced to take hands to 
rebuild and develop their economies in order to promote economic growth2 (Bhasa, 
2004:5). This involved doing business across countries’ borders, giving birth to the 
internationalisation of business (Bhasa, 2004:5). Another reason for this 
internationalisation of business was the growth rate experienced by some companies, 
which necessitated their raising capital from both domestic and international sources 
(Wattansasupachoke, 2002:17; Bhasa, 2004:5). As AltX listed companies also aspire to 
advance their growth rate (JSE Limited, 2012c), they have a similar need to raise capital 
from both domestic and international sources and to access global markets.  
 
The AC concept, as part of CG practices, was introduced during the twentieth century 
by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, which proposed that non-
officer members of the board should be responsible for nominating and overseeing 
auditors (US SEC, 1940:5). Since then, expectations of the AC have evolved, resulting 
in a number of opinions on its responsibilities (Lin, Xiao & Tang, 2008:725). However, 
after 2000, regulators and professional bodies worldwide advocated for certain functions 
to be included in the AC’s responsibilities (Lin et al., 2008:725) (the responsibilities of 
South African ACs are dealt with in §§  2.3.2–2.3.4) owing to the increased expectations 
of ACs regarding their oversight role in terms of ensuring a high standard of financial 
and integrated3 reporting, internal financial controls, as well as the identification and 
management of financial risks (IOD, 2009b:56, par. 1). These increased expectations 
emanated for instance from financial reporting, which became increasingly complex 
                                            
2
 Economic growth in a country increases the number of work opportunities available to the public. An 
increase of a country’s workforce will lead to more income being generated by individuals. This 
income has a positive effect on individuals in terms of improved living conditions, improved medical 
services and education opportunities (Reed, 2002:232). 
3
 Integrated reporting is a medium used to communicate to stakeholders the way in which a 
company’s strategy, CG aspects, performance and future goals, in the context of the external 
environment, can evolve into value creation (IIRC, 2013). It provides stakeholders with information 
about the social, economic and environmental influence of the company on the community (i.e. triple 
bottom line impact) (IOD, 2009b:59, par. 24). 
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because of the use of financial instruments, company restructurings, pressure placed on 
the board to meet forecasts (BRC, 1999:17–18), corporate failures (Lee & Stone, 
1997:99–100; Scarbrough, Rama & Raghunandan, 1998:51; Demyanyk & Hasan, 
2010:316) and financial scandals (Spira, 1999a:239, European Commission, 2003:15; 
Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes, 2007:1394), as well as the renewed focus on 
sustainability (IOD, 2009a:11). 
 
Companies’ ability to successfully do business across their country’s borders and 
successfully raise capital is dependent on investors’ perceptions of a company’s CG 
practices (Bhasa, 2004:6), which include a value-adding AC. Thus, the necessity for 
companies to adopt effective CG practices has gained momentum worldwide (Bhasa, 
2004:6). 
 
2.2.3 Corporate governance models 
 
There are two models of CG, one being the Anglo-American model and the other the 
European model4 (West, 2006:434). The Anglo-American model is associated with 
shareholder theory (§  2.2.3.2) (Bhasa, 2004:6; West, 2006:434), focusing only on the 
benefits to be reaped by the shareholders of a company (Reed, 2002:236; Bhasa, 
2004:6). The Anglo-American model is also associated with the use of equity to finance 
the company through active financial markets (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002:313; Reed, 2002:230; Aquilera & Jackson, 2003:447), widely spread ownership, 
an active corporate control market, a less stringent labour market (Aquilera & Jackson, 
2003:447), a single-tier board structure,5 limited investments from banks, and limited or 
no interference from the government (Reed, 2002:230). This model is applied by the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002:310; West, 2006:445), with the exception that these countries’ CG 
practices and/or codes also advocate that companies should acknowledge the needs of 
their stakeholders (NACD, 2008:6; FRC, 2012:3). South African companies, which 
                                            
4
 This model is also referred to as the Japanese model (West, 2006:434), the Nippon-Germano 
model (Bhasa, 2004:6) or the Continental European model (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002:312). 
5
 A single-tier board structure is a unitary board which consists of both executive and non-executive 
directors. These directors are appointed by the company’s shareholders (Millet-Reyes & Zhao, 
2010:286–287). 
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include AltX listed companies, follow in the footsteps of the UK and the USA by 
adopting the Anglo-American model of CG with a few amendments. One of these 
amendments is the consideration of the interests of other stakeholders in business 
decisions and operations (§ 2.3.1). 
 
In contrast to the Anglo-American model, the European model supports stakeholder 
theory (§ 2.2.3.2), which emphasises that welfare should be created for all who are 
affected by a company (West, 2006:434). The European model is characterised by the 
use of retail banks to finance the company, two-tiered board structures,6 which include 
the participation of representatives of the company’s workforce (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002:313), concentrated ownership, an inactive corporate control market 
and strict labour markets (Aquilera & Jackson, 2003:447). Japan and Germany are two 
countries which follow the European model (West, 2006:444). 
 
Shareholder theory (§ 2.2.3.2) is an extension of agency theory (Moore, 1999:120), 
which explains the reason for discussing agency theory before shareholder theory. 
 
2.2.3.1 Agency theory 
 
In a complex company with many dispersed shareholders, it is impractical for all these 
shareholders to manage the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983:322). Consequently, 
principals outsource this function to agents in order to use the agents’ advanced skills to 
optimally manage the principals’ funds invested in the company (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997:740) and to prevent the costs that would be incurred if all principals played a part 
in company decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983:309).  
 
This outsourcing function of management creates a separation between the principals 
(owners, shareholders) and the agents (board, controllers, managers), which is a 
feature of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:308–309; Fama & Jensen, 
1983:301–302). However, a separation between the principals and the agents could 
lead to agency problems. To illustrate: 
                                            
6
 A two-tier board structure consists of a management board and a supervisory board, each having its 
own chairperson. The management board is responsible for operating the company whilst the 
supervisory board watches over the management board. Employees, together with non-executive 
directors, serve on the supervisory board (Millet-Reyes & Zhao, 2010:286–287). 
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 The goals of the principals and agents may conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989:58, 61; Hill 
& Jones, 1992:132; Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:26; West, 2006:434). Principals, 
such as shareholders, may require an increase in share price and dividend 
payments at a reasonable risk, whilst the agents may prefer company growth to 
short-term profit (Aquilera & Jackson, 2003:448). This can be argued, as 
principals may not only be shareholders (as advocated by agency theory) 
(Aquilera & Jackson, 2003:450), but also financiers who are also interested in a 
company honouring prearranged repayments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:761). 
 The principals may be unable to verify the actions of the agents (Eisenhardt, 
1989:58, 61). 
 The level of risk that the principals and the agents prefer may differ, which has a 
direct effect on the preferred actions to be taken by the principals and the agents 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:58). 
 Agents may mismanage the funding supplied by principals (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997:741–742). 
 
To address these agency problems, CG was introduced (Fama & Jensen, 1983:312; 
Eisenhardt, 1989:59; Rossouw et al., 2002:289; Barac & Moloi, 2010:19). CG includes 
practices such as the following: 
 
 Protecting principals from agents that misuse the power vested in them (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997:742, 750, 773). Principals may therefore appoint a board to act 
on their behalf (Fama & Jensen, 1983:311; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:764). 
 Monitoring agents’ behaviour by information being made available to the 
principals (Eisenhardt, 1989:60–61, 64). Accordingly, principals can use this 
information to monitor the board’s performance in terms of the number of board 
meetings held, the number of subcommittees appointed by the board, the 
experience and tenure of board members (Eisenhardt, 1989:65) and budgeting 
information (Fama & Jensen, 1983:310; Eisenhardt, 1989:61). 
 Making incentive pay-outs or prearranged pay-outs linked to agents’ performance 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983:302; Hill & Jones, 1992:132). These pay-outs can be 
based on an incentive contract, which is in line with the principals’ expectations 
of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983:302; Eisenhardt, 1989:60; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997:744).  
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2.2.3.2 Shareholder, enlightened shareholder and stakeholder theory 
 
As noted in section 2.2.3, the Anglo-American model is concerned with shareholder 
theory. According to this theory, the company is merely responsible for maximising the 
shareholders’ profits (Friedman, 1970; Moore, 1999:118; Reed, 2002:236; Andreasson, 
2011:650). Shareholder theory is an extension of agency theory and faces similar 
agency problems (§   2.2.3.1) because shareholder theory also suggests a separation 
between the principals and the agents of a company (Andreasson, 2011:650). 
Shareholder theory concentrates on two parties only – the principals and the agents of 
the company. It has on this basis been criticised by scholars (Bhasa, 2004:8) because a 
company’s sustainability also depends on other internal and external stakeholders.  
 
Shareholder theory is closely related to enlightened shareholder theory, which takes the 
interests of other stakeholders into account only to the point where these stakeholders 
can affect shareholders’ profits. According to enlightened shareholder theory, 
stakeholders have an instrumental role in achieving the company’s objective of profit 
maximisation but nothing more (Moore, 1999:118–119; IOD, 2009a:12; Muswaka, 
2012:3). In other words, not all stakeholders’ rights are protected, merely the rights of 
those stakeholders who may contribute to a company’s profit maximisation objective.  
 
As highlighted in section 2.2.3, the European model is concerned with stakeholder 
theory. In terms of stakeholder theory, a company should serve not only its principals, 
but also other stakeholders of the company (Reed, 2002:236; Wieland, 2005:84; West, 
2006:434), as all stakeholders have a right to reap benefits from the company and to 
participate in its decision-making processes (Freeman, 2002:39). Stakeholder theory is 
also concerned with a company’s moral obligation (Moore, 1999:118) to act in an ethical 
manner (Freeman, 2008:39).  
 
Various internal7 and external8 stakeholder groups (§ 2.2.3.3) have an influence on a 
company’s growth, profitability (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22) and ongoing existence 
(Bhasa, 2004:6). To ensure these, the interdependencies between the company and the 
                                            
7
 Internal stakeholders are also referred to as primary stakeholders and are those individuals or 
groups whose support is essential in order to make the company sustainable (Freeman, 2008:47). 
8
 External stakeholders are also referred to as secondary stakeholders and are those individuals or 
groups who can influence a company’s operations (Freeman, 2008:47). 
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stakeholder groups need to be cautiously managed by the company’s agents through 
the introduction of processes and systems, as well as the maintenance of stable 
relationships (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22). To illustrate: a company can only continue 
with its operations if its employees (as internal stakeholders of the company) fulfil their 
responsibilities efficiently and effectively. In this regard, a performance bonus system 
could be introduced to support employee motivation and the smooth running of the 
company. It is therefore apparent that the CG practices adopted by a company should 
include the introduction of processes and systems and the nurturing of relationships 
with its stakeholders that assist the company in protecting stakeholders’ rights (Fligstein 
& Freeland, 1995:22).  
 
Furthermore, during an organisation’s business operations and decision-making, agents 
should not only consider their impact on an individual stakeholder group, but also take 
cognisance of the interests of all stakeholder groups. This consideration will result in 
realising maximum value for all stakeholder groups. Accordingly, stakeholder groups 
should not be seen in isolation but as being interconnected in the process of value 
creation. For example, customers would not be able to obtain goods and services 
without the company’s suppliers and employees (Freeman, 2008:48).  
 
In South Africa, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution), the 
Labour Relations Act no. 66 of 1995, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act no. 53 of 2003 (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act) and King III, all 
advocate the consideration of the interests of stakeholders (Freeman, 2002:39, 40; 
Freeman, 2008:41; IOD, 2009a:46–48, principles 8.1–8.5). Furthermore, section 76(3) 
of the South African Companies Act (RSA, 2009) and King III (IOD, 2009a:19, principle 
1.1) hold that the board should act ethically and display ethical leadership qualities. In 
other words, an obligation to consider every stakeholder group and to act ethically has 
been reflected in the broadening of the CG practices to be adopted by South African 
companies (Marx & Van Dyk, 2011:39), as required by legislation (Freeman, 2002:39–
40; Freeman, 2008:41) and recommended by King III. 
 
It may be argued that the theory adopted by AltX listed companies depends on the 
ultimate goal of the company. An AltX listed company could merely be interested in 
maximising shareholder wealth in the short term; on the other hand, the company could 
have a long-term vision to grow its business and create wealth. Where maximum 
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shareholder wealth in the short term is the primary goal, such a company would focus 
primarily on shareholders and the interests of those stakeholders that play an 
instrumental role in increasing shareholder wealth. Such companies would therefore 
embrace an enlightened shareholder approach. However, as laid down by the 
Companies Act, other stakeholders should also be considered (§ 2.3.2). With regard to 
AltX listed companies that have the main goal of growing their businesses in the long 
term, it may be argued that maximum growth and wealth can be achieved by 
considering the interests of all stakeholders during the companies’ decision-making 
processes and business operations. Thus, these companies would adopt stakeholder 
theory. 
 
2.2.3.3 Stakeholder groups 
 
The stakeholders of every company are unique and who or what they are depends on 
the company’s circumstances (IOD, 2009b:100, par. 6). Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
different internal and external stakeholder groups.  
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Figure 2.1 Stakeholder groups 
Source: adapted from Freeman, Harrison and Wicks (2007:7) 
 
Key: 
        –  Internal/primary stakeholders 
        –  External/secondary stakeholders 
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In return, shareholders receive control rights (i.e. the right to vote for important matters 
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concerning the company, such as voting for the members of the board), as well as 
voluntary dividend payments in exchange for their capital contribution. However, there is 
also the risk that shareholders will not receive any benefits in return and may even lose 
their initial capital contribution (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:750, 764). Financiers, on the 
other hand, provide the company with debt and are entitled to prearranged repayments 
(Hill & Jones, 1992:133; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:752, 761–762). If a company does not 
honour its debt repayments, the financier may be entitled to exercise certain rights by 
reclaiming some of the company’s assets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:752, 761–762).  
 
As described in the previous section, an AltX listed company could merely be interested 
in maximising shareholder wealth in the short term, or the company could have the 
vision to grow its business and create wealth in the long term. Whichever strategy it 
chooses, the company may prefer to be financed by equity rather than debt. As Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997:765) state, if a company is financed solely by debt, it hands over 
control rights to its financiers. Thus, whatever the ultimate goal of AltX listed companies, 
they would probably not consider financiers to be the primary providers of capital. 
 
Customers (consumers) – Customers pay for a service(s) or a product(s) produced by 
the company, which eventually increases the company’s revenue. This stakeholder 
group expects the service delivered or product purchased to be value for money (Hill & 
Jones, 1992:133) and to be ethically delivered or produced (Brown, Harris, Hofny-
Collins, Pasiecznik & Wallace, 2000:70). 
 
Public (society or citizens) and communities – The public at large and the 
community in which a company is situated provide it with national and local 
infrastructure respectively, as well as the resources it needs in the form of labour that 
enable it to operate (Hill & Jones, 1992:133). Therefore, this stakeholder group provides 
a company with an implied licence to operate. In return, it expects that companies will 
not harm the welfare of the group but improve its quality of life (Hill & Jones, 1992:133; 
Reed, 2002:239). Furthermore, companies are expected to act legitimately by 
respecting the society’s rules, values and expectations and acting accordingly (Palazzo 
& Scherer, 2006:71). 
 
Suppliers – Suppliers are important to a company because the quality, price and 
timeliness of the products or services being supplied affect the company’s own products 
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or services (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22) and ensure the smooth running of the 
company (Bhasa, 2004:8). 
 
Board, management and employees – The board is accountable to the company’s 
stakeholders (IOD, 2009a:12). Management and employees dedicate their time and 
skills to the company, expecting in return decent compensation and acceptable working 
conditions (Hill & Jones, 1992:133). The board’s role in the company is similar to that of 
management and employees (Freeman, 2008:44), although employees are in a position 
to withhold their services should the company not live up to their expectations (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997:751), thus negatively affecting productivity (Esser, 2009:198). 
 
Government (state) – The government has the power to regulate the operations of a 
company through the enforcement of laws (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22, 31). The 
government collects taxes from these companies and uses them to benefit society 
(Freeman, 2008:46), for instance in the provision of infrastructure. 
 
Future generations – In view of the increasing awareness of the importance of a 
company’s triple bottom line impact, companies have to take cognisance of the 
influence their operations will have on future generations (IOD, 2009a:11; IOD, 
2009b:128). Despite such awareness, companies that deplete society’s available 
resources place future generations at risk (Bhasa, 2004:8). 
 
Environment – The awareness of a company’s triple bottom line impact also demands 
that companies operate in a manner that takes into consideration their negative 
influence on the environment (IOD, 2009a:11; IOD, 2009b:128). Despite the presence 
of laws and regulations that have been promulgated to protect the environment, South 
Africa is experiencing challenges in protecting the environment from contamination by 
company operations (Mathee, 2011:37, 40). Bhasa (2004:8) notes in this regard that 
companies releasing poisonous gases and waste products could negatively affect the 
environment. 
 
Competitors – Companies should engage with their competitors in order to understand 
the way in which competitors carry out their operations. Such engagement would enable 
them to reap benefits (White, 1981:518), as well as be proactive in initiating certain 
interventions. 
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Although scholars (Bhasa, 2004:8–9) and voluntary codes (IOD, 2009a:10) state that 
the company, as a corporate citizen, should benefit, either financially or non-financially, 
all the stakeholders that are directly or indirectly affected by its operations, it is 
submitted that AltX listed companies will consider other stakeholders on the basis of 
their short and long-term goals, and accordingly adopt an enlightened shareholder 
and/or stakeholder approach, as argued in section 2.2.3.2.  
 
2.2.3.4 Reasons for adopting corporate governance models 
 
CG practices vary from country to country (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:769). The reason for 
countries not following a globalised CG model may be explained by country 
characteristics. These include the influence of political forces, the role of a country’s 
legal system in protecting investors, a country’s financial and economic development 
and its social circumstances. 
 
Influence of political forces – The political framework of a country is either a social 
democracy or a capitalistic economy (Bhasa, 2004:13–14), or a combination of both. 
The legal system of a social democracy supports the protection of the public and 
employees at the expense of the shareholders, in contrast to a capitalistic economy 
where the legal system protects investors. As such, the political framework of a country 
will influence a company’s CG practices (Bhasa, 2004:13–14). 
 
Role of the legal system in protecting investors – A country’s legal system also 
influences the CG practices that are adopted because a legal system that protects 
investors will also be reflected in these practices (Bhasa, 2004:6, 10). In countries 
where the legal system fails to protect investors, companies need to implement more 
CG practices, which increase the CG implementation costs for a company. A company 
will only be willing to invest in CG practices if the benefits derived outweigh the cost 
(Doidge, Karolyi & Stultz, 2007:2, 4). Therefore, if on the basis of a cost/benefit 
analysis, a company decides not to implement CG practices, protection for investors 
from improved CG practices may be lacking. A cost/benefit analysis refers to the 
process of comparing the costs and the benefits of a choice with the other available 
alternatives. Such a process enables an informed decision to be taken (Business 
Dictionary, 2013). 
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Financial and economic development – Companies located in countries that 
experience poor economic and financial conditions will have less access to capital from 
local financiers and investors. Therefore, if these companies are only able to raise 
capital locally they will invest less in CG practices (Doidge et al., 2007:2–3,  34). In 
contrast to the view of Doidge et al. (2007:2–3, 34), other scholars are of the opinion 
that although countries may experience poor economic and financial conditions, 
companies can nevertheless attract local institutional investments such as pension 
funds successfully by implementing good CG practices (Gillan & Starks, 2003:5). 
Companies that raise capital outside their country’s borders, however, will regard the 
implementation of CG practices as important (Doidge et al., 2007:2–3,  34).  
 
Social circumstances – Important social matters that are unique to a country can 
affect the CG practices in that country (West, 2006:433). The effect of the human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and the 
upliftment of previously disadvantaged groups should specifically be considered in this 
regard by South African companies (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:511). 
 
2.2.4 Corporate governance practices 
 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3.4, CG practices differ from country to country. This 
differentiation not only occurs between countries, but also between companies that 
operate within a specific country (Doidge et al., 2007:2). The nature of CG practices 
prescribed by a country’s legislation directly affects the CG practices companies 
implement. In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act) regulates the 
country’s CG practices, while in South Africa CG practices are regulated by the 
Companies Act. The word “Act” stipulates mandatory compliance (Esser, 2009:189) and 
a strict “comply or else” approach (Andreasson, 2011:664). 
 
In addition to mandatory regulation, various CG codes with a voluntary compliance 
approach have been developed worldwide (IOD, 2009a:5; ECGI, 2013). In South Africa, 
compliance with King III is not enforceable by law (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:506) and is 
based on an “apply or explain” principle (IOD, 2009a:6). Such voluntary compliance 
gives companies the option to improve on mandatory CG practices on the basis of the 
benefits derived from CG practices as opposed to the cost of implementing more CG 
practices (Doidge et al., 2007:34). If more CG practices are implemented, the direct cost 
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will be higher and vice versa. These costs include “out-of-pocket” costs, as well as costs 
associated with management time (Doidge et al., 2007:6). Alternatively, on the basis of 
a cost/benefit analysis a company may decide against implementing any of the CG 
practices contained in these codes. 
 
The adoption of CG practices also depends on factors such as the company’s size, 
complexity, nature (IOD, 2009a:5) and unique characteristics (Eisenhardt, 1989:60). 
These unique company characteristics are derived from the qualities, interdependent 
relationships (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22; Aquilera & Jackson, 2003:447, 459) and 
interactions (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:23) between the company itself and its internal 
and external stakeholders (Fligstein & Freeland, 1995:22; Aquilera & Jackson, 
2003:447, 459). The interaction between the company and its blockholder(s)9 may lead 
to the board being excessively monitored and influenced by these blockholders, leading 
to the board having only indirect power or limiting its freedom (Bhasa, 2004:9; 
Mäntysaari, 2005:151). In such cases, CG practices also have to cater for the needs of 
the minority shareholders to ensure that the company is not being mismanaged by the 
blockholder(s) (Bhasa, 2004:9). However, there is also the possibility that a 
blockholder(s) may improve CG practices by insisting that the company’s disclosure 
practices be improved. Such an improvement would also benefit minority shareholders 
because they will be in a better position to monitor the company’s performance (Doidge 
et al., 2007:6). This influence of a blockholder on the board may also be present in AltX 
listed companies as these companies include family-owned organisations (JSE Limited, 
2010c). Such companies are characterised by the shares being held by the family 
members who manage the company. In such cases, the blockholders may implement 
CG practices that benefit themselves to the potential detriment of the minority 
shareholders. 
 
AltX listed companies are required by law to comply with the Companies Act and 
therefore do not have an option whether or not to implement the CG practices included 
in the Act. Paragraph 21.5(i)–(ii) of the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed 
companies states that such companies are obliged to apply the King III principles 
applicable to boards and directors or to explain the reason(s) for non-application (JSE 
                                            
9
 A blockholder is referred to when ownership is concentrated in a group that holds the majority of 
shares (Bhasa, 2004:9). 
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Limited, 2014b). Apart from the King III principles applicable to boards and directors, 
King III also encourages AltX listed companies to apply all principles included in King III 
(IOD, 2009a:16) or explain the reason(s) for non-application (IOD, 2009a:6). The 
reasons for non-application should, however, be truthful. 
 
It may be contended that an AltX listed company’s price-sensitivity and, thus, the 
implementation of the principles included in King III, depends on its primary goal, that is, 
maximising shareholder wealth in the short term or having the vision to grow its 
business and create wealth in the long term. Arguably, an AltX listed company with a 
short-term goal of growing its business may be more price-sensitive and therefore less 
inclined to implement CG practices, whilst a company that intends to grow its business 
and create wealth in the long term may be less price-sensitive and therefore more 
willing to invest in effective CG practices. Hence, depending on the AltX listed 
company’s primary goal, the cost of implementing the CG principles contained in King III 
may outweigh their associated benefits. 
 
2.2.5 Importance of corporate governance practices 
 
When companies implement good CG practices, including the formation and effective 
functioning of an AC, the number of investors willing to invest in the company increases 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:773; Mckinsey & Company, 2000:3; Reed, 2002:230; Bhasa, 
2004:12; Doidge et al., 2007:2). Consequently, companies are able to gain access to 
more financial resources (BRC, 1999:3, 7–8, 19; Spira, 1999b:270) because CG 
practices provide investor protection (Doidge et al., 2007:6).  
 
Malherbe and Segal (2001:8) state that companies with poor CG practices were more 
affected during the build-up to and during the 1998 worldwide recession. Thus, although 
the recession resulted in a decrease in private capital inflows to all companies, those 
with poor CG practices were more affected (JSE Limited, 2011). However, companies 
can survive such a recession by adopting proper CG practices which will in turn attract 
investors (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2003:72). Consequently, if companies implement 
more stringent CG practices, AltX market capitalisation can be improved (JSE Limited, 
2010b). This implies that an AC, as a component of CG practices, also needs to operate 
more stringently in order to realise its value for the company and its stakeholders. 
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As highlighted in section 2.2.3.2, the primary goal of AltX listed companies differ. One 
AltX listed company might merely be interested in maximising shareholder wealth in the 
short term whilst another may have a long-term vision to grow its business and create 
wealth. What these two types of AltX listed companies have in common is that both are 
interested in the continued existence of their business and in creating wealth (either in 
the short or the long term). Thus, whatever the primary goal of AltX listed companies, it 
is important that they embrace good CG practices, as they will then attract more 
investors (Doidge et al., 2007:2), which would in turn help them achieve their goal. This 
benefit of good CG practices, that is, an increase of the company’s investor pool, is 
emphasised as follows: “If there is a lack of good CG in a market, capital will leave that 
market with the click of a mouse” (IOD, 2002:9).  
 
Furthermore, companies implementing good CG practices are able to borrow money on 
favourable terms (Francis, Hasan & Song, 2012:3). In addition, the AltX market benefits 
companies in the sense that it is an ideal platform for accessing an increased investor 
base and funds are raised by issuing shares on a regulated market (JSE Limited, 
2012b). This market also benefits investors as they are able to diversify their share 
portfolios successfully by investing in various AltX listed companies (Mkhize & Msweli-
Mbanga, 2006:87), although at a higher risk.  
 
CG practices not only hold benefits for the company itself and its investors but also add 
to a country’s economic growth and long term development (Reed, 2002:229; Vaughn & 
Ryan, 2006:504, 506). In South Africa, CG practices not only benefit the companies 
themselves but also the South African economy, because high-growth potential 
companies that require capital have the opportunity to expand their businesses, which 
in turn enhances the economy (Mkhize & Msweli-Mbanga, 2006:87). 
 
An AC, which functions as a value-adding component to the company’s operations, 
plays a vital part in the company’s CG practices (IOD, 2009b:56, par. 1; Mohiuddin & 
Karbhari, 2010:109), in turn benefitting the company and its stakeholders (Vanasco, 
1994:38). This is attributable to the fact that the AC is an impartial body that has the role 
of protecting stakeholders’ interests (Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:99, 112) in order to 
create prosperity for all stakeholders (Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:101). An effective AC 
also adds value to the company and its stakeholders as it reduces the conflicts of 
interest between the principals of the company and its agents (Menon & Williams, 
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1994:137). An AC could also reduce the chances of fraudulent activity in a company by 
introducing a disciplined control environment (NCFFR, 1987:6,  40; Cadbury Report, 
1992:2.1, appendix 4, par. 4(b); Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 2000:443, 
450, 452–453; AC Guide Review Task Force of the HKSA CG Committee, 2002:5).  
 
An effective AC furthermore strengthens stakeholders’ confidence in the financial 
reporting process (Cadbury Report, 1992:2.1, appendix 4, par. 4(h); AC Guide Review 
Task Force of the HKSA CG Committee, 2002:5) by ensuring high quality financial 
reporting (NCFFR, 1987:12, 40; Menon & Williams, 1994:123; AC Guide Review Task 
Force of the HKSA CG Committee, 2002:5; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 2010:113) through 
its nomination of an external auditor, overseeing the external audit process (Menon & 
Williams, 1994:123; Abbott & Parker, 2000:48, 61) and overseeing the actions of 
management and the internal auditors (DeZoort, 1997:208). A value-adding AC also 
creates a platform from which the chief financial officer (CFO) and the external auditor 
may obtain assistance if disputes arise (AC Guide Review Task Force of the HKSA CG 
Committee, 2002:5). In addition, such an AC provides an independent view on company 
matters (AC Guide Review Task Force of the HKSA CG Committee, 2002:5). Finally, 
the presence of an effectively functioning AC guarantees that the company’s capital is 
being used efficiently, which results in a lower cost of capital (BRC, 1999:3, 19). As a 
result of these benefits, the AC has been described as a “striking force” (Islam, Islam, 
Bhattacharjee & Islam, 2010:181) and the “cornerstone of good governance practices” 
(Spira, 2006:180). 
 
An AC can also enhance the board’s performance, helping the board to fulfil its 
oversight responsibilities (Menon & Williams, 1994:123), and increasing the quality of 
the board’s oversight over the financial reporting process (Cadbury Report, 1992:2.1, 
appendix 4, par. 4(a)). Moreover, the board’s chances of facing liability charges (RSA, 
2009:s 77) are reduced by the AC’s active engagement with those present at AC 
meetings (asking probing and challenging questions) (Sommer, 1991:91; Nkonki, 
2014:9). An AC that fulfils its responsibilities effectively positively affects the quality of 
the external audit process because when fraudulent activities are suspected, the AC 
should inform the external auditor. (Such activities may be discovered through the AC’s 
engagement with management and the internal auditors [Sommer, 1991:92] and its 
consistent oversight of management’s implementation of effective governance and 
control mechanisms.) Such actions assist the external auditor to issue a correct audit 
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report (an unmodified or modified audit report which accurately reflects the auditor’s 
opinion on the AFS) (Sommer, 1991:92). However, if rampant fraud exists which is 
unknown to the AC then the external auditor will not enjoy the benefits of such 
information.  
 
Although the importance and associated benefits of the CG practices embraced by a 
company may vary, good CG practices, including an AC that performs its 
responsibilities in a value-adding manner, ultimately protect the interests of all 
stakeholders (DeZoort et al., 2002:42). 
 
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Prior to 1994 and South Africa’s first democratic elections, South African companies 
were run in isolation, mostly insulated from “foreign product competition” (Malherbe & 
Segal, 2001:3). As a result of sanctions, South African companies were prevented from 
playing a role internationally so that South Africa failed to stay abreast of international 
corporate reforms (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:3) which negatively affected the manner in 
which companies were operated (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:505). Such governance 
deficiency also prevented the markets from functioning effectively (Armstrong, Segal & 
Davis, 2005:11). After 1994, South Africa obtained its democratic status, which opened 
doors to participation in the international financial markets. This event characterised 
South Africa as a developing country. Thus, in the face of political uncertainty, 
international investment was sought in order to promote economic growth (West, 
2009:10).  
 
After 1994, certain events called for the revision of CG and AC practices. These events 
included South Africa’s re-entry into the global economy, where foreign investors 
demanded improved CG practices (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:7) which, in turn, 
necessitated South Africa implementing effective CG practices in order to attract 
investors in support of its economic growth (Armstrong et al., 2005:14; West, 2009:11; 
Andreasson, 2011:655). In addition, in the market crisis experienced from 1997 to 1998, 
companies that implemented poor CG practices were more affected than those whose 
CG was effective (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:8). Moreover, the failure on the part of the 
local market to effectively raise capital from new equity issues during 1998, particularly 
for small and medium-sized companies, highlighted the need to modernise the 
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prevailing CG and AC practices. Prospective investors believed particularly in this 
regard that “they [were] unable to assess and monitor the management of these firms” 
(Malherbe & Segal, 2001:8). Lastly, the number of corporate collapses that occurred 
both worldwide and locally (e.g. Masterbond in South Africa), mainly as a result of poor 
CG practices (Task Force Report, 2007:1), added momentum to the updating of CG and 
AC practices. 
 
This section highlights the specific CG model adopted by South Africa and includes a 
discussion of the South African legislation, codes and reports, as well as the listing 
requirements which provide guidance on CG. Throughout this section, reference is 
specifically made to the AC and AltX listed companies. 
 
2.3.1 Corporate governance model 
 
South Africa serves as an example of a country that follows the Anglo-American model 
of CG (owing to South Africa’s historical colonial link with the British) (West, 2006:435), 
although the South African model displays certain features that are not typical of it 
(West, 2006:435, 441; West, 2009:12; Andreasson, 2011:660) and which are the result 
of the country’s unique circumstances. The Anglo-American characteristics which are 
manifested in South Africa’s CG model are, inter alia, that businesses mainly raise their 
funds from the public through the JSE, single-tiered boards are established (West, 
2006:435; West, 2009:11) and banks are involved in these businesses through arms-
length deals (West, 2009:11). In contrast with the Anglo-American model which follows 
a shareholder approach (West, 2006:441; West, 2009:12, 14), King III advocates a 
stakeholder consciousness and responsibility (IOD, 2009a:11–12; Andreasson, 
2011:656). In adopting stakeholder consciousness and responsibility, the model leans 
towards the European model, which recommends a two-tier board that includes 
stakeholders. In order to compensate for not having a two-tiered board (Kakabadse & 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:313), South Africa’s CG practices advocate a single-tiered 
board made up of a majority of independent, non-executive directors (IOD, 2009a:25, 
principle 2.18). The practice of establishing a single-tiered board is also adopted by AltX 
listed companies.  
 
The Anglo-American model is also associated with limited or no interference from the 
government. However, in South Africa, government has intervened in both the labour 
  
30 
and the capital markets through the promulgation of the Employment Equity Act no. 55 
of 1998 and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (West 2006:435,  
440–441). These interventions were deemed necessary to promote the upliftment of 
previously disadvantaged groups (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:511). Similarly, AltX listed 
companies, as South African companies, are mandated by law to comply with 
legislation that focuses on addressing the country’s social challenges. Accordingly, CG 
practices are influenced by a country’s unique circumstances (West, 2006:433), as 
illustrated by South Africa’s “modified” Anglo-American model of CG. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate governance and audit committee practices incorporated into 
legislation 
 
In the past, the Companies Act no. 51 of 1973 (the previous Companies Act) was 
continually updated with various amendments to keep it relevant (Du Plessis, 2012:47). 
These amendments, which were mostly technical in nature (RSA, 2004:12), failed to 
adequately address the responsibilities of directors (RSA, 2004:17; Du Plessis, 
2012:65), shareholder protection (RSA, 2004:15, 19), up-to-date CG practices (RSA, 
2004:13, 19), as well as ethical and social dimensions (RSA, 2004:13). Since the 
advent of South Africa’s democracy, it has been necessary to promote the South 
African economy by encouraging foreign investment. For this reason, it was necessary 
to amend the previous Companies Act to make it “investor friendly” and bring it in line 
with global trends (RSA, 2004:13). The previous Companies Act also contained 
numerous onerous and costly requirements while the value of these requirements for 
shareholders, the market and companies remained questionable (RSA, 2004:15). 
Moreover, such requirements hampered the ability of small entrepreneurial businesses 
to enter the market to stimulate the South African economy (RSA, 2004:14). As AltX 
listed companies can be classified as small to medium entrepreneurial businesses (JSE 
Limited, 2012c), it implies that the previous Companies Act prevented these high-growth 
potential businesses from being registered as publicly traded companies to promote the 
South African economy and increase work opportunities. Furthermore, the previous 
Companies Act failed to take cognisance of all stakeholders in line with the 1996 
Constitution (RSA, 2004:25) as it focused on shareholders only (RSA, 2004:24). 
Therefore, the need to address these deficiencies impelled the DTI to develop the 
current Companies Act, which was approved by Parliament in 2008 (Du Plessis, 
2012:50) and became effective on 1 May 2011 (RSA, 2009:3). 
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However, the previous Companies Act’s approach to stakeholders has only been 
partially addressed by the current Companies Act. Certain sections of the current 
Companies Act still use terminology that raises questions as to whether stakeholders 
should be considered. Section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act states that directors 
should make decisions “in the best interests of the company” (RSA, 2009), but the Act 
refrains from defining “the company” (Muswaka, 2012:4). In terms of common law, the 
phrase should be interpreted as the shareholders of the company only (Muswaka, 
2012:7). In addition, sections 20(4), 162(2) and 165(2) of the Companies Act also imply 
that a shareholder approach is followed (Muswaka, 2012:5–6). By contrast, the 
enlightened shareholder approach is recognised in sections 144, 145 and 218(2) of the 
Act (Muswaka, 2012:6), while section 7 of the Act promotes that the interests and rights 
of other stakeholder groups should also be considered (Muswaka, 2012:5). The 
Companies Act’s approach is therefore open to interpretation as the shareholder, 
enlightened shareholder and stakeholder approach are all referred to (Muswaka, 
2012:5–7). In light of the labour unrest and strike action in various industries in South 
Africa (e.g. teachers of the Department of Basic Education, workers in the 
telecommunication industry) (Sukhdeo, 2013; Sithole, 2015), companies have to take 
cognisance of the stakeholders that could negatively affect their business operations 
and affect value creation for shareholders. It can therefore be argued that an 
enlightened shareholder or stakeholder approach should be embraced by South African 
companies and that the Companies Act should also be interpreted in light of these 
approaches. 
 
In addressing the deficiencies highlighted by the DTI in the outdated CG practices in the 
previous Companies Act, the purpose of the current Companies Act is to promote 
transparency and increase the standard of CG practices implemented by companies 
(RSA, 2009:s 7(b)(iii); Muswaka, 2012:4). Furthermore, a chapter dealing with CG 
practices was introduced in the Act (RSA, 2009:ch 2, part F; Muswaka, 2012:4), whilst 
another chapter describes the options and rights available to shareholders and 
stakeholders, namely, financiers and employees (RSA, 2009:ch 7; Muswaka, 2012:4).  
 
The AC, as a component of CG practices, was addressed in the previous Companies 
Act and was incorporated into the current Companies Act with minor changes (the 
previous Companies Act required a minimum of two independent, non-executive 
directors on the AC (RSA, 2006a:ss 269A, 270A), whilst the current Companies Act 
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increases the required AC members to three (RSA, 2009:s 94)). Section 94(7) of the 
current Companies Act includes mandatory responsibilities that should be performed by 
an AC in order to fulfil its “custodial” role with regard to stakeholders and its “supporter” 
role in terms of the board. Certain of the composition requirements and responsibilities 
included in the current Companies Act have also been included in King III. 
 
The composition requirements for the AC, in terms of the current Companies Act, which 
are aligned to the King III principles and/or recommended practices, are as follows: 
 
 At least three members should serve on the AC (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended 
practice 3.2.2; RSA, 2009:s 94(2)). 
 All the members of the AC should be independent (IOD, 2009a:22, principle 2.6), 
non-executive directors of the company (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 
3.2.1; RSA, 2009:s 94(4)) and may not be involved in the day-to-day 
management of the company or have been so involved at any time during the 
previous financial year (RSA, 2009:s 94(4)(b)(i)) or a prescribed officer or full-
time employee of the company, nor should they have been so employed during 
the previous three financial years (RSA, 2009:s 94(4)(b)(ii)). 
 The minister may prescribe minimum qualifications and experience that the AC 
as a group should possess in order to effectively fulfil its responsibilities (RSA, 
2009:s 94(5)). These prescriptions were issued in a 2011 government regulation 
which states that at least one-third of the members of an AC must have 
academic qualifications or experience in economics, law, CG, finance, 
accounting, commerce, industry, public affairs or human resources (RSA, 
2011:51). In cases where the AC does not have the skills or experience to deal 
with a matter, the board should approve the AC obtaining the services of a 
specialist or consultant (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.6; RSA, 
2009:s 94(11)).  
 
In terms of the current Companies Act the responsibilities of the AC, which are aligned 
to the King III principles and/or recommended practices, include the following: 
 
 To nominate the external auditor for appointment and verify the independence of 
the external auditor (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practices 3.9.1, 3.9.3; RSA, 
2009:s 94(7)(a)), determine the audit fee and scope (terms of reference) of the 
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external auditor’s appointment (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 3.9.2; 
RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(b)), determine the nature and extent of non-audit services to 
be rendered by the external auditor (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 
3.9.4; RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(d)) and pre-approve any non-audit services rendered 
by the external auditor (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 3.9.4; RSA, 
2009:s 94(7)(e)). 
 To include a report in the AFS or report to shareholders at the annual general 
meeting (AGM) on the manner in which the AC fulfilled its responsibilities, the 
independence of the external auditor and the quality of the AFS, the 
appropriateness of the accounting practices adopted by the company, as well as 
whether the company has implemented suitable internal financial control 
measures (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.4.2; IOD, 2009a:35, 
principle 3.10, recommended practice 3.10.2–3.10.2.4; IOD, 2009b:67, par. 84; 
RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(f)). 
 To deal appropriately with complaints received from individuals within or outside 
the company, which may include queries relating to accounting matters (RSA, 
2009:s 94(7)(g)). 
 To provide suggestions to the board on financial matters (such as accounting 
policies and financial control) concerning the company (RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(h)). 
 
The board can also allocate additional functions to the AC over and above the 
responsibilities prescribed by legislation (RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(i)).  
 
The current Companies Act brought South Africa’s CG practices in line with 
international requirements (West, 2009:15). As AltX listed companies trade publicly, 
they are mandated to comply with the AC composition requirements and fulfil the 
responsibilities in terms of the Companies Act. AC members should have adequate 
knowledge of these responsibilities and they should be taken seriously and be filled with 
enthusiasm and commitment (RSA, 2009:s 76(3)(c)), as members could be held liable if 
not acting in the best interests of the company (RSA, 2009:s 77). 
 
2.3.3 Corporate governance practices incorporated into CG codes and reports 
 
In South Africa, three versions of a voluntary CG code and/or report have been issued 
to date, namely, the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 1994 
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(King I) (§ 2.3.3.1), King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002 
(King II) (§ 2.3.3.2) and King III (§ 2.3.3.3), with each new version improving on the CG 
practices included in the preceding report. The Institute of Directors (IOD) took the 
initiative and issued the first CG report, namely, King I (Rossouw et al., 2002:296), as 
well as the subsequent revised King codes and/or reports (King II and King III) (Vaughn 
& Ryan, 2006:506). In developing/reviewing the three King codes and/or reports, the 
IOD consulted multiple documents (e.g. documents issued by the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors), reports (e.g. the Treadway Report of 1987, the Blue Ribbon 
Reports of 1996 and 1998 issued in the USA, UK reports such as the Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance [the Cadbury report] 
issued in 1992, and the Greenbury Report of 1995) and websites in order to produce 
CG codes and/or reports in line with international trends (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002:309–310). This therefore implies that CG is not a static concept as 
the improvement of CG practices is an active and never-ending process (Vaughn & 
Ryan, 2006:510) which is also demonstrated by the intended release of King IV in 2016 
(IOD, 2015b). Moreover, the principles contained in King III have been incorporated into 
the JSE listing requirements (§ 2.3.4). 
 
Furthermore, the influence of the King codes and/or reports on South African law cannot 
be underestimated as the rollout of these codes and reports mobilised the introduction 
and revision of a number of Acts to incorporate CG aspects (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002:307); for example, the Public Finance Management Act no. 1 of 1999 
(PFMA), the Municipal Finance Management Act no. 53 of 2003 (MFMA) (Kakabadse & 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:307–308) and the Insider Trader Act no. 135 of 1998 
(Malherbe & Segal, 2001:64). In addition, the previous Companies Act was revised to 
include certain King II recommendations, leading to the promulgation of the current 
Companies Act (Engelbrecht, 2010:30).  
 
2.3.3.1 King I 
 
Various driving forces were behind the issuing of King I, which came into effect from 
November 1994 (Armstrong et al., 2005:9). These driving forces included, inter alia, the 
1992 Cadbury report in the UK (Esser, 2009:189; West, 2009:11), the increasing 
momentum of CG worldwide (West, 2009:11), and South Africa’s democracy and re-
entry in the global environment. 
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King I contained a number of recommendations which represented high standards for 
CG practices (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:506). Important areas which were embraced in 
King I were the role of the board (Armstrong et al., 2005:9; West, 2009:11) in terms of 
its accountability and its responsibilities (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:506) and the protection 
of shareholders (West, 2009:11). King I mentioned non-financial matters and the role of 
stakeholders (Armstrong et al., 2005:9; West, 2009:11) by referring to the triple bottom 
line approach and the inclusive approach (Esser, 2009:193). The triple bottom line 
approach advocates that a company should consider stakeholders in three categories: 
firstly, the effect of its products or services on the environment, secondly, its relationship 
with the public and, lastly, economic aspects of the company’s operations (IOD, 2002:9, 
par. 17). The inclusive approach goes further than the triple bottom line approach by 
stating that a company should define its purpose and values and communicate these to 
the company’s stakeholders beyond those already identified in the three categories 
referred to previously (Esser, 2009:193).  
 
2.3.3.2 King II 
 
The revision of King I led to the issuing of King II, which was effective from March 2002 
(Armstrong et al., 2005:16). A need to revise King I emanated from matters such as the 
following:  
 
 CG was refined worldwide (Rossouw et al., 2002:299; West, 2006:436; West, 
2009:12). 
 South African corporate collapses occurred that related to shortcomings in King I. 
These corporate collapses resulted in a decrease in shareholder confidence 
(Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:306; Armstrong et al., 2005:15; West, 
2009:12). 
 There was a need to elaborate on the interests of stakeholders, to incorporate 
areas relating to risk and internal controls assurance and to provide suggestions 
to put the code into effect (Armstrong et al., 2005:15–16). 
 Institutional investors insisted on improved CG practices (Rossouw et al., 
2002:299). 
 The South African public demanded improved CG practices deriving from the 
country’s transformation drive (Rossouw et al., 2002:298). 
 The promotion of growth for the African continent (Rossouw et al., 2002:299). 
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King II repeats an extensive amount from the preceding report. However, it also 
includes detailed guidance on the manner in which non-financial areas should be dealt 
with and disclosed and gives guidelines on conforming to and enforcing corporate 
guidelines, prompting shareholders to take an active part in the running of the company, 
encouraging the media to take part in exposing companies which fail to incorporate CG 
practices, as well as keeping a record of directors with criminal offences to enable their 
disqualification from further directorships (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:310–
311). King II also introduced sustainability reporting in addition to financial reporting 
(West, 2006:436; IOD, 2009a:13; West, 2009:12) and a company’s relationships with its 
stakeholders (West, 2009:12). Like King I, King II also follows an enlightened 
shareholder approach (§ 2.2.3.2) and refers to the triple bottom line and the inclusive 
approach (§ 2.3.3.1) (Esser, 2009:193). 
 
2.3.3.3 King III 
 
The current CG code and report, namely King III, came into effect in March 2010 (IOD 
2009a:17). Its release is attributable to the renewed focus on sustainability (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2009), international changes in CG (E&Y, 2009:Introduction, par. 2; PwC, 
2009:2), the rising expectations of stakeholders (E&Y, 2009:Introduction, par. 2), the 
issuing of the current Companies Act10 and to bring King III in line with other legislation 
such as the Auditing Profession Act no. 26 of 2005 (Auditing Profession Act) (West, 
2009:15). To illustrate: sections 45(1) and 45(2) of the Auditing Profession Act refer to 
the duty of a registered auditor to report on irregularities (RSA, 2006b). Reportable 
irregularities are also now referred to in King III (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 
3.9.5). 
 
King III is similar to King I and II in the sense that directors are accountable to company 
shareholders but should also act responsibly towards the company’s stakeholders 
(West, 2006:437; Deloitte & Touche; 2009; Esser, 2009:197), thus also following an 
enlightened shareholder approach. The approach of King I, II and III differs from that of 
the Companies Act as the latter is unclear on whether a shareholder, enlightened 
shareholder or stakeholder approach is preferred (§  2.3.2). 
                                            
10
 Certain King II recommendations have been excluded from King III, as these were included in the 
current Companies Act (Deloitte & Touche, 2009; Engelbrecht, 2010:30). 
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King II (IOD, 2002:10–11, par. 18) refers to certain characteristics of good CG practices 
which have not been included and/or clearly described in King III. However, King III 
(Esser, 2009:191; IOD, 2009a:9–10, 13) includes additional characteristics not 
described in King II which companies are encouraged to embrace. CG characteristics 
can be categorised as innovation and collaboration, social transformation, sustainability, 
and leadership: 
 
Innovation and collaboration – Companies should be operating in an innovative and 
collaborative manner. That means that companies should stand together in adopting 
innovative ways of achieving results, taking into consideration the impact on society, the 
environment and the economy (IOD, 2009a:13). 
 
Social transformation – Previously disadvantaged people should be provided with 
opportunities to improve the company and society (IOD, 2009a:13). 
 
Sustainability – A company should be operated in a sustainable manner (IOD, 
2009a:10) by considering its impact on society, the environment and the economy (IOD, 
2009a:12–13). From an ethical and financial perspective, it is essential for a company in 
the 21st century to conduct sustainable operations (IOD, 2009a:9). Furthermore, 
companies should integrate their sustainability reporting with their financial reporting. 
This sustainability reporting should include information about the company’s impact on 
society, the environment and the economy. The board should also provide information 
on ways in which the company can enhance the positive aspects of the business and 
mitigate the negative aspects (IOD, 2009a:12–13). 
 
Leadership – The leaders of companies should be independent (IOD, 2002:11, par. 
18.3; IOD, 2009a:25, principle 2.18), disciplined (IOD, 2002:10, par. 18.1), responsible, 
accountable, fair and transparent in fulfilling their responsibilities (IOD, 2009a:9). These 
leadership qualities can be explained as follows: 
 
Independence (IOD, 2009a:25, principle 2.18) – Independence refers to the 
systems that management has put into place to minimise or avoid conflicts of 
interest (IOD, 2002:11, par. 18.3). 
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Discipline – Discipline refers to the fact that a company’s senior management 
should demonstrate a commitment to behave in a way that is universally accepted 
as being correct and proper (IOD, 2002:10, par. 18.1).  
 
Responsibility – Responsibility refers to management’s responsibility for the 
company’s assets and to perform its responsibilities in an ethical and sustainable 
way (IOD, 2009b:21, par. 14.1) and the punishment of mismanagement. It further 
implies acting responsibly in respect of the legitimate interests of the company’s 
stakeholders (IOD, 2002:11, par. 18.5). 
 
Accountability – Accountability refers to the mechanisms that allow a company’s 
board, which acts as the decision-makers in a company (IOD, 2002:11, par. 18.4), 
to substantiate its decisions and behaviour to its shareholders and stakeholders 
(IOD, 2009b:21, par. 14.2). These mechanisms include the board’s duty to issue 
AFS and an integrated report. Such mechanisms provide investors and other 
stakeholders with the opportunity to question a company’s decision-makers (IOD, 
2002:11, par. 18.4) about the financial decisions taken, sustainability and value 
creation. 
 
Fairness – Fairness refers to taking the reasonable interests of every one of the 
company’s stakeholders into account (IOD, 2009b:21, par. 14.3).  
 
Transparency – Transparency refers to the ease with which stakeholders can 
obtain information about a company’s performance and sustainability to enable 
them to fully understand the manner in which a business is operated (IOD, 
2009b:21, par. 14.4). 
 
The foundation of good CG practices in a company revolves around the adoption of the 
characteristics associated with good CG (IOD, 2009a:9). As the board is regarded as 
the guardian of CG (IOD, 2009a:21, principle 2.1), the leadership qualities associated 
with good CG practices should be adopted by individual board members and specifically 
by the AC’s chairperson who leads and represents the AC. 
 
Apart from the characteristics of good CG described in King III, King III also improved 
on the preceding King II in other areas, for example: 
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 King III includes a code which stipulates the principles of CG and a report which 
deals with recommendations for companies in relation to each of the principles 
included in the code. These recommendations are based on best practice 
guidelines (IOD, 2009a:19).  
 King III’s reference methods, its structure and the practical guidance offered are 
an improvement on King II. Its reference to stakeholders is dealt with in a more 
organised and structured manner than King II (Esser, 2009:196). Also, the 
structure of King III is more user-friendly than King II, which was criticised by 
Esser (2009:195–196) for dealing with the same concept in a number of 
paragraphs. Accordingly, King III refers to a principle and then explains the 
principle. Furthermore, King II provides limited practical guidance on the 
protection of a company’s stakeholders; this is in contrast to a specific chapter of 
King III which was dedicated to stakeholder relationships (Esser, 2009:196; IOD, 
2009b:99–106). Practice notes were also published for King III (IOD, 2012). 
 King III builds on the practices of King II (E&Y, 2009:Introduction, par. 3), 
requiring companies to integrate their sustainability reporting in their financial 
reporting, while King II merely recommended sustainability reporting in addition 
to financial reporting (IOD, 2009a:13). 
 King I was only applicable to companies with securities listed on the JSE, banks, 
financial and insurance entities as defined in South African financial services 
legislation, public sector entities and agencies that fell under the Public Entities 
Act no. 93 of 1992 (Public Entities Act), as well as large unlisted public 
companies (IOD, 1994:5, par. 2). King II followed the same application as King I, 
except that public sector entities and agencies that fell under the Public Entities 
Act were replaced by those that fell under the PFMA and the MFMA (IOD, 
2002:20, par. 1.1). In addition, King II excluded large unlisted public entities as 
an affected party. In contrast with King I and II, King III is applicable to all entities, 
notwithstanding the manner and form of their incorporation (IOD, 2009a:16). 
 King III includes additional principles and recommendations such as alternative 
dispute resolution (E&Y, 2009:Introduction, par. 3). 
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2.3.3.4 Audit committee practices incorporated into King III 
 
In contrast with the Companies Act, which describes the mandatory AC composition 
and responsibilities of particular companies only (public companies, state-owned 
companies or other companies in terms of their memorandum of incorporation) (RSA, 
2009:s 94), King III recommends voluntary principles (§ 2.3.3.5) relating to the AC. 
These principles include the recommendation for all companies to appoint an AC (IOD, 
2009a:16) and contain additional general and composition recommendations, as well as 
the responsibilities that an AC should follow.  
 
The following general and composition recommendations are included in King III, in 
addition to the requirements included in the Companies Act: 
 
 The AC and its members should be evaluated on an annual basis (IOD, 
2009a:28, principle 2.22). 
 The AC should be chaired by an independent, non-executive director (IOD, 
2009a:32, principle 3.3) who should participate in the setting and agreeing of the 
AC’s agenda (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.3.2). 
 The chairperson of the board should not be a member or the chairperson of the 
AC (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.2.3). 
 The AC, as a group, should consist of members with the qualifications, 
knowledge and experience required to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities (IOD, 
2009a:31, recommended practice 3.2.4). 
 AC members should keep abreast of the latest developments in order to maintain 
their skill levels (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.20.4; IOD, 2009a:32, 
recommended practice 3.2.5). 
 
While AC responsibilities are stipulated in the Companies Act, further responsibilities 
are included in King III: 
 
 Review the integrated report (IOD, 2009a:32, principle 3.4). 
 Ensure that the company follows a combined assurance model in order to identify 
and deal appropriately with significant risks faced by the company (IOD, 
2009a:33, principle 3.5; recommended practice 3.5.1). The AC should ensure 
that the assurance providers complement each other; in other words their efforts 
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should not overlap (Nkonki, 2014:45), and there is no oversight in identifying and 
dealing with significant risks. 
 Ensure that the company’s finance function is of a high standard in terms of 
resources, qualifications and experience (IOD, 2009a:33, principle 3.6). 
 Oversee the internal audit function (IOD, 2009a:33, principle 3.7) by being 
involved in the appointment, dismissal and performance review of the chief audit 
executive (CAE) (IOD, 2009a:33, recommended practice 3.7.1). The AC should 
also review and approve the internal audit plan (IOD, 2009a:33, recommended 
practice 3.7.2) and ensure that the internal audit function is exposed to an 
independent quality review to assess its effectiveness (IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended practice 3.7.3). 
 Play a role in the company’s risk management processes with specific reference 
to financial reporting risks, internal financial controls designed to mitigate risks, 
as well as fraud risks and information technology (IT) risks which relate to 
financial reporting (IOD, 2009a:34, principle 3.8, recommended practice 3.8.2–
3.8.2.4).  
 Keep up-to-date on the reportable irregularities recognised and reported on by 
the external auditor (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 3.9.5) and review the 
quality of the external audit process (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 
3.9.6). 
 Use the integrated report to provide information about the AC’s role, composition, 
meetings and activities (IOD, 2009a:35, recommended practice 3.10.3).  
 
AC responsibilities should be included in a charter (pre-approved by the board) (IOD, 
2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.3) and fulfilled, inter alia, during the AC meetings, 
which should be conducted at least twice a year (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended 
practice 3.1.4). Furthermore, to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities the AC is required to 
meet with the internal and external auditor at least once during the year without the 
presence of management (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.5). 
 
2.3.3.5 Voluntary compliance 
 
The previous King codes and/or reports (King I and King II) were voluntary, which is in 
line with the current King III, which is also voluntary in nature. Therefore, on its own 
King III cannot assure high standards of CG in South Africa (Kakabadse & Korac-
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Kakabadse, 2002:309; Armstrong et al., 2005:22–23; Esser, 2009:189). The “apply or 
explain” principle it adopts (IOD, 2009a:6) requires directors to explain the manner in 
which the principles and recommendations included in it have been applied and, in the 
case of non-application, to explain why the recommendation was applied differently or 
to provide reasons for not following such a recommendation (IOD, 2009a:6). The 
manner in which a company implements CG practices is influenced by the board’s 
awareness of the benefits of CG practices for the company, the leadership qualities of a 
company’s management, as well as the level of participation by shareholders and 
stakeholders in the company’s affairs (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002:311).  
 
There are mixed perceptions on whether King III should be mandatory or voluntary. 
Mervin King (chairman of the King Committee on CG in South Africa, who compiled 
King I, King II and King III) and a number of business leaders have reiterated their 
concerns about “overregulating” companies by requiring mandatory compliance with 
King III (Andreasson, 2011:663–664). According to Mervin King, mandatory compliance 
will merely result in a “box-ticking” exercise without due regard to the quality of CG 
practices being adopted (Hogg, 2006). Such an exercise may also result in the 
company being too focused on the compliance aspect11 which may reduce the time 
being spent on measures to increase the company’s performance (IOD, 2009a:5). 
Furthermore, many business leaders claim, and King III states, that mandatory 
compliance could ultimately impose unaffordable extra costs on companies (IOD, 
2009a:5; Andreasson, 2011:661). Nevertheless, regulators and politicians may welcome 
a mandatory approach as a result of their priorities, which are concerned with the 
upliftment of society, because King III specifically addresses the influence of companies’ 
operations on their stakeholders (Andreasson, 2011:662). 
 
Although King III follows a voluntary approach, the JSE includes the application of the 
King III principles in its listing requirements for companies listed on the main board 
(§ 2.3.4). Furthermore, the Companies Act states that a director should act in the best 
interests of the company and could be held liable if not conforming to this requirement 
(RSA, 2009:ss 76(3), 77). King III, although voluntary in nature, can thus be a valuable 
source, providing directors with best practice guidelines for complying with the 
                                            
11
 For example: The US enacted the SOX Act to improve the reliability of financial reporting, but such 
measures were proven ineffective as the global financial crisis of 2008 occurred because the AFS of 
large financial institutions were erroneous (Leech & Leech, 2011:296). 
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requirements stipulated in the Companies Act (Deloitte & Touche, 2009) and, hence, 
reduce their liability risk. 
 
2.3.4 Corporate governance and audit committee practices incorporated into 
listing requirements 
 
In 1995, the JSE listing requirements were revised to include the requirement for listed 
companies to indicate the extent to which they have followed the recommendations of 
King I in their annual reports (Malherbe & Segal, 2001:59; Armstrong et al., 2005:15). 
The listing requirements were again amended to bring them in line with King II (IOD, 
2009a:5). A further amendment occurred when King III was issued, when the JSE once 
again updated CG practices to include a requirement for listed companies to apply the 
principles contained in King III or explain the reason(s) for non-application (Andreasson, 
2011:663; JSE Limited, 2012a:par. 8.63(a),  21.5). The latest revision of the JSE listing 
requirements was made during 2013 and took effect from 30 September 2014 (JSE 
Limited, 2014a:1). This amendment was made to enable companies that were already 
listed in Australia, London, New York and Toronto to list faster and more easily on the 
JSE’s main board or on the AltX. The administrative process for applying for listing was 
consequently relaxed (Finweek, 2014). This amended process also resulted in the 
application or explanation (in the case of non-application) of AC principles in terms of 
King III no longer being mandated for AltX listed companies. Arguably, this amendment 
was done to encourage business development (particularly for small and medium-sized 
companies) and improve the South African economy. Further investigation into the 
impact of this amendment relating to AC practices on business development and the 
South African economy could be a possible area for further research. 
 
In terms of CG practices (which include AC practices), the latest JSE listing 
requirements, which are applicable to main board companies, remain unchanged with 
companies still being required to apply the principles contained in King III or to explain 
why they are not doing so (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 8.63(a)). These listing requirements 
also include a number of CG stipulations for which companies are not given the option 
of non-application. These include the following:  
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 The board should be appointed through a formal process involving the 
nomination committee if necessary (IOD, 2009a:26, recommended practices 
2.18.7, 2.19.1; JSE, 2014b:par. 3.84(a)). 
 The board should consist of members with balanced power and authority levels 
(IOD, 2009a:25, principle 2.18; JSE, 2014b:par. 3.84(b)). 
 The company should appoint a chief executive officer (CEO) and a chairperson, 
with these positions being held by two different individuals (IOD, 2009a:24, 
principle 2.16; JSE, 2014b:par. 3.84(c)). 
 An AC and a remuneration committee must be appointed in compliance with 
King III and, if necessary, a risk and nomination committee as well. In addition, 
the composition of these committees, a description of their mandates, the 
number of meetings held and other important information about these 
committees must be disclosed in the company’s annual report (IOD, 2009a:29, 
recommended practice 2.23.6; IOD, 2009a:31, principle 3.1; IOD, 2009a:35, 
recommended practice 3.10.3; JSE, 2014b:par. 3.84(d)). 
 The AC must ensure that the CFO is competent to perform his/her 
responsibilities and report annually to the company’s shareholders in the annual 
report that this duty has been duly performed (IOD, 2009a:33, principle 3.6; JSE, 
2014b:par. 3.84(h)). 
 
In addition to the CG stipulations listed above, further CG practices not covered by 
King III were introduced. These include the following: 
 
 A curriculum vitae (CV) of each director must be provided in the case of a new 
listing. Where a director stands for re-election or election at a general meeting or 
AGM, the director’s CV should accompany the notice of such meeting (JSE 
Limited, 2014b:par. 3.84(e)). 
 Each director should be categorised as executive, non-executive or independent 
(JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 3.84(f)). 
 If motivated by the AC, a listed company may request the JSE’s approval for its 
executive CFO to be appointed on a part-time basis only (JSE Limited, 
2014b:par. 3.84(g)). 
 The board should evaluate the competence, experience and qualifications of the 
company secretary on an annual basis and report to its shareholders, via the 
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annual report, that this duty has been successfully performed (JSE Limited, 
2014b:par. 3.84(i)). 
 Where the company secretary fails to maintain an arms-length relationship with 
the company and/or is a director of the company, the board should clearly 
substantiate, through the company’s annual report, that the company secretary is 
still able to perform his/her CG role effectively (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 3.84(j)).  
 
The current JSE listing requirements also include additional responsibilities for the AC: 
 
 The AC should only recommend that an auditor be appointed (at the AGM) if 
such an auditor is listed on the JSE list of auditors (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 
3.86). 
 The chairperson of the AC and the board should sign a letter stating that they are 
satisfied with the quality and completeness of the financial information and that 
the AC has recommended that the information be approved by the board. This 
letter should be submitted to the JSE before a company will be listed (JSE 
Limited, 2014b:par. 16.10(u)(i) and (ii)). 
 The chairperson of the AC must approve the working capital pack prepared by 
the CFO (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 25.2(a)). This pack includes documents such 
as a working capital forecast for the next 12 months, a review of cash flow 
projections, future commitments, contingent liabilities and the statement of 
financial position borrowings (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 25.4). 
 
It is apparent that the JSE regards CG as an important area that should form part of 
every company listed on the JSE’s main board. This is illustrated by its reference to 
King III, and the inclusion of additional CG requirements and AC responsibilities. 
 
In terms of CG practices (which include AC practices) for AltX listed companies, the 
current JSE listing requirements have been relaxed in this regard, as reference is now 
only made to one CG element of King III. These listing requirements state that AltX 
listed companies should include a narrative statement regarding the manner in which 
they apply the principles applicable to boards and directors (IOD, 2009a:21–31, 
principles 2.1–2.27), detailing the reasons for every case of non-compliance (JSE 
Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(i)–(ii)). Such narrative statement should enable shareholders 
to assess the manner in which the principles have been applied. Thus, no reference is 
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made to the principles and recommended practices concerning ethical leadership and 
corporate citizenship, the AC’s composition and responsibilities, the governance of risk 
and IT, compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards, internal audit, governing 
stakeholder relationships, integrated reporting and disclosure as contained in King III 
(IOD, 2009a:19–21, governance element 1; IOD, 2009a:31–49, governance elements 
3–9). In other words, where the previous JSE listing requirements for AltX listed 
companies referred to the mandatory appointment of an AC and that the AC principles 
included in King III should be followed or its non-application thereof explained (JSE 
Limited, 2012a:par. 3.84(d), 21.5(i)), the latest listing requirements relating to ACs are 
less prescriptive. 
 
Only one of the main board’s JSE listing requirements that relate to the AC’s 
responsibilities is similar to the listing requirements for AltX listed companies. This 
responsibility implies that the chairpersons of the AC and the board should sign a letter 
stating that they are satisfied with the quality and completeness of the financial 
information and that the AC has recommended that the board approve the information. 
This letter must be submitted to the JSE before a company will be listed (JSE Limited, 
2014b:par. 16.10(u)(i)–(ii)), 21.36). 
 
The JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies also contain two additional 
requirements for ACs. The first requirement states that the company’s designated 
advisor must be invited to and should attend all AC meetings as an observer and must 
support the AC to ensure the company’s compliance with the JSE listing requirements 
(applicable to AltX listed companies) for one of the following periods (depending which 
period is the longest): for the first year after the AltX listed company has been listed; or 
until the date of the first publication of the AltX listed company’s AFS. Despite this 
regulation, a designated advisor can continue to attend AC meetings if he/she deems it 
necessary (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(iii)). Secondly, a company applying to be listed 
on the AltX must appoint an executive CFO and, in addition, the AC of the company 
must submit written confirmation to the JSE that the CFO has appropriate skills and 
experience to fulfil his/her responsibilities (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.3(e)). 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The AC concept is embedded in CG practices. Therefore, the definition and origin of CG 
were discussed (§§ 2.2.1–2.2.2). The implementation of CG practices depends on the 
theory being applied by a company, namely, shareholder, enlightened shareholder or 
stakeholder theory. The researcher consequently argued that the theory adopted by 
AltX listed companies depends on the ultimate goal of the company. Such a company 
could merely be interested in maximising shareholder wealth in the short term, or it 
could have a long-term vision to grow its business and create wealth. Where maximum 
shareholder wealth in the short term is the primary goal, companies would focus 
primarily on shareholders and the interests of stakeholders that play an instrumental 
role in increasing shareholder wealth. Such AltX listed companies would therefore 
embrace enlightened shareholder theory. In terms of companies with the main goal of 
growing their businesses in the long term, it was argued that maximum growth and 
wealth can be achieved in the long run by considering the interests of all stakeholders 
during the companies’ decision-making processes and business operations. Thus, 
these companies would adopt stakeholder theory (§ 2.2.3.2). However, all AltX listed 
companies are mandated by the Companies Act to take the interests of a number of 
stakeholders into account during their operations. 
 
The influence of a blockholder(s) on the board may also be an issue in AltX listed 
companies as these companies include companies owned by families. Family-owned 
businesses are characterised by shares being held by family members who also 
manage the company. Because these family members act on the board of the company 
they may implement CG practices that are to their own advantage, possibly to the 
detriment of minority shareholders (§ 2.2.4). 
 
CG practices (including AC composition requirements and responsibilities) applicable to 
AltX listed companies include mandatory compliance with the Companies Act (§ 2.3.2), 
while the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies state that companies are 
obliged to apply King III principles applicable to boards and directors (which includes the 
appointment of an independent AC) unless they provide a truthful explanation for non-
application (§ 2.3.4). Whether or not an AltX listed company applies the remainder of 
King III’s recommended principles (§ 2.3.3.4) on an “apply” or “explain” basis (§ 2.3.3.5) 
may depend on a cost/benefit analysis. This relates to companies’ price-sensitivity and 
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their primary goal, namely, maximising shareholder wealth in the short term or growing 
their business and creating wealth in the long term. It was argued that an AltX listed 
company with a short-term goal of growing its business may be more price-sensitive 
and therefore less inclined to implement CG practices, whilst a company intending to 
grow its business and create wealth in the long term may be less price-sensitive and 
therefore willing to invest more in good CG practices (§ 2.2.4). Despite these 
arguments, AltX listed companies that embrace good CG practices attract more 
investors, enhance their survival potential and stimulate their short or long term growth 
potential. Furthermore, both the company and its stakeholders benefit when the AC 
fulfils its responsibilities effectively (§ 2.2.5). 
 
The requirements and practices detailed in the Companies Act (§ 2.3.2), King III (§ 
2.3.3.3) and the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (§ 2.3.4) provide the 
AC with the foundation for establishing itself as a value-adding component of the 
company in terms of its CG practices. Such a foundation should, however, be 
complemented by additional attributes that should be adopted by an AC. Chapter 3 will 
focus on the attributes that contribute to an understanding of the way in which the AC 
adds value to an AltX listed company and its stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ATTRIBUTES INFLUENCING THE VALUE ADDED BY AN AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter 2 the definition and history of CG were discussed. CG models and practices 
and the importance of implementing CG practices were dealt with. Chapter 2 also 
explained the CG model adopted in South Africa and highlighted the CG practices 
(which includes AC practices) for AltX listed companies as laid down by the Companies 
Act, the JSE listing requirements and King III.  
 
The mere formation of an AC does not guarantee that it will add value to the company 
and its stakeholders (Sommer, 1991:91; Menon & Williams, 1994:124; Pucheta-
Martínez & De Fuentes, 2007:1407; Chan & Li, 2008:17; Lin et al., 2008:722; Marx 
2008:205; Nkonki, 2014:13). Thus, before understanding the value an AC may hold, the 
attributes influencing the value added by an AC will be identified and explored. This will 
provide a theoretical framework for investigating the way in which the AC of a specific 
AltX listed company adds value to the company and its stakeholders. As such, the 
purpose of chapter 3 is to identify and explore the attributes that should be considered 
in order to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed company, as an 
example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed company, adds value 
to the company and its stakeholders. This will be done on the basis of a review of the 
legislation, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies, codes and reports, 
and scholarly literature. Once identified, these attributes will form a theoretical 
framework consisting of three components that influence the value added by an AC. 
These components are the characteristics of AC members (§  3.2), the fulfilment of AC 
responsibilities through optimised activities (§  3.3), and the fulfilment of AC 
responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships with the board and information 
providers (§  3.4). The value that each attribute adds to the company and its 
stakeholders will also be dealt with. The theoretical framework for an AC is set out in 
figure 3.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1   Theoretical framework for an AC 
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3.2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
 
The characteristics of AC members influence the amount of value the AC adds to the 
company and its stakeholders. These characteristics include the independence of AC 
members, and their qualifications and experience, the leadership qualities of the AC 
chairperson, and the number of AC members who serve on the AC.  
 
3.2.1 Independence 
 
An AC that consists of independent members is viewed as value-adding (DeZoort et al., 
2002:42, 43; IOD, 2009b:56, par. 1) because an AC’s independence influences the 
value added by the activities it carries out (Scarborough et al., 1998:53). Independence 
is defined as the absence of excessive power and favouritism which may arise as a 
result of the intensity of the association between a director and the company (IOD, 
2009b:119). Arguably, this association may refer to the remuneration the director 
receives from the company. To safeguard the independence of the AC, it is submitted 
that the company should follow the recommendation made by King III (IOD, 2009a:30, 
principle 2.25, recommended practice 2.25.4) that directors should receive a fair 
remuneration and non-executive members should be remunerated according to a base 
fee, as well as a fee paid for every AC meeting attended.  
 
The value added by an independent AC relates to the ability of its members to monitor 
management’s skills, decisions and actions (Menon & Williams, 1994:125) and hold 
management accountable to the company’s shareholders (BRC, 1999:22). An 
independent AC also provides the external auditor with a platform for openly expressing 
his/her views and concerns about management (Menon & Williams, 1994:125). 
Furthermore, an independent AC should support the external auditor appropriately in 
instances where a dispute between management and the auditors arises. Where the 
independent AC members have qualifications and/or experience associated with the 
reports issued by the external auditor, the support the AC is able to give will increase 
(DeZoort & Salterio, 2001:43). An independent and experienced AC would also be able 
to recommend the appointment of an external auditor who has a reputation for 
delivering high quality services (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001:33–34, 46–47) and 
would demand that this auditor deliver accordingly (Abbott & Parker, 2000:48). Where a 
company’s AC consists of independent members, the quality of financial reporting 
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should increase (Carcello & Neal, 2003:290; Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes, 
2007:1407). Indeed, AFS fraud is less likely to occur in a company where the AC 
consists of independent members (Beasley et al., 2000:450, 452–453).  
 
Accordingly, efforts have been made worldwide to improve the value added by the AC 
by strengthening its independence. In South Africa, King III recommends that the AC 
should consist exclusively of independent members (IOD, 2009a:22, principle 2.6; IOD, 
2009a:31, recommended practice 3.2.1; IOD, 2009a:32, principle 3.3) and non-
executive directors (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.2.1; IOD, 2009a:32, 
principle 3.3). The JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 
2014b:21.5(i)) state that such companies should appoint an independent AC (IOD, 
2009a:22, principle 2.6) and, where a company does not comply with this, it should 
explain the reason for not doing so (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(ii)). In addition, the ACs of 
AltX listed companies must comply with section 94(4)(b)(i) of the Companies Act, which 
states that an AC member should be a director who is not involved in the day-to-day 
management of the company, and has not been so involved at any time during the 
previous financial year (RSA, 2009). The Act further states that an AC member should 
not be a prescribed officer or a full-time employee of the company, nor should they have 
been so employed during the previous three financial years (RSA, 2009:s 94(4)(b)(ii)). 
Furthermore, an AC member should not be a significant supplier or customer of the 
company (RSA, 2009:s 94(4)(b)(iii)). It is clear from the Companies Act that directors 
serving on the AC should be non-executive, which is in line with King III, as noted 
above. Although the “independence” requirement is not specified, it is submitted that the 
Companies Act does nevertheless imply this. This argument is based on section 
94(4)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act and is further strengthened by section 94(4)(b)(iii), as 
just discussed. Nkonki12 (2014:13), however, does not support this view as it states that 
although the Companies Act requires AC members to be non-executive, it does not 
require them to be independent. However, Nkonki (2014:13) acknowledges that it is 
best practice that all members of the AC should be independent, non-executive 
directors.  
 
                                            
12
 Nkonki is a company consisting of registered auditors, accountants and consultants offering their 
services to companies in the private and public sector. 
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In the USA, this principle is also supported by section 301(3)(A) of the SOX Act, which 
requires the AC to consist exclusively of independent directors (USA, 2002). In the UK, 
the United Kingdom Corporate Governance code (UK CG code) recommends that all 
the AC members should be independent, non-executive directors (UK, 2012:18, 
s C.3.1). An AltX listed company’s appointment of independent, non-executive directors 
to serve on its AC (which includes the AC chairperson) is of particular importance owing 
to the value the committee adds to the company and its stakeholders. Therefore, the 
value added by an independent AC contributes to an increase in investor confidence 
and advances the company’s growth (JSE Limited, 2012c). 
 
In summary, the independence of AC members is supported by legislation, the JSE 
listing requirements for AltX listed companies, as well as codes and reports. In turn, 
independent ACs add value in terms of the activities they carry out. It is therefore 
important to consider the independent status of the AC when attempting to understand 
the way in which the AC adds value. 
 
3.2.2 Leadership 
 
An AC functions as a group. This implies that when attempting to understand the value 
added by the AC the group dynamics should also be considered (DeZoort et al., 
2002:42). One AC attribute concerned with the group dynamics is leadership (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993:45), which is determined by the character and actions of the AC’s 
chairperson. These are important if the AC is to operate successfully. The chairperson 
should have a “strong” character, and the ability to identify and manage information 
providers (Spira, 1999a:245), as well as any AC members who may prevent the AC 
from adding value by virtue of their dominant personality (DeZoort et al., 2002:43). 
When leading AC meetings, the chairperson should act in a manner that encourages 
open and constructive conversation (ACF, 2005:3), and ensure that all members of the 
AC participate and express their views (ACF, 2005:3; Nkonki, 2014:55). An AC 
chairperson with effective leadership qualities could prevent a situation where excessive 
reliance is placed on one AC member (DeZoort et al., 2002:43). The chairperson’s 
leadership is also important as his/her interpersonal and persuasive skills will assist in 
managing relationships among AC members and ensuring that the AC works together 
successfully as a team (DeZoort et al., 2002:43). 
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3.2.3 Qualifications 
 
The AC as a group should have the necessary qualifications (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993:37; Lin et al., 2008:727; Nkonki, 2014:14). King III recommends that the AC 
should collectively have the qualifications required to fulfil its responsibilities (IOD, 
2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.4). The JSE listing requirements for AltX listed 
companies do not make specific reference to AC members’ qualifications (JSE Limited, 
2014b:21.5(i)) but the ACs of such companies should comply with section 94(5) of the 
Companies Act, which states that the minister may prescribe the minimum qualifications 
that the AC as a group should possess in order to fulfil its responsibilities effectively 
(RSA, 2009). These prescribed minimum qualifications include that at least one-third of 
the AC members must have academic qualifications or experience in economics, law, 
CG, finance, accounting, commerce, industry, public affairs or human resources (RSA, 
2011:51). In cases where the AC does not have the qualifications or experience to deal 
with a matter, the Companies Act requires and King III recommends that the board 
should approve that the AC obtain the services of a specialist or consultant to assist it 
(IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.6; RSA, 2009:s 94(11)). It has also been 
found that AC members themselves believe that they should have qualifications in 
areas relating to law, accounting and auditing (DeZoort, 1997:210, 224). 
 
An AC that collectively has adequate qualifications and experience should be able to 
add value to the company and its stakeholders in the way it fulfils its responsibilities 
(IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.4; RSA, 2009:s 94(5)). In addition, an AC 
with qualified and experienced members should be able to overcome the challenge of 
dealing with complex information (DeZoort et al., 2002:41–42). Moreover, in light of the 
AC’s responsibility to review the AFS and with the difficulties associated with financial 
reporting, financial and accounting qualifications are also regarded as particularly 
important (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:37, 45; Krishnan & Lee, 2009:243). Besides a 
strong CG system, the exposure of a company to litigation risk should reduce with the 
appointment of AC members with financial qualifications (Krishnan & Lee, 2009:243, 
257). There is also a positive association between the value added to a company and 
an AC that consists of financially qualified directors (Chan & Li, 2008:17, 26).  
 
King III recommends that the combined qualifications and experience of the members 
serving on the AC should be suitable for the company’s size, circumstances and 
  
55 
industry (IOD, 2009b:57, par. 13). AltX listed companies are small to medium-sized 
companies with unique circumstances as such companies are associated with high-
growth potential upcoming companies that wish to advance their listing to the JSE main 
board (JSE Limited, 2012c). It can therefore be argued that the qualifications and 
experience levels of AC members are important for an AltX listed company to increase 
its growth rate as well as its subsequent listing on the JSE main board. 
 
In summary, when attempting to understand the way in which value is added by the AC 
of an AltX listed company, the collective qualifications of the AC members should be 
considered. In addition, the qualification attribute is closely linked to the experience 
attribute as the literature often highlights the value added by the AC in instances where 
both attributes are present. 
 
3.2.4 Experience 
 
It is also important that the AC as a group has the necessary experience (POB, 
1994:15; Lee & Stone, 1997:98; Spira, 1999a:236; RSA, 2009:s 94(5); Nkonki, 
2014:14). For the purpose of this study an experienced member is defined as a member 
who has spent sufficient time in the field relating to the member’s allocated oversight 
responsibilities (DeZoort, 1998:2, 4; DeZoort & Salterio, 2001:43), has a business 
background (POB, 1994:15; Lee & Stone, 1997:98; Nkonki, 2014:14) and has an 
understanding of the company’s business (Spira, 1999a:236; Nkonki, 2014:14).  
 
King III recommends that the AC should collectively have sufficient experience to fulfil 
its responsibilities (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.4). The JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies do not make specific reference to the level of 
experience required of AC members (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)). However, the ACs of 
such companies should comply with the 2011 government regulation in terms of the 
Companies Act which states that at least one-third of AC members must have academic 
qualifications or experience in economics, law, CG, finance, accounting, commerce, 
industry, public affairs or human resources (RSA, 2011:51).  
 
To maintain and increase AC members’ experience and competencies, training courses 
have to be attended. The JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies require 
newly appointed executive and non-executive directors (which include AC members) to 
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attend a compulsory Directors Induction Programme (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.3(d)) 
at the IOD (IOD, 2015a) to improve their knowledge of the Companies Act, the JSE 
listing requirements for AltX listed companies and CG practices (JSE Limited, 2012c). 
Furthermore, AC members should keep abreast of the latest developments in risk and 
legislation (IOD, 2009a:27, principle 2.20, recommended practice 2.20.4; IOD, 
2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.5). Arguably, it is submitted that “new” AC 
members should attend an induction course, whilst “established” AC members should 
attend training courses which focus on the latest CG trends and developments (such as 
the role of IT in the company). King III recommends that the company secretary should 
assist with programmes relating to induction and training (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.6). “Established”, experienced AC members should provide 
“new”, inexperienced AC members with “on-the-job” training to ensure that they are 
sufficiently experienced in the event that “established” AC members retire. AC members 
who lack adequate experience should also be assigned to a mentorship programme 
(IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.20.2).  
 
The optimal collective experience level of the AC can be achieved by rotating AC 
members. This rotation is implied by King III’s recommendation that at least one-third of 
non-executive directors should retire annually (IOD, 2009a:26, recommended practice 
2.18.6). KPMG (2013:3) also suggests that a policy be implemented that mandates the 
rotation of AC members because “new” members serving on the AC provide alternative 
ways of fulfilling AC responsibilities. This rotation should, however, be carefully 
implemented to balance the “established” and the “new” members serving on the AC 
(KPMG, 2013:3). Members who have served on the AC for a number of years are able 
to evaluate the consistency and validity of explanations provided by management and 
assurance providers within a specific timeframe. Such an evaluation of the consistency 
and validity of these answers provide the AC with evidence of the trustworthiness of the 
information (Gendron et al, 2004:168–169). However, there is also the risk that the 
independence of these members may be called into question as a result of their lengthy 
service. Furthermore, the observation that “new”, inexperienced members are often 
more careful and critical in fulfilling their allocated responsibilities demonstrates the 
importance of new blood (DeZoort, 1998:19). Moreover, “new” members may decrease 
the risk of the AC demonstrating a lack of independence, which may happen if members 
serve too long on the committee. All in all, a combination of “established” and “new” 
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inexperienced members adds balance to the AC, enabling it to function as a value-
adding CG component of the company. 
 
The collective experience level of an AC is influenced by the appointment of “new” 
members, who should be formally appointed (IOD, 2009a:26, principle 2.19; JSE 
Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(i)–(ii)). The appointment process includes the identification of 
members with suitable qualifications and experience (DeZoort, 1998:3, 18; IOD, 
2009a:26, recommended practice 2.19.1) and performing background and reference 
checks with the assistance of the nomination committee (IOD, 2009a:26, recommended 
practice 2.19.2). In addition, AC members should be elected and/or re-elected by the 
shareholders at the AGM (IOD, 2009b:40, par. 80; RSA, 2009:s 70(3)(b)(i), 94(2)). 
 
In light of South Africa’s skills shortage (Daniels, 2009:35) and the lack of suitable 
candidates to serve on ACs (Barton & Wong, 2006:36; Nkonki, 2014:6), it can be 
expected that qualified, experienced individuals will be more willing to serve on the ACs 
of JSE main board companies. These companies may be viewed as being a safer 
harbour than AltX listed companies and capable of paying adequate remuneration for 
services rendered. Thus, the researcher is of the opinion that small to medium-sized 
companies which are still in a growing phase, such as AltX listed companies (JSE 
Limited, 2012c), may find it difficult to attract suitable qualified and experienced people 
to serve on their AC. 
 
In summary, the experience, rotation and combination of members serving on the AC, 
as well as the identification and appointment of AC members, should all be considered 
when attempting to understand the way in which value is added by the AC of an AltX 
listed company. 
 
3.2.5 Number of audit committee members 
 
There should be sufficient members serving on the AC to enable it to fulfil its 
responsibilities effectively (DeZoort, 1998:2; DeZoort et al., 2002:42,  44). The 
Companies Act requires and King III recommends that the AC should consist of at least 
three members (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.2.2; RSA, 2009:s 94(2)). 
However, although the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies state that 
these companies should appoint an AC (IOD, 2009a:22, principle 2.6), they do not 
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stipulate a specific number of members (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)). Nevertheless, the 
ACs of AltX listed companies must comply with the requirements of the Companies Act, 
thus they should have at least three members. This Companies Act requirement is 
echoed in the recommendations issued by the UK CG code (UK, 2012:s C.3.1). 
However, the UK CG code makes an exception for smaller companies where ACs are 
only required to have two members (UK, 2012:s C.3.1).  
 
An AC guide issued by Nkonki (2014:13) supports a small AC, consisting of three to five 
members. Nkonki (2014:13) perceives that a small committee works more efficiently 
than a larger one. When too many members serve on the AC, efficiency levels may 
decrease and conflict and debate may increase (Sharma, Naiker & Lee, 2009:261). Too 
many members may also increase the number of AC meetings needed as a result of the 
differing opinions among AC members (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007:276).  
 
As described, legislation and voluntary codes advocate that the AC should consist of a 
minimum of three directors. However, no mention is made of the maximum number of 
members that should be serving on the AC to enable it to function as a value-adding 
committee for the company and its stakeholders. Smaller companies (which include 
AltX listed companies) may be more price-sensitive (Menon & Williams, 1994:137–138) 
than larger companies, which may affect their willingness to bear the costs of the AC, 
which include those associated with the number of members serving on the AC and the 
remuneration received by individual members. AC costs are also affected by the 
number of meetings held, which may be related to the complexity of the company’s 
operations. With reference to the cost implications associated with the number of AC 
members, it can be expected that AltX listed companies with the primary goal of 
maximising shareholder wealth in the short term will not employ the services of more 
than three directors to serve on their AC. On the other hand, AltX listed companies with 
a long-term vision to grow their business and create wealth may employ more than 
three AC members. 
 
Although the number of members should be considered when attempting to understand 
the way in which value is added by an AC, the independence, leadership, qualifications 
and experience of AC members are arguably more important in this regard. 
  
59 
3.3 THE FULFILMENT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH 
OPTIMISED ACTIVITIES 
 
The AC’s responsibilities are prescribed by the Companies Act (ch 2, §  2.3.2) and the 
JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (ch 2, §  2.3.4), and are 
recommended by King III (ch 2, §  2.3.3.4). These responsibilities should be 
complemented by optimised AC activities that enhance the value it adds to both the 
company and its stakeholders. These optimised activities include the AC acting 
diligently during the fulfilment of its responsibilities by accepting its fiduciary role and 
providing feedback to the board and its stakeholders. Other activities include AC 
responsibilities being formalised in an AC charter and work plan and assessing the AC 
annually in terms of the extent to which it has fulfilled its responsibilities. 
 
The responsibilities placed on the shoulders of the AC by the board (IOD, 2009a:31, 
recommended practice 3.1.3) and the company’s stakeholders could be challenging, 
because the AC consists of people who are unfamiliar with the day-to-day operations, 
controls and reporting aspects of the company, only meeting at certain intervals 
(DeZoort et al., 2002:41) and depends on individuals (information providers) to supply it 
with information (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:29) that could be complex (DeZoort et al., 
2002:41). To overcome these challenges, it is important that optimised AC activities 
should be adopted. These include conducting sufficient AC meetings, where information 
is sent to AC members in advance so that they can prepare for them. Another activity 
relates to the AC’s consideration of the scheduled date, time and duration of AC 
meetings, which should be planned so as to ensure that meetings are well attended and 
add value. Furthermore, the meetings should be accompanied by accurate minutes and 
action sheets. 
 
3.3.1 Fiduciary role 
 
It can happen that AC responsibilities are fulfilled by following a “tick-box approach” 
(DeZoort et al., 2002:45), where responsibilities are merely carried out with no regard 
for quality. However, it is important that responsibilities are carried out diligently 
(DeZoort et al., 2002:45) to enable the AC to add value to the company and its 
stakeholders. As such, the AC of an AltX listed company should understand its 
responsibilities and perform them with enthusiasm (Nkonki, 2014:5, 7), in good faith, in 
  
60 
the best interests of the company and with a degree of caution, skill and experience that 
may be expected of a person in the same position (RSA, 2009:s 76(3)). An AC member 
could be held personally liable if he/she fails to act in such a manner (RSA, 2009:s 
77(2)).  
 
3.3.2 Feedback to the board and stakeholders 
 
The AC should report to both the board and the shareholders on the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities (IOD, 2009a:35, principle 3.10) through a number of media. Internal 
communications can be in the form of minutes of AC meetings (Spira, 1999b:269; 
Nkonki, 2014:10, 14), the presentation of formal reports to the board (Nkonki, 2014:14) 
and/or oral reporting to the board by the AC’s chairperson (IOD, 2009b:58, par. 19; 
Nkonki, 2014:14). External communications can take place at the AGM (IOD, 2009b:67, 
par. 84) and through a report in the AFS (IOD, 2009a:35, recommended practice 
3.10.2–3.10.4; RSA, 2009:s 94(7)(f)). In providing the board with feedback, the AC adds 
value to the company by illustrating its accountability to the company’s shareholders 
(Spira, 1999a:253). However, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies 
make no mention of the feedback the AC should provide to the board and the 
company’s shareholders (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)). Furthermore, the company’s AFS 
and integrated report are public information which could be accessed by stakeholders. It 
therefore implies that a company also provides feedback to its stakeholders. 
 
3.3.3 Audit committee charter and work plan 
 
An AC’s responsibilities should be formalised in an AC charter (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993:36, 45; DeZoort et al., 2002:44; 55; Nkonki, 2014:10), which should be approved 
by the board (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.3; Mohiuddin & Karbhari, 
2010:110). Although the board can allocate additional responsibilities to the AC (RSA 
2009:s 94(7)(i)), the AC should be cautious about accepting responsibilities for which it 
is not qualified, which fall outside its scope (BRC, 1999:27; IOD, 2009a:32, 
recommended practice 3.2.4; Nkonki, 2014:13) or for which it does not have the time to 
deal with (Olson, 1999:1102; Nkonki, 2014:13). For this reason, the AC charter should 
be a fair reflection of the AC’s responsibilities (DeZoort, 1997:222). It may be argued 
that if the responsibilities included in the charter are incomplete, invalid and irrelevant, 
their fulfilment would not classify the AC as being a value-adding component of CG. 
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Such a charter, which is viewed as the “contract” between the AC and the board, is 
therefore important for clarifying any uncertainty about the responsibilities assigned to 
the AC (Nkonki, 2014:10). AC members should also be familiar with the charter so that 
they know what is expected of them (BRC, 1999:27). 
 
King III recommends that the company secretary should accept responsibility for 
ensuring that the AC charter is kept up-to-date (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 
2.21.8) and should draft a yearly work plan in line with the AC charter (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.11). This King III recommendation is not, however, included 
in the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)). In 
terms of the Companies Act, (RSA, 2009:s 88(a)) the company secretary is required to 
provide board members both individually and as a group with direction as to the 
responsibilities that they need to fulfil. If the company secretary is involved in drafting 
the AC charter and work plan, he/she would be fulfilling this statutory duty. 
 
3.3.4 Annual assessments 
 
The AC and its individual members should be evaluated on a yearly basis (IOD, 
2009a:28, principle 2.22) with the assistance of the company secretary (IOD, 2009a:28, 
recommended practice 2.21.13). The AC charter could be used as a benchmark for 
these annual assessments in terms of which “what went well” is discussed, areas for 
improvement determined and the value added by the AC gauged. This assessment 
could also be used to communicate to stakeholders the extent to which the AC has 
fulfilled its responsibilities. The results of this annual assessment should be included in 
the integrated report (IOD, 2009a:28, recommended practice 2.22.4). The JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)) also state that 
these companies should evaluate the AC and its individual members every year. Where 
companies do not comply with this requirement, reasons for not doing so should be 
explained (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(ii)), which is similar to the “apply or explain” 
provision of King III. The integrated reporting framework also supports the inclusion of 
these annual assessments, because they provide stakeholders with information about 
the effectiveness of the company’s governance structure (IIRC, 2013:25). Such 
communication in the integrated report could demonstrate the valuable role played by 
the company’s AC and build trust between the AC and the company’s stakeholders. 
  
  
62 
3.3.5 Number of audit committee meetings 
 
The will, motivation and desire of AC members to fulfil their responsibilities in a value-
adding manner (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:29, 40, 42, 44; DeZoort, 1998:2; DeZoort et 
al., 2002:42, 45; Chan & Li, 2008:17; Sharma et al., 2009:245) may be confirmed, inter 
alia, by the number of AC meetings held per year (DeZoort, 1998:2; DeZoort et al., 
2002:45; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007:266; Nkonki, 2014:11). Thus, an AC can only be 
of value if it meets regularly (Menon & Williams, 1994:124).  
 
An increase in the number of meetings held annually is associated with fewer problems 
being experienced in relation to the company’s financial reporting matters, an increase 
in the quality of services rendered by the external auditor (Abbott & Parker, 2000:48; 
DeZoort et al., 2002:65), higher quality AFS (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001:34, 46–47) 
and fewer fraudulent activities (Beasley et al., 2000:450, 452–453). It is doubtful 
whether an AC that fails to meet or meets only once during the year will be of value to 
the company and its stakeholders (Menon & Williams, 1994:125). In terms of the 
number of AC meetings, an AC guideline published by Nkonki (2014:14) reiterates that 
at least three AC meetings should be held every year, whilst King III recommends that 
the AC should meet at least twice a year (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.4). 
As the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies do not require such 
companies to follow the principles applicable to ACs contained in King III or to explain 
the reason for non-application (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(i)–(ii)), they do not compel 
the ACs of these companies to meet at least twice a year, or to explain the reason(s) for 
not doing so. 
 
According to Sharma et al. (2009:249), the ACs of New Zealand companies that are 
associated with rapid growth tend to meet on average 3.76 times per year. In South 
Africa, AltX listed companies are typically fast-growing companies (JSE Limited, 2012c). 
Thus, it can be expected that their ACs should meet at least four times annually (a 
benchmark displayed by New Zealand companies), which is 100% more than the 
number of meetings recommended by King III. Although it is expected that at least four 
meetings be held, it can be argued that fewer meetings could still serve the purpose, as 
an experienced AC should try to limit costs (ch 2, § 2.2.5) by scheduling only the 
number of AC meetings required (based on the company’s needs and unique 
circumstances) at appropriate intervals during the financial year. 
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3.3.6 Information sent to audit committee members in advance of audit 
committee meetings 
 
AC members should be provided with information prior to the AC meeting to enable 
them to prepare effectively for it (Spira, 1999a:242; KPMG, 2014:6; Nkonki, 2014:11). It 
is important to note, however, that even if this information is sent out to members before 
the meeting, it does not necessarily mean that they will study it (Spira, 1999a:243, 245). 
Nevertheless, even if the AC members do not familiarise them with the content before 
the meeting, they can obtain a certain degree of assurance based on the volume and 
detail of the information provided (Feldman & March, 1981:177; Spira, 1999a:244). In 
addition, the person providing this information should only make sufficient and relevant 
information available to the AC members that relates to areas that will be discussed at 
the AC meeting. Providing members with irrelevant and superfluous information may 
prevent the AC from analysing the important information and thus from fulfilling its 
responsibilities (Deloitte Development LLC, 2012:5).  
 
3.3.7 Scheduled date, time, duration and attendance of audit committee meetings 
 
An AC guideline issued by Nkonki (2014:14) suggests that the first annual AC meeting 
should be scheduled before the commencement of the interim audit, another after the 
interim audit, and the last meeting after the completion of the year-end audit and prior to 
reporting. Since the AC is a subcommittee of the board, it also has a responsibility to 
report to the board (IOD, 2009a:35, principle 3.10) and could use the board meeting as 
a platform for providing feedback (§ 3.3.2). As the AC consists of directors who also 
serve on the board (IOD, 2009a:31, principle 3.2), it may be logistically more convenient 
to schedule the AC meeting before the board meeting. However, such an arrangement 
may hamper the AC in dealing effectively with all the issues that emerge during the 
meeting (Spira, 1998:34–35; Spira, 1999a:246). Furthermore, the duration of such 
meetings should be considered when understanding the way in which value is added by 
the AC (DeZoort, 1998:2; Collier & Gregory, 1999:312, 316, 318, 323, 328). Lastly, AC 
members should make a concerted effort to attend all AC meetings, as their collective 
input will enable the AC to improve the manner in which it fulfils its responsibilities to the 
benefit of the company and its stakeholders. 
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3.3.8 Minutes and action sheets of audit committee meetings 
 
Decisions taken at each AC meeting should be included in the minutes of the meeting 
(Spira, 1999a:242; IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.12; Nkonki, 2014:14, 
60) and timeously distributed by the company secretary to all members (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.12). These minutes should be accurate (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.12). The JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies 
do not make specific reference to the company secretary’s role in preparing the minutes 
of the AC meetings (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)). However, these ACs should comply 
with the Companies Act which states that the minutes of AC meetings should be 
properly recorded by the company secretary (RSA, 2009:s 88(d)). As the company 
secretary is responsible for recording these minutes, it is submitted that he/she should 
always be present at the meetings. It is suggested that the minutes of the previous 
meeting should be approved prior to the commencement of the following AC meeting. 
The AC should also make use of action sheets on which members report back on 
agreed actions taken based on the previous minutes. Such minutes and action sheets 
could be used to demonstrate to the board that the AC has fulfilled its allocated 
responsibilities (§ 3.3.2) and to encourage AC members to behave in a proper manner. 
 
3.4 THE FULFILMENT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES BY 
MAINTAINING HEALTHY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BOARD AND 
INFORMATION PROVIDERS 
 
In fulfilling its responsibilities, the AC should be supported by the board. In this regard 
(Scarborough et al., 1998:52, 54; Raghunandan, Read & Rama, 2001:106), information 
is provided by management and internal (e.g. the internal auditor) and external 
assurance providers (e.g. the external auditor) (DeZoort et al., 2002:44–45). These role-
players are referred to as the three lines of defence, and provide the AC with assurance 
on the risks faced by the company. These three lines of defence are advocated by the 
combined assurance model in King III (IOD, 2009b:62, par.46). The designated advisor 
of an AltX listed company also advises the AC (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(iii)), whilst 
the company secretary supports the AC in administrative (RSA, 2009:s 88(d); IOD, 
2009a:27, recommended practices 2.21.8, 2.21.11–2.21.12) and compliance matters 
(RSA, 2009:s 88(b)). As such, it is important that the interactions and relationships 
between the AC and the board, and the AC and the information providers are 
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investigated to understand the way in which value is added by the AC to the company 
and its stakeholders (Carcello & Neal, 2003:297). To measure the extent to which 
healthy relationships are being maintained, the following attributes should be 
considered: the informal interaction and ad hoc meetings with management and 
assurance providers, the agenda, the tone of AC meetings and the accompanying 
procedures, as well as the perception of the value of the AC. 
 
3.4.1 Informal interaction and ad hoc meetings with management and assurance 
providers 
 
The only way in which the AC can fulfil its responsibilities is to engage with and obtain 
combined assurance from management (Zanni & Terrel, 2002:54; KPMG, 2014:7, 9; 
Nkonki, 2014:26) and assurance providers (Olson, 1999:1106; KPMG, 2014:7, 9; 
Nkonki, 2014:26). This engagement between the AC and management, as well as the 
assurance providers, implies that there should be a good working relationship, open 
channels of communication, as well as informal meetings to stay up-to-date (BRC, 
1999:30; KPMG, 2014:5). Furthermore, individual meetings could be held between the 
AC chairperson and the CFO, the internal auditor (Olson, 1999:1109) and the external 
auditor before the AC meetings. These pre-meetings will enable the chairperson to 
prepare properly for AC meetings, direct the meetings effectively (Nkonki, 2014:55) and 
minimise unpleasant surprises at the meetings (CAQ, FEE & ICAA, 2013:7; KPMG, 
2014:14). It is suggested that, after the meetings have taken place, the AC chairperson 
should also meet individually with management and assurance providers. This could 
provide the AC, management and assurance providers with an opportunity to unpack 
the matters that were discussed at these AC meetings. King III also recommends that 
the AC should meet with the auditors (internal and external) at least once per annum 
(IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.5). During these meetings, management 
should not be present (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.5). This interaction 
allows for the exchange of confidential information without management interference 
(Gendron et al., 2004:166; Nkonki, 2014:46). In addition, interaction in the form of 
private meetings (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.5; Nkonki, 2014:46), 
confidential memorandums and reports (BRC, 1999:33; Nkonki, 2014:46) enable the AC 
to remain up-to-date on the quality of the processes followed in preparing the AFS and 
the appropriateness of the AFS disclosures (BRC, 1999:33; KPMG, 2014:8). The AC 
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can also meet with the risk manager, compliance officer and ethics officer, if deemed 
necessary (Nkonki, 2014:11). 
 
3.4.2 Agendas, tone of and procedures followed at audit committee meetings 
 
Agendas should not be too lengthy in relation to the time allocated for the meeting, as 
lengthy agendas may limit the time spent on important matters (Spira, 1999a:242). In 
addition, the level of detail in the agenda may be an indicator of the trust placed in the 
AC by the board, as the agenda is usually prepared by the company secretary based on 
input from the chairperson of the board, the CEO, the CFO and the CAE (Spira, 
1999a:242). King III recommends that the chairperson of the AC should also contribute 
to finalising the agendas (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.3.2). It is imperative 
that the AC is involved in setting the agenda to ensure that it is focused and 
manageable (Olson, 1999:1110; KPMG, 2014:5). An agenda set by management could 
hamper the AC to focus on important areas (KPMG, 2014:12, 14) to the potential 
detriment of the minority shareholders.  
 
In order to understand and assess the risks faced by the company, AC members should 
understand the company’s business. Only then will they be able to handle the agenda 
items appropriately by asking management and assurance providers probing and 
challenging questions at AC meetings (Sommer, 1991:91; DeZoort, 1998:18; Olson, 
1999:111; Spira, 1999a:245, 248; Spira, 1999b:268; DeZoort et al., 2002:45; Gendron 
et al., 2004:154, 168; Nkonki, 2014:11, 26). Asking tough questions and engaging in 
robust conversations will enable the AC to take appropriate action (e.g. engaging the 
services of an outside consultant) based on their interpretation of the responses 
provided (Spira, 2003:186) and, inter alia, considering the effect of these responses on 
the quality of the AFS (BRC, 1999:33; Nkonki, 2014:26). Although AC members may 
use a checklist of questions to ask management and assurance providers, it is 
important for them to remain open-minded and to ask additional questions which may 
not be covered by the standard checklist (BRC, 1999:42–43, principle 4). During these 
meetings, the AC can also act as a problem-solving and support function to resolve 
conflict between management and assurance providers (Spira, 1999a:241), as well as 
the board and the external auditor (Spira, 1999b:264).  
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Furthermore, during AC meetings, the company secretary can fulfil his/her duties, as 
prescribed by the Companies Act and recommended by King III, by making AC 
members aware of the laws affecting the company (RSA, 2009:s 88(b)) and providing 
guidance on areas of good governance (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.7). 
Accordingly, the company secretary could provide valuable input during AC meetings 
which could enhance the AC’s fulfilment of its responsibilities. 
 
In addition, the JSE listing requirements (JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(iii)) state that the 
company’s designated advisor must be invited to and should attend all the AC meetings 
as an observer and should support the AC to ensure the company’s compliance with the 
JSE listing requirements for one of the following periods (depending on which period is 
the longest): for the first year after the AltX listed company has been listed; or until the 
date of the first publication of the AltX listed company’s AFS. Despite this requirement, a 
designated advisor can continue to attend AC meetings if he/she deems it necessary. 
As such, the designated advisor could provide valuable input during AC meetings on the 
risks faced by the company in the event of non-compliance with the JSE listing 
requirements. 
 
3.4.3 Perception of the value of the audit committee 
 
Both the board and the AC’s information providers should understand and respect the 
AC’s role (Cadbury report, 1992:par. 4.37; Morrow & Pastor, 2007:47; Nkonki, 2014:5). 
If they perceive the AC to be an effective component of the company’s governance 
processes, it will strengthen communication channels and foster interaction between the 
AC and the board, as well as between the AC and its information providers (Nkonki, 
2014:5). It is also important that the board does not view the AC as a liability formed 
only to comply with legislation (IOD, 2009a:5; Nkonki, 2014:5). Thus, the perceived 
value of the AC by the board and the AC’s information providers should be taken into 
consideration when understanding the effectiveness of the AC (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993:42, 45). 
 
Management and assurance providers can create a company culture where the AC is a 
powerful body and may, consequently, feel threatened by possible investigation by the 
AC (Spira, 1998:34). Such a threat stems from AC members raising concerns and 
making assessments based on the comments and feedback received from 
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management and assurance providers during AC meetings (§ 3.4.2) (Spira, 1999a:245; 
Gendron et al., 2004:154). Thus, management and assurance providers who perceive 
the AC as a value-adding component will take the AC seriously (Spira, 1999a:251) and 
will therefore be well prepared when providing information and explanations at the AC 
meetings. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 3 provided the attributes that should be investigated to understand the way in 
which the AC of an AltX listed company adds value to the company and its 
stakeholders. Through a review of the legislation, the JSE listing requirements for AltX 
listed companies, codes and reports, and scholarly literature, the researcher identified 
and explored various attributes that contribute to the AC adding value to the company 
and its stakeholders. Attributes were grouped into the following three components: the 
characteristics of AC members (§ 3.2), the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through 
optimised activities (§ 3.3) and the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining 
healthy relationships with the board and information providers (§ 3.4). 
 
Attributes identified and described under the characteristics of AC members include the 
following: independence (§ 3.2.1), leadership (§ 3.2.2), qualifications (§ 3.2.3) and 
experience of AC members (§ 3.2.4), as well as the number of AC members that serve 
on the AC (§ 3.2.5).  
 
Acceptance of AC members’ fiduciary role (§ 3.3.1), providing feedback to the board 
and its stakeholders (§ 3.3.2), the compilation of an AC charter and work plan (§ 3.3.3) 
and conducting annual AC assessments (§ 3.3.4) were highlighted as activities that also 
form part of the attributes to be considered. Other activities, namely, the number of AC 
meetings held annually (§ 3.3.5), whether or not information was sent to AC members 
and invitees to these AC meetings prior to the AC meetings (§ 3.3.6), the scheduled 
date, time, duration and attendance of AC meetings (§ 3.3.7), as well as preparation of 
minutes and action sheets for AC meetings (§ 3.3.8) were also viewed as attributes that 
should be reflected on when understanding and describing the amount of value added 
by a specific AltX listed company’s AC to the company and its stakeholders.  
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These activities should be complemented by healthy relationships with the board and 
information providers. The attributes described under the maintenance of healthy 
relationships include informal interaction and ad hoc meetings with management and 
assurance providers (§ 3.4.1). In addition, interaction when compiling the agendas of 
AC meetings, the tone of and procedures followed at AC meetings were also 
emphasised (§ 3.4.2). Lastly, the perception of the value of the AC by the board and the 
AC’s information providers was highlighted (§ 3.4.3).  
 
In the next chapter, the research design and approach, as well as the method followed 
in understanding the way in which value is added by a specific AltX listed company’s AC 
to the company and its stakeholders will be described.  
  
  
70 
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 identified and explored the AC attributes that help to assess the way in which 
it adds value to an AltX listed company and its stakeholders. These attributes were 
derived from legislation, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies, codes 
and reports, and scholary literature and provided the basis for the theoretical framework 
that was empirically tested in this study.  
 
In this chapter, the research design and approach are discussed (§ 4.2), followed by a 
description of the research method (§ 4.3). The chapter ends with a description of the 
ethical principles adhered to (§ 4.4). 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
 
A research design concerns what is to be studied and the way in which it will be studied 
(Babbie, 2010:91). In line with this, Hofstee (2006:109) states that the researcher needs 
to select a research design that is appropriate for addressing the research objectives. 
 
When deciding on a design, a researcher can follow a quantitative or qualitative design 
or a combination of both. A qualitative research design is more flexible than a 
quantitative one, as research participants are asked “open-ended” questions as 
opposed to “closed-ended” questions (Mack, Woodsong, Macqueen, Guest, & Namey, 
2005:3–4). Such “open-ended” questions provide research participants with an 
opportunity to express their views freely and in detail (Mack et al., 2005:4). The 
researcher is of the opinion that a qualitative research design is the most appropriate 
way to address the objectives of this study. For this reason and because the 
characteristics and fulfilment of responsibilities of an AltX listed company’s AC are 
unique, “open-ended” questions would allow research participants to share information 
with the researcher freely. Furthermore, a qualitative research design is appropriate if 
an issue (in this study, the manner in which value is added by an AC) needs to be 
explored (Creswell, 2007:39) and if the characteristics of entities, processes and 
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meanings are not measurable in terms of quantity, intensity, or regularity (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2011:8).  
 
Qualitative researchers collect data in a setting that is familiar to the research 
participants (Creswell, 2007:37) and analyse data according to themes (Creswell, 
2007:37–38). The findings of qualitative research are presented in a “story-telling” or 
narrative style, which includes quotations from the research participants, and the 
researcher’s responses and analyses (Creswell, 2007:37). Thus, in this study, a 
qualitative research design allowed the researcher to gather contextual, in-depth 
knowledge and to gain an understanding of the way in which value is added by the AC, 
as provided by the research participants’ narration of their experiences in a setting 
which was familiar to them (§ 4.3.2 discusses the setting in which the data were 
collected.). A qualitative research design also allowed the researcher to tell the story 
from an insider perspective. As the data collection and analyses unfolded, new 
knowledge on the way in which the AC adds value to a specific AltX listed company and 
its stakeholders was generated. 
 
Previous research on the value added by ACs has been criticised for using quantifiable 
measures, as it focused on documents such as annual reports and meeting agendas 
and minutes (Spira, 1999a:234; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007:277). As such, the use of 
these quantitative measures alone does not provide a complete picture of the value 
added by the AC (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007:277). An alternative research design 
was suggested by Spira (1999a:234), which focused on the views of participants 
(serving on the AC or closely related to the AC) on the value added by the AC. Thus, 
the researcher’s decision to follow a qualitative research design is substantiated by 
Spira’s (1999a:234) suggestion. 
 
Qualitative research studies imply that there is no single truth as research participants 
have subjective views (Creswell, 2007:17). This was evident in this study, since the 
views of research participants were in some instances divergent. Furthermore, the 
researcher should position him/herself close to the research participants in order to 
interact with them during the data collection phase (Creswell, 2007:17). This suggestion 
of Creswell was followed in this study since the researcher acted as the primary data 
collection instrument, conducting the interviews personally. However, the data obtained 
were influenced by the participants’ and the researcher’s values and could therefore 
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have been biased (Creswell, 2007:17). To reduce bias in collecting and interpreting 
data, the researcher implemented measures to ensure trustworthiness (§ 4.3.5).  
 
Inductive reasoning (which is associated with a qualitative research design) implies that 
the researcher creates findings by observing the phenomenon under study and 
develops theories based on these observations (Bendassolli, 2013:2). Such a reasoning 
process differs from deductive reasoning, which is associated with experimental 
methods where theory exists and such theory is confirmed or disputed by conducting 
experiments (Bendassolli, 2013:4). In this study, an inductive reasoning process was 
followed during the analysis and interpretation of the data obtained during the data 
collection phase (Creswell, 2007:17). During the latter phase, the researcher made 
observations that were aligned to the theories on the value added by a specific AltX 
listed company’s AC to the company and its stakeholders (Bendassolli, 2013:2). 
 
When conducting research, a researcher should express his/her own paradigm (i.e. 
epistemology) (Creswell, 2007:15, 30). A paradigm refers to the set of principles that a 
researcher brings to the research (Creswell, 2007:19). In this study, the researcher 
acted as a constructivist. As a constructivist, the multiple subjective views of the 
participants were relied upon to develop themes which were based on the researcher’s 
interpretation (Creswell, 2007:21). The researcher’s paradigm accordingly influences 
the qualitative research approach chosen to address the research objectives (Creswell, 
2007:37; Fouché & Schurink, 2011:310).  
 
In view of the constructivist paradigm adopted by the researcher, a case study was 
considered to be the most appropriate research approach to complement the research 
design. A case study is defined as a qualitative research approach in terms of which the 
researcher explores a case(s) over a certain period by collecting detailed, in-depth data 
from multiple sources of information (Creswell, 2007:73). The result of such a study is 
an in-depth description of a case(s) and a number of themes (Creswell, 2007:73; 
Fouché & Schurink, 2011:321; Saldaña, 2011:8). Case study research is appropriate for 
exploring and understanding the uniqueness, dynamics and eccentricity of a particular 
case in detail (Welman et al., 2005:193), as well as when the researcher intends to 
familiarise him/herself with the research subjects’ worlds and identify patterns in their 
lives, words and activities (Fouché & Schurink, 2011:320).  
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A case study approach therefore enabled a detailed explorative study of the 
characteristics of the AC, the fulfilment of the AC’s responsibilities through optimised 
activities and the fulfilment of the AC’s responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships. It also allowed an understanding of the manner in which the AC fulfilled its 
responsibilities (formal and informal) (Turley & Zaman, 2007:768; Magrane & Malthus, 
2010:434). Such an approach also enabled the researcher to understand the way in 
which value was added by the AC that was not evident from publicly available sources 
(Turley & Zaman, 2007:782). 
 
The purpose of an explorative (i.e. instrumental) case study is to understand an issue 
(Creswell, 2007:74) in order to produce new knowledge (Fouché & Schurink, 2011:321). 
In view of the fact that the characteristics of an AltX listed company’s AC and the 
fulfilment of the AC’s responsibilities are unknown, an explorative (instrumental) case 
study was chosen. 
 
Although a case study research approach is appropriate for this study, it has its 
challenges. The findings of a case study are not generalisable, thus the readers of such 
a study are informed that the related findings are only applicable to the company 
selected for the study, as views on the value added by an AC differ among individuals 
and companies (Spira, 1999a:236) and therefore cannot be generalised to other AltX 
listed companies. However, this does not invalidate the findings of the study because 
detailed knowledge of the case is obtained (Hofstee, 2006:123), which may be useful 
when conducting similar studies on the value added by ACs. Another challenge of the 
case study approach is that the researcher may be subjective when collecting data and 
documenting the findings (Hofstee, 2006:123), which can lead to them being 
inaccurately presented. This challenge was addressed during the study by following the 
appropriate method and applying measures of trustworthiness (§ 4.3.5).  
 
4.3 METHOD 
 
The research method can be defined as the manner in which the chosen research 
approach is applied to achieve the researcher’s objectives (Hofstee, 2006:108, 112, 
115). The methodological aspects that will be addressed in this section include the 
selection of a research site and research participants, the collection of data and their 
  
74 
analysis and management. The measures implemented to ensure trustworthiness will 
also be dealt with. 
 
4.3.1 Selection of a research site and research participants 
 
Non-probability sampling is often applied to qualitative research (Strydom & Delport, 
2011b:391). In non-probability sampling, unit(s) will be deliberately selected to deepen 
the researcher’s understanding about the phenomenon under study (Ishak & Bakar, 
2014:29). As a result, certain of the units have no chance of being selected (Business 
Dictionary, 2015). Numerous non-probability sampling techniques exist (Strydom & 
Delport 2011b:392–394). In this study, the research site (case) and participants were 
selected from 60 AltX listed companies (Maluleka, 2015) on the basis of a purposeful 
sampling strategy. The specific research site and participants were chosen because the 
researcher was of the opinion that they could provide rich information about the 
phenomena being explored (Creswell, 2007:118, 125; Yin, 2011:88). 
 
Selection criteria were developed to select the research site. Although the selection of 
an ideal number of cases was in the hands of the researcher, it was important to bear in 
mind that the value of case study research is embedded in the presentation of detailed 
information. Thus, if more cases are selected, the value of case study research may be 
compromised (Creswell, 2007:76). Based on this argument, only one AltX listed 
company was purposefully selected.  
 
The following criteria were used for selecting a research site: 
 
 Accessibility – The AltX listed company had to be accessible (Creswell, 
2007:119). 
 Listing duration – On average, the 60 companies listed on the AltX had been 
listed for 7.59 years (Maluleka, 2015). Therefore, to be eligible for the study, the 
company had to be listed for at least 7.59 years. Such a selection criterion would 
ensure rich data as a company that had been listed for an extended period would 
have had ample opportunity to shape and establish the AC’s characteristics and 
responsibilities.  
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The AltX listed company that was selected for the study was accessible and had been 
listed for a period of 7.74 years (Maluleka, 2015). Hence, the company met the 
selection criteria. 
 
Access to the research site was arranged through a member of management (CFO) of 
the specific AltX listed company. The CFO approached the AC chairperson and the 
CEO to request their approval to conduct the study. After the AC chairperson and the 
CEO showed interest in the study, a memorandum detailing the scope of the research 
was sent to the CEO, who then provided written approval for the study. To ensure 
anonymity (§ 4.4), the approval letter was not included in this dissertation. 
 
The research participants selected from this company had to include individuals who 
would provide rich information about the phenomena being studied (Saldaña, 2011:33). 
The importance of selecting board members (who did not serve on the AC) to interview 
was highlighted by King III which states that the board should be dedicated to 
supporting and retaining an AC that is of value to the company and its stakeholders 
(IOD, 2009b:56, par. 5). Shareholders who are present at shareholders’ meetings have 
insight into the AC report and also vote for directors to be appointed as AC members 
(RSA, 2009:s 61(8)(a), 61(8)(c)). As the major shareholders’ investment in a company is 
significant compared with that of minority shareholders, major shareholders would be 
more interested in the role of and the value added by the AC to the company and its 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the AC is responsible for the application of a combined 
assurance model (IOD, 2009a:33, principle 3.5). Combined assurance is provided by 
internal (e.g. the internal auditor) and external assurance providers (e.g. the external 
auditor), as well as management. Thus, based on this responsibility, the AC should 
have a close relationship with both these assurance providers and management. The 
external auditor is also regarded as an important informant as he/she has to audit a 
wide range of companies and comes across both “good” and “bad” ACs. He/she will 
therefore be in a position to provide information about the value added by the AC of a 
specific company (Sommer, 1991:92). The company secretary is also an important 
source of information as he/she is responsible for keeping the AC charter up-to-date 
(IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.8), helping to compile the AC’s work plan 
(IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.11), and preparing and circulating the AC 
minutes (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.12). The designated advisor also 
has a close relationship with the AC as he/she advises the AC on the application of the 
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JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 2014b:s 21.5(iii)). 
Thus, for this study, research participants had to consist of AC members and persons 
who had a relationship with the AC. The latter included board members (those that did 
not form part of the AC), major shareholders, management (CEO and CFO), assurance 
providers (internal and external auditor), the company secretary and the designated 
advisor. 
 
The criteria that were developed for the selection of the research participants were 
applied when approaching specific individuals and requesting them to take part in the 
study. For the purpose of this study, it was important that participants from each of the 
following categories, namely, the AC, board (excluding AC members), major 
shareholders, management and assurance providers, participate in the study to provide 
an in-depth understanding of the way in which value is added by the AC of the specific 
AltX listed company. The company secretary and the designated advisor were also 
regarded as important participants. Ultimately, eight of the ten participants who were 
purposely selected according to the selection criteria, agreed to take part in this study. 
Table 4.1 provides details of the participant categories and the number of individuals in 
these categories that were approached to participate in comparison to the number of 
individuals who actually participated in the study. 
 
Table 4.1 Number of individuals approached to participate in the study 
compared to the number of individuals that actually participated  
 
Participant categories 
Number of individuals 
approached to participate 
in the study 
Number of individuals that 
actually participated in the 
study 
AC (which includes the 
chairperson of the AC) 
3 3 
Board (which includes the 
chairperson of the board) 
2 (Note 1) 1 
Management (CEO and 
CFO) 
2 (Note 2) 2 
CAE Note 3 Note 3 
External auditor (partner in 
charge of the external audit) 
1 0 
Company secretary 1 1 
Designated advisor 1 1 
Total 10 8 
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Note 1: The two board members were also major shareholders of the company as they 
held 22.6% and 19.4% of the issued shares in the company respectively (ABC Limited, 
2014a:27). 
 
Note 2: The CEO was also a major shareholder of the company who held 10.1% of the 
issued shares in the company (ABC Limited, 2014a:27). 
 
Note 3: The AltX listed company in this study did not have an internal auditor.  
 
As indicated in table 4.1 the researcher was unable to secure two of the ten interviews. 
The board member who did not participate in the study had a busy work schedule and 
could therefore not accommodate the researcher, while the external auditor was initially 
keen to participate but later withdrew as a result of confidentiality concerns. 
 
4.3.2 Data collection 
 
In a case study, a number of data sources can be used, for example interviews, 
observations, documents and archival records (Fouché & Schurink, 2011:321). In this 
study, semi-structured individual interviews were conducted, field notes were made and 
company documents were reviewed. By using these three data sources, an 
understanding was gained of the way in which the AC adds value to the AltX listed 
company and its stakeholders. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of the study was 
enhanced by using more than one data source (Saldaña, 2011:76). The use of more 
than one data source to corroborate the research findings is referred to as triangulation 
(Creswell, 2007:208).  
 
Semi-structured individual interviews – The research participants were individually 
interviewed and these interviews were semi-structured in nature. An interview can be 
described as a connection where information is exchanged between the interviewer and 
the participant (Greeff, 2011:342). A semi-structured interview is an interview in which 
the researcher uses pre-populated questions to guide the interview, although new 
questions may arise during the course of the interview (Myers, 2011:124). 
 
The rationale for using semi-structured interviews was to obtain detailed and 
comparable data on the participants’ views on a particular aspect (Greeff, 2011:348, 
  
78 
351, 360). Semi-structured interviews provide participants with a chance to inform the 
interviewer of important matters concerning the value added by the AC not covered by 
the pre-populated questions, whilst the pre-populated questions provide structure to the 
interviews (Myers, 2011:125). It was therefore a useful way to obtain an informed view 
of the value added by the company’s AC. 
 
According to Gendron et al. (2004:156), the pre-populated questions posed to research 
participants should be developed on the basis of the research objectives and previous 
research studies. Thus, pre-populated interview questions were developed to address 
the AC attributes that contribute to understanding the way in which the AC adds value to 
an AltX listed company and its stakeholders. Chapters 2 and 3 identified and explored 
the attributes that should be considered in terms of legislation, the JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies, codes and reports, and scholarly literature. The 
attributes identified from these sources therefore provided the theoretical framework for 
the study (Delport, Fouché & Schurink, 2011:306) and guided the researcher in 
developing the questions for the interviews (Greeff, 2011:352).  
 
In this study, main and sub-questions were developed for each category of participants. 
The main questions were asked first. If during their responses the participants failed to 
provide information about the areas addressed by the sub-questions, then these were 
also posed. Appendix A lists the pre-populated questions linked to the attributes 
influencing the value added by an AC.  
 
Greeff (2011:352) states that the interview questions should be arranged from simple 
and broad to complicated and specific. The less sensitive questions should be asked 
first followed by the more sensitive questions as the interview progresses. Questions 1–
5 contained in appendix A deal with qualifications, experience, the AC members’ 
appointment process, performance assessment and training. The researcher regarded 
these questions as simple and unthreatening. Questions 6 (How does the AC add value 
to the company?) and 7 (How does this differ from other companies and why?) were 
regarded as complicated and sensitive. Nevertheless, these questions were posed to 
participants at the start of the interview, as the second last question of the interview 
(question 50: What else can the AC do to increase the value being added to the 
company and its stakeholders?) related back to questions 6 and 7. The separation of 
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these questions was used as a measure of trustworthiness to corroborate the 
participant’s answers. Questions 9–49 were asked in a logical sequence: 
 
 Questions 8–13 related to the relationship between the AC and the board, 
management, the external auditor, the company secretary and the designated 
advisor. 
 Questions 14–22 built on the relationship status and revolved around meetings 
(excluding AC meetings) between the AC and management as well as the 
external auditor. 
 Questions 23–47 were associated with AC meetings. The questions were 
regarded as sensitive because the AC meetings were the platform on which the 
AC mainly fulfils its responsibilities. The researcher was also denied access to 
these AC meetings which further supports the sensitive nature of these 
questions. Hence, the questions were positioned at the end of the interview. 
 Question 48 revolved around the manner in which the AC demonstrated its CG 
responsibilities to the board. It made logical sense to position this question after 
all the questions relating to relationships and the fulfilment of the AC’s 
responsibilities had been posed. 
 Question 49 (Do you believe that you have any responsibilities to the public apart 
from your responsibilities to shareholders?) was also regarded as a sensitive 
question and was therefore asked towards the end of the interview. 
 Question 51 was included as the researcher wanted to reduce the risk of missing 
information about the value of the AC that had not been covered by the other 
interview questions. 
 
The questions that guided the interview were included in an interview schedule (Greeff, 
2011:352), which covered the areas the researcher wanted to deal with during the 
interview with the specific category of participant (Greeff, 2011:352). The participant 
was allowed to move away from questions contained in the interview schedule. 
However, the researcher determined the relevance of such a deviation and redirected 
the interview if necessary (Greeff, 2011:353). Eight interview schedules were drawn up 
as the number of and type of questions included varied depending on the category of 
the participant. Appendix B provides an example of the interview schedule for the AC 
chairperson. 
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Research participants may be reluctant to share information during an interview (Greeff, 
2011:360). To overcome this risk, the researcher made contact with and maintained a 
good relationship with the CFO as the researcher had previously worked with him/her. 
This relationship meant that the CFO was willing to approach the CEO and AC 
chairperson to request approval for the study. In the interests of establishing good 
relationships, the researcher also informed the participants of her credentials, the 
sincerity of the intention to collect data objectively, the objectives of the proposed study 
and the manner in which the research would be undertaken (Fouché & Schurink, 
2011:325). To further reduce the risk of participants not being communicative, the 
interview commenced with an explanation of the objectives of the study, the role of the 
participant, and the fact that all information obtained during the interview would be 
treated confidentially and the participants would remain anonymous (Greeff, 2011:350). 
Six of the research participants were interviewed at the company where they were 
employed, in a private, comfortable, quiet venue where there were no interruptions 
(Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:34). This relaxed atmosphere enabled participants to 
share their experiences of the way in which value was added by the AC. Although the 
other two interviews were conducted at coffee shops, these venues were comfortable. 
The researcher is of the opinion that this setting also allowed these two research 
participants to share their experiences regarding the value added by the AC easily, as 
these venues were suggested by the research participants themselves. See also the 
ethical considerations discussed in section 4.4. 
 
There is a risk that the interview questions may not probe the participants sufficiently to 
provide a detailed response (Greeff, 2011:360). This risk was managed by pilot testing 
(Creswell, 2007:133) the interview questions in the interview schedule with one of the 
researcher’s colleagues who had previously served on ACs. It was considered 
important to pilot the interview that would be held with the AC chairperson because 
he/she was regarded as an important source of information and this interview schedule 
was the most comprehensive (appendix B). The colleague’s role during the pilot testing 
was to ensure that the questions were limited, neutral, clear, focused, open-ended and 
arranged in the correct sequence (Greeff, 2011:352). After the pilot interview the 
questions in the interview schedule were refined and the researcher felt confident about 
proceeding with the data collection phase.  
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A training session was attended to equip the researcher with interview skills and 
communication techniques. Proper interview skills are important as they result in high 
quality data being collected (Greeff, 2011:343). During the interviews the researcher 
applied good communication techniques such as providing minimal verbal responses 
(e.g. “yes”), clarifying information brought to the fore by the participant, encouraging the 
participant to expand on his/her ideas (Greeff, 2011:345) and probing participants in 
order to increase the richness of the information obtained (Greeff, 2011:345; Saldaña, 
2011:43). Furthermore, the adoption of good listening skills and showing curiosity and 
respect led to the establishment of good relationships with the participants (Greeff, 
2011:351; Saldaña, 2011:39–40). Interviews were also conducted at a rate the 
participants felt comfortable with and they were allowed to complete their sentences 
and/or ideas (Greeff, 2011:351). 
 
The interview process was as follows: Research participants were invited to participate 
in an interview and a time and place for the interview was then arranged (Greeff, 
2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:34), taking into account the amount of time required. An hour 
(Greeff, 2011:351) was deemed sufficient for each interview as the research 
participants included high profile individuals with busy work schedules. The participant 
information sheet describing the areas to be addressed during the interview (appendix 
C) was then e-mailed to the participant. The researcher was of the opinion that the fact 
that the interview questions were absent from the information sheet, prevented 
participants from providing insincere and rehearsed responses. 
 
At the commencement of the interview, the purpose of the study, the role of the 
participant, the confidential treatment of information revealed during the interview 
(Greeff, 2011:350), the digital voice recording (Greeff, 2011:359) and the participant’s 
right to withdraw at any point during the interview were explained (Greeff, 2011:350). 
After the participant had agreed to being recorded (Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:40) 
and had signed the informed consent form (appendix D) (Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 
2011:40) the interview and recording of the interview commenced. The interview 
concluded with a summary of the main findings and the participant was asked whether 
he/she had any questions. He/she was then thanked for his/her willingness to 
participate (Greeff, 2011:351). The digital voice recordings were subsequently 
transcribed and analysed shortly after the interview (Greeff, 2011:360; Saldaña, 
2011:44). Interviews were transcribed from 379 minutes of voice-recorded 
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conversations in total, which translated into 192 pages of transcriptions. Interviews took 
between 14 and 68 minutes each. 
 
As indicated in section 4.3.1, not all of the ten research participants who were 
purposefully selected according to the selection criteria agreed to be interviewed. 
Nevertheless, the interviews conducted with the eight participants (who did agree to 
take part in this study) were deemed sufficient as data saturation was achieved. Hence, 
the same themes on the value added by the AC as experienced by the eight research 
participants occurred repeatedly. The researcher is of the opinion that no new 
information would have been brought to the fore by the two research participants who 
did not take part in this study. 
 
Field notes – In the context of this study, field notes can be described as notes 
detailing the things that the researcher heard, saw, understood, considered and felt 
during the progression of the interview (Greeff, 2011:359). These notes were made 
immediately after each interview and were kept throughout the data collection phase. 
This helped in recalling the observations made during each interview. In these field 
notes the researcher also made reference to things that actually happened and things 
that the researcher thought had happened (Greeff, 2011:359), as well as the 
participant’s body language and tone of voice (Saldaña, 2011:40). In qualitative 
research the researcher is regarded as the primary data collection instrument because 
he/she needs to document what he/she comprehends and feels during the research 
process (Saldaña, 2011:32). Although qualitative research is inherently subjective 
(Creswell, 2007:17), the researcher attempted to be as objective as possible during the 
data collection phase and not be unduly influenced by her “feelings”. These field notes 
provided contextual insights into the participants’ responses and were used to give 
readers background on the observations made during the interviews. 
 
Company documents – Public documents such as the company’s AFS for the year 
ending 2008, annual report for the year ending 2010 and integrated report for the year 
ending 2014 were reviewed. Previous AFS were only reviewed to obtain information 
about AC members’ appointment dates, whilst information included in the company’s 
integrated report for the year ending 2014 enabled the researcher to refine the 
questions included in the interview schedules. The following documents were provided 
to the researcher on request and were also reviewed: attendance registers for the AC 
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meetings held during the 2014 calendar year, the AC’s latest terms of reference and its 
work plan.  
 
A study of the company’s documents was combined with an analysis of the transcribed 
interviews to corroborate findings from the interviews (Strydom & Delport, 2011a:376–
377). This also served to highlight information that was not brought to the fore during 
the interviews. As such, information obtained from the company documents added 
additional evidence on the value added by the company’s AC and was analysed in 
terms of the applicable themes and categories.  
 
Permission to attend an AC meeting was requested but was denied. This is not a new 
phenomenon (Spira, 2003:183). Spira (1998:33; 1999a:242) suggests that information 
about the structure of AC meetings and the records of issues dealt with at AC meetings 
should be obtained by studying the agendas and minutes of these meetings. As a 
result, the researcher requested the agendas and minutes of AC meetings for the 
preceding twelve months to obtain an understanding of the AC responsibilities, the 
involvement of AC members, management and assurance providers, as well as the 
procedures followed. However, again access to these agendas and minutes was denied 
for reasons of confidentiality (Strydom & Delport, 2011a:379). This obstacle was 
overcome by including questions on these matters in the various interview schedules 
(appendix A, questions 40–44, 46–47). 
 
Only the latest documentation was requested from the company as this study was not 
historical in nature. The researcher does acknowledge that historical data on the 
company’s AC would indicate the manner in which processes and systems concerning 
the AC had changed and whether these processes and systems had affected the way in 
which the AC adds value to an AltX listed company and its stakeholders. However, the 
study of historical data does not fall within the scope of this study. The researcher thus 
proposes that further research should be performed on the development of processes 
and systems concerning the AC and to establish whether or not these developments 
affected the value added by an AC. 
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4.3.3 Data analysis 
 
The aim of qualitative data analysis is to reveal new information that has been observed 
and discovered about the phenomena being studied (Saldaña, 2011:89). Qualitative 
data analysis is defined as “[t]he non-numerical examination and interpretation of 
observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of 
relationships” (Babbie, 2010:394). The qualitative data analysed included interview 
transcripts, field notes and company documents.  
 
Numerous techniques are available for analysing data (Saldaña, 2011:89, 93; Schurink, 
Fouché & De Vos, 2011:400). In this study, following the data collection phase, the hard 
copies of the eight transcribed interviews, field notes and company documents were 
read extensively to identify preliminary codes. These codes were highlighted (Saldaña, 
2011:95) and then written next to the relevant text in the right-hand margin of the 
transcripts, field notes and company documents being analysed. Codes are defined as 
a descriptor assigned to a piece of data. Such a descriptor captures the core meaning 
of a data piece (Saldaña, 2011:95). Codes can be assigned throughout the data 
analysis phase if data with a similar core meaning appear (Saldaña, 2011:96). Codes 
are subjectively determined, depending on the interpretation of the data analysis 
(Saldaña, 2011:97). Descriptive open coding techniques were used. Open coding refers 
to the examination of textual data (a sentence or paragraph), subsequently summarising 
the data using a descriptive code (Myers, 2011:110). Descriptive codes take the form of 
nouns which summarise the main focus of a particular text (Saldaña, 2011:104). This 
first review of the data allows the researcher to stimulate his/her analytical thinking, to 
recall areas to be followed up and to establish interrelationships among themes 
(Saldaña, 2011:95).  
 
The transcribed interviews (in the form of MS Word documents) were then formatted, 
numbered sequentially (P1–P8 to maintain the anonymity of participants), saved in Rich 
Text File format and imported into Atlas.ti, that is, Computer Assisted Qualitative 
Analysis software. The steps followed in the first-coding phase were repeated again for 
the transcribed interviews using Atlas.ti. The researcher allocated a code that differed 
from the code assigned during the first-coding phase if deemed necessary. This 
software merely assisted the data analysis process by acting as a repository for the 
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researcher’s data (Saldaña, 2011:137); the researcher is the one who has to do the 
thinking and capture his/her thoughts into the software (Yin, 2011:180).  
 
During qualitative data analysis the researcher captures “text” input into the software 
and performs the disassembling and reassembling processes (Yin, 2011:181). This 
second-coding was also done on the hard copies of field notes and company 
documents by reviewing the codes that were assigned in the first-coding phases. As in 
the transcribed interviews, the researcher changed codes if required. Thereafter, similar 
descriptive codes were grouped and assigned to a specific descriptive category 
(Babbie, 2010:401; Saldaña, 2011:104). The interrelationships among these categories 
were explored (Saldaña, 2011:92) and common themes identified in order to place the 
value added by the AC in context. The theoretical framework drawn up in chapter 3 
guided the themes and categories developed by the researcher.  
 
The transcribed interviews were then sent to an independent and experienced co-coder 
to enhance the reliability of the findings. Reliability is defined as “the stability of 
responses to multiple coders of data sets” (Creswell, 2007:210). The co-coder did not 
review the theoretical framework of attributes influencing the value added by an AC, 
which served as a guideline during the theming and categorising of data, but he/she did 
code the transcribed interviews independently and provided the researcher with a report 
on the themes and categories identified. The researcher then compared the co-coder’s 
themes and categories with those that had emerged after the second-coding phase. A 
meeting was subsequently held where differences were clarified. The findings are 
presented in chapter 5 under the applicable themes and categories that emerged. 
Verbatim quotes from participants were also used to support the findings. 
 
4.3.4 Data management 
 
A marked file was created for the AltX listed company selected for the study in which 
hard copies of interview transcripts, field notes and company documents were filed in a 
logical order. Another file was created for storing the consent forms signed by the 
participants. These files were stored in a safe location under lock and key. Soft copies 
of data were stored in a marked folder on a password protected computer. This folder 
was backed up on a separate storage device which was kept in a different, secure 
location.  
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4.3.5 Measures to ensure trustworthiness 
 
A study is considered to be trustworthy when the data collection and analysis phases 
have been properly conducted and the findings accurately presented (Yin, 2011:78). 
Guba’s model of trustworthiness (Krefting, 1991:214–222; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:398) 
was used as a guideline for implementing measures to ensure trustworthiness and 
increase the rigour of the study. According to this model, trustworthiness is built on the 
following four pillars: truth value (credibility), applicability (transferability), consistency 
(dependability) and neutrality (conformability). Each pillar advocates strategies which 
are discussed below. 
 
Truth value – Truth value is defined as the researcher’s degree of confidence in the 
findings being presented. These findings are based on the research method adopted, 
the research participants, and the context in which the research was undertaken 
(Krefting, 1991:215; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:398). Truth value further refers to the 
believability of the researcher’s findings (Saldaña, 2011:135). For the purpose of this 
study, reflexivity, triangulation, peer examination, structural coherence and referential 
adequacy were used to enhance the truth value.  
 
Reflexivity is regarded as the effect of the researcher’s own beliefs, background and 
culture on the research process (Ruby, 1980:153; Krefting, 1991:218). To improve the 
researcher’s neutrality in this study, field notes were made during the data collection 
phase which detailed feelings and thoughts experienced during the research process. 
 
Triangulation refers to the use of numerous data methods, data sources, investigators 
and theories to corroborate the research findings (Creswell, 2007:208). In this study 
data were collected from interviews, field notes and company documents. The findings 
brought to the fore by these data sources were subsequently compared to corroborate 
the research findings. Different categories of participants (AC members, a member of 
the board, management, the company secretary, and the designated advisor) were 
interviewed which provided information that was compared to corroborate the findings. 
The findings presented were also compared with the existing scholarly literature.  
 
Peer examination refers to discussions among the researcher and colleagues about all 
aspects of the research process (Krefting, 1991:219; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:412–413). 
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Regular formal and informal meetings were held with the researcher’s two supervisors 
to discuss the progress, findings and difficulties encountered during the research 
process. These meetings provided clear direction and helped the researcher through 
the research journey. 
 
Structural coherence involves the integration of a large volume of unstructured, linked 
data into the dissertation to present a clear picture of the phenomena being studied 
(Guba, 1981:85–86; Krefting, 1991:220). This dissertation is presented in six chapters in 
which the literature, methodology and findings are described in detail to provide a 
holistic picture of the study. 
 
Referential adequacy (literature review) was established by using research resources 
which are relevant and current. These resources are included in the list of references 
(Maritz & Visagie, 2011:10). Appendices (Maritz & Visagie, 2011:10) are also included 
in the dissertation and include a participant information sheet (appendix C) and a letter 
of informed consent (appendix D). Furthermore, the services of a co-coder were used to 
code the data independently and provide the researcher with a coding report. 
 
Applicability – Applicability is concerned with the manner in which the research 
findings relate to other research studies (Krefting, 1991:220; Lincoln & Guba, 
1999:398). Qualitative studies are generally associated with the study of a unique group 
where the findings emanating from such a group may not necessarily be transferable to 
other situations (Krefting, 1991:220; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:420). According to Lincoln 
and Guba (1999:420), the researcher is not responsible for informing the reader about 
the transferability of a study, but should merely provide adequate information to allow 
the reader to assess the transferability of the study to other situations (Krefting, 
1991:221; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:420).  
 
The provision of the selection criteria used to identify the research site and the research 
participants, background information on the research participants, the context of the 
study, the research process and the findings of the study was a strategy to address the 
applicability of the study. By providing such information, readers should be able to 
decide for themselves whether or not such findings may be applicable to other 
situations (Krefting, 1991:220; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:420). 
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Another strategy to ensure the applicability of the study was the selection of research 
participants who could give a holistic view of the value added by the selected AltX listed 
company’s AC. In this study research participants were purposefully selected using 
predetermined selection criteria. 
 
Consistency – Consistency is also known as reliability and occurs when the data are 
analysed again and the same findings result (Delport & Roestenburg, 2011:177). In this 
study, a code-recoding procedure was followed where an independent, experienced co-
coder was used (§ 4.3.3) to increase the consistency of the findings (Krefting, 1991:221; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1999:421). Furthermore, an in-depth description of the method, 
including the selection of a research site and research participants, data analysis and 
interpretation of data, was provided to allow readers to follow the decision trail (Krefting, 
1991:221; Lincoln & Guba, 1999:421). Other strategies that were used to increase the 
consistency of the study included triangulation and peer examination (refer to the “truth 
value” pillar discussed in this section) (Krefting, 1991:217). 
 
Neutrality – Neutrality refers to the idea that the data links up with the findings and can 
be effortlessly understood by others (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008:294). An audit trail of 
the records used in this study was created to ensure that readers and/or other scholars 
would be able to verify the trustworthiness of the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1999:422–
423). Other neutrality strategies used include reflexivity (Lincoln & Guba, 1999:430) and 
triangulation (refer to the “truth value” pillar discussed in this section) (Guba, 1981:83). 
 
4.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Research ethics govern the manner in which research is done and reported on 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008:62, 65) and protect the rights of the research participants 
by ensuring that ethical principles are adopted during the study (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008:63).  
 
Internationally accepted ethical principles included in the Belmont Report (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research, 1978:4) were applied during this study. The Belmont report (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
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Research, 1978:4) refers to three principles: respect for persons, beneficence and 
justice. The researcher adhered to all three of these principles. 
 
Respect for persons – Respect for persons implies that the researcher should respect 
the autonomy of and provide protection for research participants (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 1978:4). 
A letter of consent to perform the study was obtained from the AltX listed company 
selected for the study (see § 4.3.1 for the reasons for excluding this letter from the 
dissertation). The research participants of the AltX listed company were identified on the 
basis of selection criteria (§ 4.3.1). The researcher personally invited the research 
participants to the interview and e-mailed them a participant information sheet 
(appendix C) and voluntary informed consent form (appendix D), requesting them to 
sign the consent form (Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:40). The participant information 
sheet provided information about the fact that participation in the study was voluntary, 
as well as details on the objectives of the study, the research process, the benefits of 
the study, and the right of withdrawal from the study at any point (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 
1978:11, 14). It also confirmed that information obtained during the interviews would be 
kept confidential and that participants’ anonymity would be protected. The interview 
process commenced only after a participant’s signed consent form and agreement to 
record the interview had been obtained (Greeff, 2011:350; Saldaña, 2011:40). 
 
To safeguard the anonymity of both the company and the research participants, a 
pseudonym was given to the AltX listed company, namely, ABC Limited. In the 
presentation of the findings in chapter 5, the company is therefore referred to as ABC 
Limited. The participants’ names were also excluded from the researcher’s findings.  
 
Confidentiality was maintained as the transcriber and the co-coder had to sign a 
confidentially agreement before the researcher provided them with the digital recordings 
containing the interview data and the interview transcriptions respectively. Data 
management techniques that safeguard confidentiality were also applied (§ 4.3.4). 
 
Beneficence – Beneficence refers to not doing harm or minimising possible harm to 
participants and maximising the benefits to be reaped by participants from the study 
(National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
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Behavioural Research, 1978:6). To evaluate the risks and benefits of the study for 
research participants, the researcher did a risk/benefit analysis (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 
1978:16). Accordingly, the benefits of this study are deemed to be that the results of the 
study would be shared publicly (although anonymity would be maintained) to provide 
greater knowledge on the way in which value is added by ACs at AltX listed companies. 
On the other hand, a risk associated with the study was identified as the fact that the 
research participants might be apprehensive about a breach of anonymity and 
confidentiality. This risk was dealt with by providing research participants with an 
informed consent form confirming that information shared during the interview would be 
kept confidential and anonymous. Furthermore, the researcher reiterated the 
importance of maintaining confidentiality and anonymity before the interviews 
commenced. 
 
To further minimise possible harm to participants, high quality research was produced 
by applying a recognised research design and approach (Maritz & Visagie, 2011:14). In 
addition, the supervisors who guided the researcher through the research process were 
qualified and experienced. Ethical clearance was also obtained from the Research 
Ethics Review Committee in UNISA’s College of Accounting Science and the 
researcher attended a training course on ethical considerations in qualitative research. 
 
Justice – Justice refers to “equal share and fairness” (Orb, Eisenhauer & Wynaden, 
2000:95). In other words, “avoiding exploitation and abuse of participants” (Orb et al., 
2000:95). This requirement for justice was complied with by the researcher providing 
participants with a participant information sheet (appendix C) and presenting findings in 
a manner that is accurate and objective and does not deceive the readers. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter explained that an explorative qualitative research design was suitable to 
understand the way in which the AC adds value to an AltX listed company and its 
stakeholders (§ 4.2). To complement this design, a case study approach was selected. 
The research site and research participants were purposefully selected on the basis of 
predetermined selection criteria (§ 4.3.1). Accordingly, an AltX listed company which 
was accessible to the researcher and that had been listed for at least the same 
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timeframe as the average listing duration of AltX listed companies was selected as the 
research site. Participants included the AC members, a member of the board, members 
of management, the company secretary and the designated advisor. The collection of 
data from a number of sources using semi-structured interviews, field notes and 
company documents contributed to the trustworthiness of the study (§ 4.3.2). Data 
sources were analysed using descriptive open coding techniques and Atlas.ti was used 
as a supportive tool when analysing interview transcripts (§ 4.3.3). Data were stored in 
such a way that confidentiality was safeguarded (§ 4.3.4). A number of strategies were 
implemented to ensure the trustworthiness and increase the rigour of the study during 
both the data collection and analysis phase (§ 4.3.5). Internationally accepted ethical 
principles were also applied during this study (§ 4.4). 
 
Chapter 5 will discuss the empirical findings of the study. These findings are based on 
the analysis of data obtained from the semi-structured individual interviews held with the 
research participants, as well as field notes and company documents. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapter explained that an explorative qualitative research design and 
case study approach were applied to understand the way in which value is added by an 
AltX listed company’s AC. Chapter 4 also described the method used in selecting both 
the research site and the participants, as well as data collection and analysis, and the 
management of data. The measures implemented to ensure the trustworthiness of the 
study were also dealt with. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the ethical 
considerations applied during the current study. 
 
This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the research findings. Semi-
structured in-depth individual interviews, observations in the form of field notes and 
relevant company documents were used in order to achieve the research objectives. In 
this chapter, the interpretation and reporting style will be discussed (§ 5.2) followed by a 
description of the interview context (§ 5.3). Thereafter, the empirical findings will be 
presented within the context of the theoretical framework of the three components 
influencing the value of an AC, as explained in chapter 3. These components include 
the characteristics of AC members, the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through 
optimised activities and the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers (§ 5.4).  
 
5.2 INTERPRETATION AND REPORTING STYLE 
 
As discussed in chapter 4 (§ 4.3.3), data were firstly analysed by reading the hard 
copies of the eight transcribed interviews, the field notes and the company documents 
in order to identify preliminary codes. These codes were then written next to the 
relevant text in the right-hand margins. During this first-coding phase, descriptive open 
coding techniques were used. During the second-coding phase, the researcher used 
Atlas.ti, Computer Assisted Qualitative Analysis software, to assign codes to the 
imported transcribed interviews. Second-coding was also done on the hard copies of 
field notes and company documents. Codes which were initially assigned during the 
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first-coding phase were revised and changed if deemed necessary. Similar descriptive 
codes were then grouped and assigned to a specific descriptive category (Babbie, 
2010:401; Saldaña, 2011:104). The interrelationships among these categories were 
explored (Saldaña, 2011:92) and common themes identified in order to bring the value 
added by the AC into context.  
 
After second-coding was completed, a co-coder was assigned to co-code the 
transcribed interviews independently. However, this person did not review the 
theoretical framework (ch 3, fig 3.1) which guided the theming and categorising of data. 
His/her input was merely to increase the reliability of the findings. 
 
An inductive reasoning process was followed during the analysis and interpretation of 
the data obtained during the data collection phase (Creswell, 2007:17). During this 
phase, the researcher made observations and aligned them to theories relating to the 
value added by the AC of a specific AltX listed company and its stakeholders 
(Bendassolli, 2013:2). Although themes and categories were developed on the basis of 
the theoretical framework, an inductive reasoning process in terms of a constructivist 
paradigm was followed during the analysis and interpretation of data.  
 
Transcribed interviews were imported into Atlas.ti as primary documents in the order in 
which the interviews were conducted and transcribed, for example primary document 1 
corresponds with the first interview conducted and transcribed. Verbatim quotes from 
research participants were used to support the findings. The referencing method used 
to present the findings of the study was created by Atlas.ti. For example, the reference 
“P1:31” refers to the following: “P” means “participant”, number “1” refers to the primary 
document number and number “31” represents the quotation number in the primary 
document. Verbatim quotes used during the presentation of findings were indented and 
indicated in italics. Shorter verbatim quotes that were used as part of the researcher’s 
paraphrasing were not presented in italics but were displayed in inverted commas. 
Instances where readers would be unable to understand the quote without reading a 
larger section of the transcribed interview, for example where participants referred to 
“they” or “them”, were replaced with the appropriate word(s) in brackets to ensure that 
readers have a clear understanding of the specific individual/group referred to by the 
participant. In addition, where participants referred to themselves during the interviews 
and a reader might be able to identify the participant, the researcher replaced words 
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such as “I”, with the participant’s role in the company in brackets (e.g. the [chairperson 
of the AC]), to protect participants’ anonymity. To protect anonymity further, verbatim 
quotes that revealed gender, such as “he” or “his”, were supplemented with the 
inclusion of “she” or “her” and also indicated in brackets. An additional word(s) or a 
letter was also included in brackets where the participant erroneously excluded a word 
or made a language error which hampered comprehension. To further protect the 
anonymity of the participants, findings were reported from two broad perspectives, 
namely, AC members and non-AC members. The following table provides a summary of 
the participant groups and the references included in the empirical findings to support 
assertions: 
 
Table 5.1 Participant groups and references used 
 
Participant groups References used 
AC members (including the chairperson of the AC) P2, P6, P8 
Non-AC members (chairperson of the board, CEO, CFO, 
company secretary, designated advisor) 
P1, P3, P4, P5, P7 
 
One interview was conducted in Afrikaans and was subsequently translated to present 
the study in one language only. 
 
In chapter 2 (§ 2.2.3.2), the researcher argued that AltX listed companies with the main 
goal of growing their businesses in the long term could achieve maximum growth and 
wealth by considering the interests of all stakeholders during the companies’ decision-
making processes and business operations. It was therefore expected that the AltX 
listed company is this study, which had a long-term vision to grow its business, as 
evidenced by its listing duration of 7.74 years (Maluleka, 2015) and the strategic 
practices reflected in its integrated report (ABC Limited, 2014a:7), would embrace 
stakeholder theory. The AC participants were, however, of the opinion that the 
beneficiaries of the AltX listed company are primarily shareholders. For this reason, 
when reporting on the findings, except where otherwise indicated, reference is made to 
shareholders and not stakeholders.  
 
In qualitative research, where the researcher is regarded as the primary data collection 
instrument, he/she needs to document what he/she comprehends and feels during the 
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research process (Saldaña, 2011:32). As a result, a first-person writing style is generally 
used during the presentation of the findings (Creswell, 2007:17). However, for the 
purpose of this study, a third-person writing style was chosen for presenting and 
discussing the findings because a co-coder was used to prevent findings from being 
biased. In addition, the information obtained during the interviews was validated, where 
possible, with information from company documents. These documents provided factual 
data and were therefore not based on the researcher’s observations and conclusions. 
Lastly, although field notes are regarded as subjective, they were only used to provide 
readers with background on the observations made during the interviews (§ 5.3). 
 
5.3 CONTEXT OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
Ten participants, namely, all seven board members, the external auditor, the company 
secretary and the designated advisor were invited to participate in the study and 
showed an interest in participating. However, one participant later withdrew owing to 
anonymity concerns, whilst another participant’s busy work schedule prevented him/her 
from participating in the study. This resulted in eight interviews being conducted. 
Interviews were held with all three members of the AC, the chairperson of the board, the 
CEO and the CFO, the company secretary and the designated advisor. Table 5.2 
provides the ten participants’ designations, their involvement in the AC and their 
participation in the study. 
 
Table 5.2 Participants’ designations, their involvement in the AC and their 
participation in the study 
 
Designation 
Member of the 
AC (yes/no) 
Invitee to the AC 
meetings 
(yes/no) 
Participated in the 
study (yes/no) 
Non-executive, independent 
board member 
Yes 
Not applicable as 
member served 
on AC 
Yes 
Non-executive, independent 
board member 
Yes Yes 
Non-executive, independent 
board member 
Yes Yes 
Chairperson of the board 
(Non-executive) 
No No Yes 
Non-executive board 
member 
No Yes No 
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Designation 
Member of the 
AC (yes/no) 
Invitee to the AC 
meetings 
(yes/no) 
Participated in the 
study (yes/no) 
Executive board member 
(CEO) 
No Yes Yes 
Executive board member 
(CFO) 
No Yes Yes 
External auditor No Yes No 
Company secretary No Yes Yes 
Designated advisor No Yes Yes 
Total 3 6 8 
 
The researcher noted the recurring themes and categories that emerged during the 
interview process and believes that data saturation was reached on conclusion of these 
interviews. Thus, no further interviews were deemed necessary. 
 
As indicated in chapter 4, field notes are also regarded as data and contributed to an 
understanding of the value added by the AC. The field notes further enhanced the 
trustworthiness of the study (Saldaña, 2011:76). The researcher used her field notes to 
describe her experiences with the research participants who formed part of this study.  
 
During the interviews the researcher observed strong bonds between participants. Such 
closeness was perceived to be similar to the closeness that exists in a family-owned 
business. These strong bonds may be attributable to the size of the AltX listed company 
as only seven members served on the board. A family-owned business is also 
characterised by shares being held by family members who manage the company. Like 
the shareholding of a family-owned business, the majority of the shares (52.1%) of the 
AltX listed company in this study were held by both executive and non-executive board 
members (ABC Limited, 2014a:27).  
 
The field notes were used to provide background on the interviews. Table 5.3 gives 
some background on each of the eight participants. 
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Table 5.3 Background of the interviews 
 
Participant 1: The interview was confirmed directly with the participant and was conducted at 
a coffee shop during office hours because the meeting room on the company’s premises was 
booked. The researcher was nervous as it was her first interview. However, the interview 
setting assisted in creating a relaxed atmosphere. Although the participant had a work deadline 
to meet, he/she answered the interview questions in detail and provided many examples to 
support his/her responses. The researcher wondered whether this thoroughness would also be 
an indication of his/her thoroughness in preparing for an AC meeting. This participant 
mentioned that the following participants, in addition to the three AC members, the company 
secretary and the designated advisor, also attended AC meetings: a non-executive board 
member, the CEO, the CFO and the external auditor. The researcher had initially expected that 
AC meetings would only be attended by the three AC members, the company secretary and 
the designated advisor, with the presence of management and the external auditor only being 
requested on occasion. In addition, after covering all the questions the researcher felt that the 
participant wanted to share more information. A general question was thus posed: Is there 
anything else that you want to add regarding the value of the AC? In response the participant 
provided additional information. This general question was also included in the other interview 
schedules as the researcher wanted to reduce the risk of missing information about the value 
of the AC that the original interview questions might not have covered. Additionally, the 
information obtained in this interview was used to refine the questions in the other interview 
schedules. 
Participant 2: The interview was confirmed directly with the participant. The meeting was 
conducted in a meeting room during office hours with no interruptions. The participant 
requested that the interview be conducted in Afrikaans. The participant was tired and yawned 
several times during the interview. The researcher wondered if this could be as a result of the 
participant’s busy work schedule. Despite this observed fatigue, the researcher found that the 
participant was at ease during the interview, which might have been because it was conducted 
in his/her mother-tongue. The participant considered each of the questions carefully before 
responding.  
Participant 3: The interview was confirmed via the participant’s personal assistant. However, 
on arrival at the arranged interview venue the researcher was disappointed to find that the 
interview had been cancelled. Nevertheless, the interview did eventually take place 
approximately 30 minutes later than scheduled. The interview was conducted in a meeting 
room during office hours with no interruptions. The researcher considered the responses 
obtained from this participant to be honest, frank and to the point.  
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Participant 4: The interview was confirmed directly with the participant. Owing to a 
misunderstanding about the venue where the interview was to be conducted, the interview 
started approximately an hour later than scheduled. This misunderstanding made the 
researcher anxious. However, the participant stated that his/her work schedule could 
accommodate the postponed interview. The interview was conducted in a meeting room with 
no interruptions. Before the commencement of the interview, the participant was concerned 
about his/her anonymity. The researcher assured him/her that his/her anonymity would be 
safeguarded. However, such a concern may have influenced his/her responses to the 
questions. During the interview he/she came across as being very knowledgeable and 
competent. The researcher anticipated that his/her knowledge contributed to the value added 
by the AC. This impression was subsequently confirmed by other participants.  
Participant 5: The interview was confirmed directly with the participant and was conducted in 
a meeting room after office hours with no interruptions. The researcher immediately felt 
comfortable in the participant’s presence. During the course of the interview the researcher’s 
perception of the participant’s openness was confirmed as documents to support his/her 
responses were shown.  
Participant 6: The interview was confirmed via the participant’s personal assistant and was 
conducted in a meeting room during office hours. The interview was interrupted by the 
participant’s cell-phone whereupon the participant apologised and explained that he/she had to 
take the call. He/she did not leave the meeting room and the call lasted approximately 30 
seconds. In response to the questions, the participant replied at length and gave rich 
descriptions. The researcher found the participant to be open-minded and felt that he/she 
made a valuable contribution to the AC. This assumption was confirmed by the responses of 
the other participants. The researcher was also impressed by the interest shown by the 
participant in the current study. 
Participant 7: The original interview with this participant was rescheduled as he/she had to 
attend to work responsibilities. It was clear that this participant was very busy. The interview 
was confirmed via the participant’s personal assistant and was conducted in the participant’s 
office with no interruptions. On arrival for the interview, the personal assistant informed the 
researcher that the participant would be late for the interview owing to other work 
commitments. As a result, the interview started approximately 30 minutes later than scheduled. 
The participant displayed good people skills, opening the interview by asking the researcher to 
share information about his/her background. The researcher’s perception of the participant as 
being truthful in answering the questions was confirmed when documents supporting his/her 
responses were shown. The researcher considered this participant to be highly skilled and 
driven to succeed.  
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Participant 8: The participant was initially hesitant to participate in the study as he/she was of 
the opinion that his/her contribution to the study would be insignificant. However, as he/she 
met the selection criteria, the researcher persuaded him/her to participate. Further difficulty 
was experienced when scheduling the interview as a result of the participant’s busy work 
schedule. Eventually the interview was conducted at a coffee shop, after hours. The 
researcher was impressed with the professionalism of this participant. 
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The information obtained from the eight transcribed interviews and the company 
documents (AFS for the year ending 2008, annual report for the year ending 2010, 
integrated report for the year ending 2014, attendance registers for the AC meetings 
held during the 2014 calendar year, the AC’s terms of reference and the AC work plan) 
were used to present the empirical findings of this study. In addition, information 
obtained from these two data sources (transcribed interviews and company documents) 
were corroborated manually where possible to increase the trustworthiness of the study. 
The empirical findings will be presented within the context of the theoretical framework 
set out in figure 3.1 (ch 3), consisting of attributes influencing the value added by an AC, 
namely, the characteristics of AC members (§ 5.4.1), the fulfilment of AC responsibilities 
through optimised activities (§ 5.4.2) and the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by 
maintaining healthy relationships with the board and information providers (§ 5.4.3). 
Each section (§§ 5.4.1–5.4.3) will commence with a table summarising the themes and 
categories in the relevant empirical findings. Thereafter a detailed discussion of these 
themes and categories will follow. The themes and categories emerged during the data 
analysis phase using descriptive open coding techniques (§ 5.2). The co-coder also 
assisted the researcher in the finalisation of the themes and categories that emerged 
from the data analysis.  
 
5.4.1 The characteristics of audit committee members 
 
The characteristics of AC members are a fundamental component of the AC if it is to 
operate as a value-adding committee for the company and its stakeholders (ch 3, § 3.2). 
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the themes and categories that emerged from the 
analysis of findings relating to the characteristics of AC members. 
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Table 5.4 Themes and categories of the empirical findings related to the 
characteristics of AC members 
 
Themes Categories 
Independence 
(§ 5.4.1.1) 
 Status of AC members’ independence 
 Measures taken by the company to ensure independence 
 Manner in which independence could be jeopardised 
 Value added by independent members serving on the AC 
Leadership  
(§ 5.4.1.2) 
 Participants’ perspectives on the AC chairperson’s leadership 
role 
 Value added by the leadership displayed by the AC 
chairperson 
Qualifications 
(§ 5.4.1.3) 
 Status of qualifications held by AC members 
 Value added by qualified members serving on the AC 
 Suggestions made regarding qualifications held by AC 
members 
Experience  
(§ 5.4.1.4) 
 
 Status of AC members’ experience levels 
 Involvement in other companies’ boards and/or ACs 
 Serving on other committees of the same company 
 Attendance of training programmes and/or “on-the-job” 
training 
 Value added by experienced members serving on the AC 
 Status of the combination of “established” and “new” 
members serving on the AC 
 Value added by the appointment of a “new” AC member  
 Suggestions made regarding the rotation of AC members 
 Process for appointing and re-electing an AC member 
Number of AC members 
(§ 5.4.1.5) 
 Adequacy of the number of AC members 
 
5.4.1.1 Independence 
 
All the members serving on the AC were independent, non-executive directors (ABC 
Limited, 2014a:15). The AltX listed company in this study therefore complied with the 
requirements of the Companies Act (RSA, 2009:s 94(4)(b)(i)–(iii)) and the JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)) and followed the 
recommendations of King III (IOD, 2009a:22, principle 2.6; IOD, 2009a:31, 
recommended practice 3.2.1; IOD, 2009a:32, principle 3.3). A review of the integrated 
report found that AC members did not hold shares in the company (ABC Limited, 
2014a:27), which supported their independence status. Furthermore, at every AC 
meeting AC members were prompted to declare their interest in the company in writing 
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on the attendance register. A review of these attendance registers (for AC meetings 
held during the 2014 calendar year) revealed that AC members did not declare any 
interest in the company (ABC Limited, 2014b; ABC Limited, 2014c; ABC Limited, 2014d; 
ABC Limited, 2014e). This practice further supported the assertion that AC members 
are expected to be independent from the AltX listed company.  
 
The importance of paying AC members a fair remuneration whilst being cautious that 
such payments do not negatively affect their independence towards the company was 
highlighted by an AC participant (P6:258). The same participant further remarked that 
there is a relationship between an AC member’s remuneration and his/her ability to 
engage in robust discussions (§ 5.4.3.2). However, he/she also stated that the 
remuneration paid to AC members by the AltX listed company in this study was fair and 
did not impede their independence or hamper the AC members’ ability to engage in 
robust discussions (P6:252). This finding is consistent with the researcher’s argument in 
chapter 3 (§ 3.2.1) that companies should remunerate AC members fairly as 
recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:30, principle 2.25, recommended practice 2.25.4) 
in order to safeguard members’ independence. The AC participant commented: 
 
One thing that I found is if independent non-executive director[s] [are] … dependent 
on the fees to maintain their standard of living, I find that the discussions are not 
robust (P6:250).  
 
Further investigation into this issue does not fall within the scope of the study. The 
researcher thus proposes that further research should be performed on the relationship 
between an AC member’s remuneration and his/her ability to engage in robust 
discussions. 
 
Independent AC members were perceived by an AC participant and some non-AC 
participants to add value as they monitored information prepared by management and 
guided management in running the company. This finding is in agreement with the 
literature which states that an independent AC is able to monitor management’s skills, 
decisions and actions (Menon & Williams, 1994:125). This finding is illustrated by the 
following: 
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As the independent eyes … [the AC] come in with fresh eyes to look at information 
data, the financials, and they pick up things …. So I think, as … [an] independent, 
not related party in the company, it’s very important to have the AC. That’s how they 
add value for me (P3:2). 
 
… you need somebody from the outside to give a more untainted view …. Every day 
[management are] running these numbers … [management are] doing the same 
thing, and [management] do it because that’s how [they] have always done it … 
Sometimes you need somebody from the outside to come in and say have you 
looked at it this way? Could you not possibly do it better if you do it this way? 
(P8:38). 
 
A review of the AC’s work plan indicated that a meeting with the external auditor, 
without the presence of management, did take place (§ 5.4.3.1) (ABC Limited, 2014g:6). 
One AC participant claimed that during this meeting the external auditor could share 
his/her “issues” (P6:144) regarding management with the AC. Arguably, this practice 
could be attributable to the independence of the AC as confirmed by findings in the 
literature (Menon & Williams, 1994:125) that state that an independent AC provides the 
external auditor with an opportunity to express his/her views and concerns about 
management openly. 
 
A review of the integrated report (ABC Limited, 2014a:16) revealed that the AC was 
responsible for recommending the appointment of the external auditor to the board. In 
the case of the company in this study, the AC recommended a firm of external auditors 
that was on the JSE list of accredited auditors (JSE Limited, 2015:2). This therefore 
implies that the AC of the AltX listed company in this study added value by 
recommending an external auditor with a good reputation. This finding is in keeping with 
what was revealed by Archambeault and DeZoort (2001:33–34, 46–47) that an 
independent and experienced AC will recommend the appointment of an external 
auditor who has a reputation for delivering high quality services.  
 
One non-AC participant stated that AFS fraud was less likely to occur with independent 
members serving on the AC (P3:16), which correlates with the findings of Beasley et al. 
(2000:450, 452–453). As such, an independent AC adds value by increasing the quality 
of the AFS (Carcello & Neal, 2003:290; Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes, 2007:1407). 
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The findings suggest that the company regarded the independence of their AC 
members as important, since they were requested to declare their interest in the 
company prior to an AC meeting. Furthermore, the remuneration paid to them was fair 
and therefore did not influence their independence. This quality of independence in the 
AC members enabled them to add value to the company, its management, the external 
auditor and the shareholders, as the AC monitored information prepared by 
management and guided management in running the company. They also provided an 
opportunity for the external auditor to openly express his/her views and concerns about 
management. The AC further recommended an external auditor with a good reputation 
and reduced the potential for AFS fraud by increasing the quality of the AFS. 
 
5.4.1.2 Leadership 
 
Participants repeatedly commented on the excellent leadership qualities of the AC 
chairperson. One non-AC participant explained that the chairperson had the ability to 
ensure that AC members were adequately prepared for the AC meetings (§ 5.4.2.6) 
(P5:224). Two of the AC participants (which excluded the AC chairperson) and one non-
AC participant further stated that the chairperson added value by controlling AC 
meetings efficiently and effectively (§ 5.4.3.2) (P2:112; P5:242; P8:128). This finding is 
in agreement with the Audit Committee Forum (ACF) (2005:3), which states that the AC 
chairperson should play a role in leading AC meetings so that there is open and 
constructive dialogue. This is what an AC participant had to say about the AC 
chairperson: 
 
… everybody speaks through the chair. So an item will be brought up, the chairperson 
will say item number four, give us a short couple of sentences and then [the AC 
chairperson will] invite people to make comments, to add, make suggestions. If there’s 
a discussion … sometimes people are quite passionate, [the AC chairperson] will 
come as a mediator to say we’re not gonna agree on this, let’s park it or let’s have 
another discussion maybe at the end but let’s move through the agenda. So [the AC 
chairperson] will manage the meeting to make sure it runs smoothly (P8:128). 
 
Some non-AC participants stated that the AC chairperson added value by encouraging 
all members present at AC meetings to participate in a disciplined and structured 
manner (P4:150). In support of this finding, the ACF (2005:3) and Nkonki (2014:55) 
  
104 
opine that an AC chairperson should ensure that all members of the AC participate and 
provide their inputs during AC meetings. This is supported by DeZoort et al. (2002:43), 
who maintain that the chairperson’s leadership will contribute to successful teamwork 
being displayed by the AC. To illustrate this, a non-AC participant said in this regard: 
 
… no one is allowed to talk simultaneously … [he/she] will actually give each person 
the opportunity to say [his/her] say and to add their value and to ask questions if 
need be (P1:220). 
 
As AC meetings are the platform used by the AC to fulfil its responsibilities, it can be 
argued that the leadership qualities that the AC chairperson displayed during these 
meetings positively influenced the way in which the AC fulfilled its responsibilities.  
 
The AC chairperson had healthy relationships with information providers which enabled 
the AC to fulfil its responsibilities (§ 5.4.3). The researcher is of the opinion that the 
chairperson’s leadership qualities enabled him/her to interact with information providers 
effectively. This is consistent with Spira’s (1999a:245) findings, which show that an AC 
chairperson needs to have a “strong” character to enable him/her to identify and 
manage information providers. 
 
The chairperson’s leadership qualities may be one of the reasons why he/she added 
value to management by offering the CFO training and guidance on technical and soft 
skills. Although King III recommends that directors who lack adequate experience 
should be assigned to a mentorship programme (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended 
practice 2.20.2), this recommendation was not implemented by the company studied 
here. Instead, the AC chairperson played a mentorship role. The researcher is of the 
opinion that the role played by this chairperson is unique to the AltX listed company in 
this study and falls outside the scope of the responsibilities reflected in the company’s 
AC charter (ABC Limited, 2014f:1–6). This finding is evidenced by the following views 
voiced by two non-AC participants: 
 
… [the AC chairperson] likes to add value to [the CFO’s] expertise and to guide [the 
CFO] and take [his/her] hand and leading the [CFO] in knowing what to present, how 
to present it [at the AC meetings] … (P1:18). 
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We’re quite fortunate to have [an AC chairperson], who’s currently at [an audit firm]. 
So [he/she] would on a continuous basis mention that there’s for example training 
happening at [the audit firm] and then [he/she] would invite … the [CFO] … and the 
accountant to come and attend the training (P7:38). 
 
The description of the chairperson’s leadership qualities given by the participants 
implies that he/she acted in a disciplined and responsible manner, which was in keeping 
with the characteristics associated with good CG as reported in chapter 2 (§ 2.3.3.3). 
 
In summary, the findings suggest that the participants respected the AC chairperson for 
his/her leadership qualities which enabled him/her to add value to the way AC meetings 
were conducted and its responsibilities carried out. These leadership qualities also 
enabled the chairperson to interact effectively with information providers and to act as a 
mentor to the CFO.  
 
5.4.1.3 Qualifications 
 
Two of the three AC members were chartered accountants (CA)s13 registered with 
SAICA (ABC Limited, 2014a:4). The third had a Baccalaureus Commercii (BCom) 
degree and held a postgraduate diploma in Property Development (ABC Limited, 
2014a:4). Therefore, AC members were adequately qualified as required by section 
94(5) of the Companies Act (RSA, 2009) and the 2011 regulation issued by the minister 
(RSA, 2011:51) and as recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended 
practice 3.2.4). One AC participant stated that his/her experience of serving on a 
number of ACs (§ 5.4.1.4) had shown him/her that many directors are not sufficiently 
aware of their responsibilities as directors of a company. Accordingly, he/she was (at 
the time of conducting the interview) in the process of writing a paper, for distribution to 
company directors, which consolidated all the directors’ responsibilities in terms of the 
Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements and King III (P6:413, 415, 417). This 
would seem to show that this particular AC member was knowledgeable in areas 
relating to the law, the JSE listing requirements and voluntary codes. One of the non-AC 
                                            
13
 A CA is defined as a person who has completed the required university qualification, learning 
programme and the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA’s) professional 
examinations and who is therefore entitled to use the designation Chartered Accountant (South 
Africa) (CA(SA)) after registering at SAICA (SAICA, 2015b). 
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participants supported this finding. 
 
According to section 94(5) of the Companies Act (RSA, 2009), King III (IOD, 2009a:32, 
recommended practice 3.2.4) and a study conducted by DeZoort et al. (2002:41–42), an 
AC with members who collectively have sufficient qualifications and experience 
(§ 5.4.1.4) is able to add value to the company and its shareholders by fulfilling its 
responsibilities. As reported in section 5.4.2, this particular AC had fulfilled its 
responsibilities as set out in the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements for AltX 
listed companies and King III. As such, the members’ qualifications contributed greatly 
to the fulfilment of AC responsibilities. 
 
One non-AC participant suggested that there was a direct relationship between AC 
members being financially qualified and members adding value to the company by 
being actively involved in debates during AC meetings (§ 5.4.3.2). This is what this non-
AC participant had to say:  
 
… I’ve seen ACs where there’s one strong financial person who probably chairs that 
AC meeting and then … the other two members often have very little interaction, 
they [are] not necessarily that financially strong … but in the context of [this 
company], I think all three members have a fairly strong financial background and 
are fairly active in the debates and discussions that take place in that [AC] meeting 
(P4:150). 
 
In addition, it is important for the AC to provide the board with feedback on the manner 
in which the AC has discharged its responsibilities (IOD, 2009a:35, principle 3.10). One 
of these responsibilities requires the AC to issue an opinion on the company’s AFS 
(IOD, 2009a:35, recommended practice 3.10.2.3; ABC Limited, 2014a:25–26). In this 
regard, one non-AC participant stressed the importance of the AC chairperson’s 
approval of the AFS prior to their release (P3:10). It is therefore probable that the AC 
chairperson’s technical abilities helped him/her to add value to the board by reviewing 
the AFS (P2:162; P4:242). Furthermore, the independent auditors’ report on the 
company awarded it an unmodified opinion (ABC Limited, 2014a:29), which, it is 
submitted, was as a result of the oversight exercised by financially qualified AC 
members (particularly the chairperson) in reviewing the AFS. These findings are aligned 
to the findings of Kalbers and Fogarty (1993:37, 45) and Krishnan and Lee (2009:243), 
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who found that, in light of the AC’s responsibility to review the AFS, it is important for 
members to have financial and accounting qualifications. 
 
In chapter 2 (§ 2.2.4), the argument was raised that AltX listed companies with a long-
term vision to grow their business and create wealth may be less price-sensitive than 
those with the short-term goal of growing their business. However, the AltX listed 
company in this study (which had a long-term vision to grow its business as evidenced 
by its listing duration of 7.74 years [Maluleka, 2015] and the strategic practices reflected 
in its integrated report [ABC Limited, 2014a:7]) does not support this argument and was 
accordingly price-sensitive. Such price-sensitivity was noted, as one participant on the 
AC suggested that the value of the AC could be increased by including members who 
have expertise in areas relating to IT and the law (P6:82). However, this suggestion had 
not been implemented by the company owing to budgetary constraints. The researcher 
is of the opinion that such absence of adequate legal expertise was compensated for by 
the support provided by the company secretary and, to a lesser extent, the designated 
advisor (§ 5.4.3.2). 
 
In summary, the researcher found that AC members were adequately qualified which 
enabled them to add value to the company, the board and the company’s shareholders, 
as evidenced by the fact that the AC had fulfilled its responsibilities and that AC 
members participated actively during AC meetings, as well as the fact that an 
unmodified audit opinion was issued on the AFS. Nevertheless, such value could be 
increased further if members with a legal or an IT background were to serve on the AC.  
 
5.4.1.4 Experience 
 
The AC chairperson had been employed as a partner at two auditing firms since 2007 
(ABC Limited, 2014a:4). The second AC member had a corporate finance background 
and he/she was the CEO of a training institute. During 2005, he/she received a 
businessperson award and had international business experience. His/her expertise lies 
in industry consolidation, the establishment of new businesses and an involvement in 
companies that were in the process of being listed (ABC Limited, 2014a:4). The other 
AC member had 14 years’ banking experience and his/her main focus included property 
finance and structured lending (ABC Limited, 2014a:4). Thus, AC members were 
adequately experienced as required by the Companies Act regulation (RSA, 2011:51) 
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and recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.4) to fulfil AC 
responsibilities. 
 
Two of the three AC members were also involved on the boards of other companies 
and/or on other ACs. The AC chairperson served as an independent, non-executive 
member on the boards of a number of companies (ABC Limited, 2014a:4) and had also 
acted, for “about seven years” (P6:12), as the chairperson of several boards. Most of 
these companies were “listed and most of them [were] on the AltX” (P6:14). The second 
AC member served on the “ACs of various companies” (P2:3). These companies were 
“all smaller unlisted companies or private companies” (P2:3). As these AC members 
were particularly involved in AltX listed or smaller unlisted companies, they had been 
exposed to the AC practices followed in smaller business environments. As such, these 
members were familiar with good AC practices and applied them to the AltX listed 
company in this study (P7:112, 114). Therefore, the AC members’ business 
backgrounds enabled them to add value by providing better quality guidance to 
management (P7:112, 114).  
 
In this study, the company’s audit, risk, nomination and remuneration committees, and 
the social and ethics committee, were appointed by the company’s board (ABC Limited, 
2014a:15). The following table indicates the members of the AC and their involvement 
in these committees (ABC Limited, 2014a:5, 17–18): 
 
Table 5.5 AC members’ involvement in the risk, nomination and remuneration 
committees and the social and ethics committee 
 
AC member 
Risk 
committee 
Nomination and 
remuneration 
committee 
Social and ethics 
committee 
First member and 
chairperson  
Member Member None 
Second member None None None 
Third member Chairperson None None 
 
As indicated in table 5.5, two of the three AC members’ understanding of the company 
and its risks resulted from their involvement in the risk and/or nomination and 
remuneration committees. Such an understanding of the company’s business, 
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especially where related to the company’s risks, improved the AC’s ability to fulfil its risk 
oversight responsibilities, which accordingly enabled it to add value to the company 
(P3:45). 
 
One non-AC participant indicated that the external auditor perceived the AC as a 
powerful body (§ 5.4.3.3) owing to the experience of the AC chairperson. Furthermore, 
the majority of AC participants indicated that the diversity of experience of the individual 
AC members enabled them to add value to the company by viewing matters from 
different perspectives. Members with different experience levels prevented a focus on 
certain areas only. In this regard one AC participant indicated: 
 
… like-minded people but bringing something different which is really great because 
then you don’t get bogged down in one certain detail … (P8:12). 
 
The individual experience levels of AC members also enabled them to add value as this 
stimulated debates during meetings (§ 5.4.3.2) (P8:10). The ability of members to ask 
probing questions (relating to their responsibilities) during AC meetings was also linked 
to their years of experience in the companies in which they were permanently employed 
(P6:104; P7:106). 
 
Executive and non-executive directors of AltX listed companies (which include AC 
members) are required to attend a compulsory Directors Induction Programme (JSE 
Limited, 2014b:par. 21.3(d)) at the IOD (IOD, 2015a) and all the AC members of the 
company in this study had attended this programme (P2:13; P6:80; P8:20). Attendance 
of such a programme adds value to both the AC and the company, as it provides a 
valuable learning opportunity. The JSE (JSE Limited, 2012c) also reports that the 
Directors Induction Programme improves directors’ knowledge of the Companies Act, 
the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies and CG practices. This finding 
was substantiated by the following verbatim quotes: 
 
It gives you a feel for governance, it gives you a feel for your duties as a director 
(P6:80). 
 
So that also gives you a very good broad outline right in the beginning as … what is 
required from you (P7:40). 
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As noted above, while all “new” directors need to attend the compulsory Directors 
Induction Programme, the programme does not focus exclusively on the responsibilities 
and best practices of ACs. In view of this, the researcher believes that this learning 
opportunity could be improved by offering an induction course specifically for AC 
members. 
 
The structured induction provided by the IOD was complemented by “on-the-job” 
induction provided by the company’s management and the company secretary 
(P1:240). This “on-the-job” induction provided by the company secretary is implied by 
recommended practice 2.21.6 in King III (IOD, 2009a:27). The AC member who was 
appointed during 2014 (ABC Limited, 2014a:12) visited the company (P8:20) and 
studied relevant company documentation (P8:72) to improve his/her understanding of 
the company’s business. KPMG (2014:15) confirms that site visits enhance an AC 
member’s understanding. Although the company does not formally assign the “new” 
inexperienced AC member to a mentorship programme (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended 
practice 2.20.2), “on-the-job” training is provided for both “new” and “established” AC 
members. One AC participant remarked: 
 
The committee are constantly learning from one another. You have a mix of 
individuals (P8:4). 
 
… there’s a lot of support from the people who are already in the committee … 
(P8:20). 
 
Two of the three AC members were CAs (SA) (§ 5.4.1.3). Being a CA(SA) implies that 
members should comply with SAICA’s continuing professional development (CPD) 
policy and develop and maintain professional proficiency (SAICA, 2015a:1) by 
undertaking appropriate activities (SAICA, 2015a:3) such as attending training 
programmes and meetings, as well as undertaking practical activities such as 
developing systems and processes (SAICA, 2015a:5–6). Individuals need to keep a 
record of these activities as proof that they have complied with the CPD policy (SAICA, 
2015a:3). One AC participant asserted that they maintained their professional 
competence by undertaking activities prescribed by SAICA’s CPD policy. Another AC 
participant indicated that they also maintained their competence level through the 
experience they gained in their workplace. This AC participant explained: 
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But most of the AC members’ training comes from their exposure that they have, 
daily, in the specific area where they operate in (P2:19). 
 
One of the AC participants who supported the notion of “new” directors attending an 
induction course questioned the attendance of ongoing training courses as 
recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:27, principle 2.20, recommended practice 2.20.4; 
IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.5). This AC participant stated the following: 
 
I’m not sure how [training courses] would actually help because the AC … the crux 
of [serving on the AC] is understanding the business, understanding what’s going 
on in the business … and the financial aspects of the business and then making 
sure that, from [a] CG perspective, all those requirements are met. So I … being on 
the AC I’m not sure outside of what are the requirements of how to appoint 
somebody on an AC, how it needs to be constituted, your responsibilities on the 
committee, which the IOD’s [Directors Induction Programme] showed us and taught 
us, I don’t think there’s more you can really study for (P8:24). 
 
The above perception is not supported by the researcher as it is submitted that 
maintaining an understanding of the business alone is not sufficient to fulfil AC 
responsibilities. This is based on the researcher’s own experience as a lecturer in the 
Department of Auditing at a university where study material is updated regularly as a 
result of the fact that the risks involved, as well as the laws, listing requirements, and 
voluntary codes change frequently in a business environment. The researcher thus 
supports the recommendation of King III. 
 
AC members had been offered an opportunity to identify applicable training courses to 
maintain their experience level. Although the attendance of such courses was supported 
and paid for by the company, this was only to the extent that the company’s limited 
training budget would allow (P2:19). One non-AC participant commented as follows: 
 
What we did last time, but it was more on a board level, said to all the members you 
can go to the IOD to see if there’s anything that you would like to do there and attend 
any of those programmes (P7:38). 
 
However, with regard to training, the price-sensitivity of the company (§ 5.4.1.3) once 
again came to the fore, as one AC participant acknowledged that there were limited 
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financial resources available to provide AC members with training (P2:19). In the face of 
limited financial resources, one non-AC participant pointed out that AC members should 
take responsibility for their own training needs and develop these needs accordingly: 
 
… what I have seen with [board members], we’re all very much on our own growth 
path where we wanna grow and we wanna learn and make sure that we stay up-to-
date (P7:38). 
 
The AC consisted of two “established” and one “new” member. The two “established” 
members were appointed in 2009 (ABC Limited and its subsidiaries, 2008:7) and 2010 
(ABC Limited, 2010:83), whilst the “new” member was appointed in April 2014 (ABC 
Limited, 2014a:12, 78) to replace the member who resigned. One AC participant and 
some of the non-AC participants revealed that the new AC appointment had added 
value to the way the AC fulfilled its responsibilities as he/she brought a new perspective, 
asking challenging questions during AC meetings (P1:246; P2:70; P5:208). One non-
AC participant referred to the “new” AC member as “a new broom” (P1:240) in 
reference to the idiom, “a new broom sweeps clean”, meaning that a person in a new 
position will do a thorough job to prove that he/she is capable. DeZoort (1998:19) came 
to a similar conclusion, stating that “new”, inexperienced members are often more 
careful and critical in fulfilling their allocated responsibilities. However, two non-AC 
participants did not agree with this finding (P4:328, 330, 332; P7:54).  
 
Accordingly, one non-AC participant pointed out that the “established” members 
enabled the AC to add value to the company as they were acquainted with the 
company’s risk areas and knew where to challenge management and the external 
auditor. This non-AC participant framed the situation as follows: 
 
I think what comes with experience is sort of the knowing what type of questions to 
ask, knowing which boundaries need to be tested, knowing where there … in the past 
[there] were mistakes (P5:208). 
 
Based on the value added by the “new” AC member described above, a non-AC 
participant suggested the rotation of AC members, which is in line with the suggestion 
made by KPMG (2013:3). The non-AC participant suggested: 
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… after a three-year term that it should be assessed to bring in a “new” member just 
to have a breath of fresh air and new challenging questions [being asked] (P1:246). 
 
King III proposes that at least one-third of non-executive directors should retire annually 
(IOD, 2009a:26, recommended practice 2.18.6). The company in this case study follows 
this recommendation to a certain extent as its memorandum of incorporation states that 
at least one-third of the non-executive directors should retire from the company at each 
AGM (ABC Limited, 2014a:14). However, these directors may be reappointed by the 
shareholders (ABC Limited, 2014a:14). This implies that, at the AGM, if non-executive 
directors indicate their willingness to continue serving in that role and are reappointed 
by shareholders, they will not be rotated. Accordingly, there may be a risk of only 
“established” members serving on the AC, which could impede AC independence. Such 
a risk was not at issue for the AltX listed company in this study as a “new” AC member 
had been appointed during 2014. 
 
Before being appointed, the “new” board member (who also served on the AC) was 
interviewed by a non-executive director (chairperson of the board) and two executive 
directors (CEO and CFO) (P8:14). However, in view of the fact that the chairperson and 
the CEO are major shareholders, holding 22.6% and 10.1% of the shares respectively 
(ABC Limited, 2014a:27), they are not independent as advocated by King III (IOD, 
2009a:24, principle 2.16; ABC Limited, 2014a:11). Arguably, this raises the risk that the 
chairperson and the CEO as shareholders may influence the CFO to appoint a 
particular person. As the interview was followed up with discussions with board 
members and, subsequently, the approval of all board members (P1:240; P7:6), they 
could conceivably have been influenced by the CEO and the chairperson. Under these 
circumstances, the new member’s independence may be called into question, and they 
may ultimately land up being controlled by the chairperson of the board, the CEO and 
the CFO, in turn resulting in the AC’s responsibility to obtain assurance from 
management (IOD, 2009b:62, par. 46) being weakened as a result of a possible 
“closeness” between the AC member and management (in this case the CEO and 
CFO). This risk is in line with Mäntysaari’s (2005:151) and Bhasa’s (2004:9) findings 
that a major shareholder may excessively monitor and influence the board (ch 2, 
§  2.2.4). In this company, the major shareholders were also board members (§ 5.3), 
which implies that the board members could use its influence to make decisions (in this 
case appoint a board member) that are to their own benefit, to the potential detriment of 
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the minority shareholders. However, in this study abuse of power by the board was not 
mentioned by the participants during the interviews. 
 
The company followed a “formal” (P7:6, 17; P8:14) appointment process, as interviews 
were conducted and all board members were involved. The company therefore followed 
the recommendation of King III that directors should be appointed through formal 
procedures (IOD, 2009a:26, principle 2.19). Furthermore, sections 70(3)(b)(i) and 94(2) 
of the Companies Act were complied with (RSA, 2009) and the King III recommendation 
applied (IOD, 2009b:40, par. 80), which refer to the shareholders’ involvement in 
appointing board members, as the company’s integrated report stated that the 
appointment of the “new” board member (who also acted as an AC member) was 
subject to shareholders’ confirmation (ABC Limited, 2014a:78). Because the “new” AC 
member’s position was only approved by shareholders during the AGM held in 
September 2014 (ABC Limited, 2014a:78), he/she acted in the position of both board 
and AC member for approximately five months without the shareholders’ consent. This 
practice is nevertheless acceptable, because King III (IOD, 2009b:58, par. 17) 
recommends that the board fill an AC vacancy as soon as one arises, subsequently 
obtaining approval by the shareholders for the appointment at the next AGM. The 
concerns raised by Barton and Wong (2006:36) and Nkonki (2014:6) that AltX listed 
companies may find it difficult to attract qualified and experienced AC members were 
not seen to be an issue, since none of the participants mentioned that difficulties were 
experienced when appointing the “new” member. 
 
The re-election of an AC member at the AGM (IOD, 2009b:40, par. 80; RSA, 2009:s 
94(2)), was proposed by the board (ABC Limited 2014a:15, 78). One AC participant 
asserted that lack of support by the CEO (who was one of the major shareholders in the 
company) could hamper an AC member’s chances of being re-elected. The AC 
participant articulated the following: 
 
’Cause the [CEO] is a major shareholder as well and maybe irritating [him/her] too 
much could result in [an AC member] not being re-elected (P6:250, 252). 
 
Accordingly, the influence of majority shareholders was not only present when “new” 
appointments were made, but was also an issue when AC members stood for re-
election. In this AltX listed company, the board members that did not form part of the AC 
  
115 
(which include the CEO) collectively held the majority of shares in the company (ABC 
Limited, 2014a:27). Thus, there is the risk that these board members might use their 
power to re-elect AC members based on their own preference. This could undermine 
the role played by the AC and the power it wields, to the potential detriment of the 
minority shareholders. 
 
The findings suggest that the experience of the AC members was adequate as they had 
extensive experience resulting from their full-time occupations, they also served on the 
boards of other companies and/or ACs, and had sufficient knowledge of the company’s 
business. Accordingly, this experience enabled the AC to add value to the company, the 
management and the shareholders as it was able apply the good practices applied in 
other companies to the AltX listed company in this study, thus being able to give 
guidance to management. In addition, AC members’ involvement in the risk committee 
enabled them to add value by fulfilling the AC’s risk oversight responsibilities. AC 
members’ different individual experience levels has also enabled them to add value to 
the company, as matters can be viewed from various perspectives which stimulates the 
asking of probing questions and debates at AC meetings. AC members’ business 
knowledge have been enhanced by both formal and informal training programmes, 
which have also improved the way in which they fulfil their responsibilities.  
 
Also, the collective experience of the AC members enabled them to add value to the 
company and its shareholders because the “new” AC member in particular asked fresh 
challenging questions during AC meetings, whilst the “established” AC members 
challenged management and the external auditor on the risk-related areas with which 
they were familiar. Therefore, the balance between the “established” and “new” 
members serving on the AC was satisfactory. To increase this balance it was suggested 
that AC members should be rotated. Furthermore, the appointment of “new” AC 
members and the re-election of “established” members could be biased as a result of 
the power wielded by non-AC board members who are major shareholders of the 
company. Accordingly, there is a risk that the role played and power wielded by the AC 
could be undermined to the possible detriment of the minority shareholders. However, 
none of the participants mentioned the abuse of the board’s power during the interviews 
and it would seem that no difficulties were experienced in filling the vacant positions on 
both the board and the AC. 
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5.4.1.5 Number of audit committee members 
 
The company’s AC consisted of three independent, non-executive members (ABC 
Limited, 2014a:15) which was in agreement with the requirements of section 94(2) of 
the Companies Act (RSA, 2009) and the recommendation of King III (IOD, 2009a:31, 
recommended practice 3.2.2). However, the price-sensitivity of the company essentially 
precludes the appointment of two additional AC members (as noted in § 5.4.1.3). 
 
King III (IOD, 2009a:28, principle 2.23) recommends that the board should delegate 
certain of its responsibilities to committees. The company in this study had established 
an audit, a risk, a remuneration and nomination committee, as well as a social and 
ethics committee (ABC Limited, 2014a:15). Members of these committees were elected 
from the company’s board, which, in the AltX listed company in this study, comprised 
seven members (§ 5.3, table 5.2) (ABC Limited, 2014a:5, 16–19). It should be noted 
that the non-executive directors of the AltX listed company in this study could not serve 
on all the committees as they had full-time occupations. Based on this argument, the 
researcher is of opinion that the three members serving on the AC were sufficient in 
view of the size of the company’s board. 
 
The literature suggests that a small AC, consisting of three to five members, works 
more efficiently than a larger one (Nkonki, 2014:13). However, there should be enough 
members serving on the AC to fulfil its responsibilities effectively (DeZoort, 1998:2; 
DeZoort et al., 2002:42, 44). The findings of this study support the literature as none of 
the participants mentioned that difficulties were experienced with the AC’s efficiency 
levels. In addition, the three members who served on the AC enabled the AC to add 
value to the company and its shareholders by meeting its responsibilities through 
optimised activities (§ 5.4.2) and by maintaining healthy relationships (§ 5.4.3).  
 
5.4.2 The fulfilment of audit committee responsibilities through optimised 
activities 
 
The AC work plan and the company’s integrated report were used to determine whether 
the AC fulfilled its responsibilities as set out in the Companies Act, the JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies and King III (ch 2, §§  2.3.2, 2.3.3.4, 2.3.4). As 
noted in chapter 2, section 2.3.4, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies 
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state that such companies should have an independent AC, but do not refer to further 
composition requirements or responsibilities in line with the Companies Act and King III 
(IOD, 2009a:22, principle 2.6; JSE Limited, 2014b:par. 21.5(i)–(ii)). Table 5.6 provides a 
summary of the responsibilities of the AC and their fulfilment. 
 
  
 
Table 5.6 The company’s compliance with the AC responsibilities in terms of the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements for 
AltX listed companies and King III 
 
AC responsibilities 
Required by the 
Companies Act 
(Yes/No) 
Required by the JSE 
listing requirements 
for AltX listed 
companies (Yes/No) 
Recommended by 
King III (Yes/No) 
Compliant (C) or Not 
compliant (NC) 
Nominate the external auditor for appointment and verify the 
independence of the external auditor. 
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(a)) 
No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practices 3.9.1, 3.9.3) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:3) 
Determine the audit fee and scope (terms of reference) of 
the external auditor’s appointment. 
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(b)) 
No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.9.2) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:3) 
Determine the nature and extent of non-audit services to be 
rendered by the external auditor. 
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(d)) 
No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.9.4) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:2) 
Pre-approve any non-audit services rendered by the 
external auditor. 
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(e)) 
No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.9.4). 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:2) 
Include a report in the AFS or report to shareholders at the 
AGM on the manner in which the AC has fulfilled its 
responsibilities, the independence of the external auditor 
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(f)) 
No 
 
 
Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:32, 
recommended 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25–26, 75–82; 
1
1
8
 
  
 
AC responsibilities 
Required by the 
Companies Act 
(Yes/No) 
Required by the JSE 
listing requirements 
for AltX listed 
companies (Yes/No) 
Recommended by 
King III (Yes/No) 
Compliant (C) or Not 
compliant (NC) 
and the quality of the AFS, the appropriateness of the 
accounting practices adopted by the company, and whether 
the company has implemented suitable internal financial 
control measures. 
practice 3.4.2; IOD, 
2009a:35, principle 
3.10, recommended 
practices 3.10.2–
3.10.2.4; IOD, 
2009b:67, par. 84) 
 
ABC Limited, 
2014g:2) 
 
Deal appropriately with complaints received from individuals 
within or outside the company, which may include queries 
relating to accounting matters.  
Yes 
(RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(g)) 
 
No No C 
Note 1 
Provide suggestions to the board on financial matters (e.g. 
accounting policies and financial control) concerning the 
company. 
Yes 
RSA, 2009:s 
94(7)(h)) 
 
No No C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25) 
 
Review the integrated report. No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:32, 
principle 3.4) 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014g:5) 
Ensure that the company follows a combined assurance 
model in order to identify and deal appropriately with 
significant risks faced by the company. 
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:33, 
principle 3.5, 
recommended 
practice 3.5.1) 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014g:5–6) 
Ensure that the company’s finance function is of a high 
standard in terms of sufficient resources, qualifications and 
experience. 
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:33, 
principle 3.6) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014g:6) 
1
1
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AC responsibilities 
Required by the 
Companies Act 
(Yes/No) 
Required by the JSE 
listing requirements 
for AltX listed 
companies (Yes/No) 
Recommended by 
King III (Yes/No) 
Compliant (C) or Not 
compliant (NC) 
Oversee the internal audit function by being involved in the 
appointment, dismissal and performance review of the CAE.  
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:33, 
principle 3.7, 
recommended 
practice 3.7.1) 
 
Note 2 
Review and approve the internal audit plan. No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:33, 
recommended 
practice 3.7.2) 
 
Note 2 
Ensure that the internal audit function is exposed to an 
independent quality review to measure its effectiveness.  
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.7.3) 
 
Note 2 
Play a role in the company’s risk management processes 
with specific reference to the financial reporting risks, 
internal financial controls designed to mitigate risks, as well 
as fraud risks and IT risks related to financial reporting. 
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
principle 3.8, 
recommended 
practices 3.8.2–
3.8.2.4) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014g:2) 
Stay up-to-date on reportable irregularities recognised and 
reported on by the external auditor. 
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.9.5) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:3) 
1
2
0
 
  
 
AC responsibilities 
Required by the 
Companies Act 
(Yes/No) 
Required by the JSE 
listing requirements 
for AltX listed 
companies (Yes/No) 
Recommended by 
King III (Yes/No) 
Compliant (C) or Not 
compliant (NC) 
Review the quality of the external audit process. No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:34, 
recommended 
practice 3.9.6) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited, 
2014a:25; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:3) 
Use the integrated report to provide information about the 
AC’s role, composition, meetings and activities. 
No No Yes 
(IOD, 2009a:35, 
recommended 
practice 3.10.3) 
 
C 
(ABC Limited 
2014a:15–16, 25–26, 
75–82) 
The company’s designated advisor must be invited to and 
should attend all AC meetings as an observer and must 
support the AC to ensure the company’s compliance with 
the JSE listing requirements (for AltX listed companies) for 
one of the following periods (depending which period is the 
longest): for the first year after the company has been listed; 
or until the date of the first publication of the AltX listed 
company’s AFS. Despite this regulation, a designated 
advisor can still continue to attend AC meetings if he/she 
deems it necessary. 
 
No Yes 
(JSE Limited, 
2014b:par. 21.5(iii)) 
No Note 3 
 
A company applying to be listed on the AltX must appoint an 
executive CFO and the AC of the company must submit 
written confirmation to the JSE that the CFO has the 
appropriate skills and experience to fulfil his/her 
responsibilities. 
 
No Yes 
(JSE Limited, 
2014b:par. 21.3(e)) 
No Note 4 
 
1
2
1
 
  
 
Note 1: The AC report states that the AFS “will be open for discussion at the forthcoming AGM”. As such, the AC invited shareholders to 
discuss queries they may have regarding the AFS (ABC Limited, 2014a:26, 75). 
 
Note 2: Not applicable as company does not have an internal audit function (§ 5.4.3.1). The reasons for not having an internal audit function 
are stated in the company’s integrated report (ABC Limited, 2014a:10, 17). 
 
Note 3: At the time of the interview with the designated advisor (3 November 2014), the company had not been notified about the changes to 
the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies which were effective from 30 September 2014. One of these changes related to the 
designated advisor’s attendance of AC meetings where, in the case of the company in this study, his/her presence would no longer be 
required. Thus, the company still followed the previous JSE listing requirements which were discontinued at the end of September 2014, 
stating the following: the company’s designated advisor must be invited to and should attend all the AC meetings as an observer and must 
support the AC to ensure the company’s compliance with the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies (JSE Limited, 2012a:par. 
21.5(ii)). To this end, further research is required on the impact of this change on the AC’s fulfilment of its responsibilities. 
 
Note 4: Not applicable as the company was already listed at the time of this study. 
1
2
2
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Based on the findings provided in table 5.6, the AC had fulfilled its responsibilities as set 
out by the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies and 
King III. 
 
Table 5.7 provides a summary of the themes and categories that emerged from the 
analysis of the findings relating to the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through optimised 
activities. 
 
Table 5.7 Themes and categories of the empirical findings related to the 
fulfilment of AC responsibilities through optimised activities  
 
Themes Categories 
Fiduciary role 
(§ 5.4.2.1) 
 Knowledge and acceptance of fiduciary role 
Feedback to the board 
and shareholders 
(§ 5.4.2.2) 
 Media used to provide feedback 
 Value of the feedback processes 
AC charter and work 
plan 
(§ 5.4.2.3) 
 Information included in the AC charter and work plan 
 Value of the AC work plan  
 Person responsible for preparation of the AC work plan 
Annual assessments 
(§ 5.4.2.4) 
 Annual assessment process  
 Value of the annual assessment process 
Number of AC meetings  
(§ 5.4.2.5) 
 Perceptions on the sufficiency of the number of annual AC 
meetings  
 Perceptions on the value of having four annual AC meetings  
Information sent to AC 
members in advance of 
AC meetings (§ 5.4.2.6) 
 
 Information included in the packs 
 Person responsible for the preparation of the packs 
 Timeframe provided to AC members to familiarise themselves 
with information included in the pack 
 Amount of time spent by AC members on familiarising 
themselves with the information in the pack 
 Perceptions of attendees with regard to AC members being 
adequately prepared for AC meetings 
 Benefits associated with being adequately prepared for AC 
meetings 
Scheduled date, time, 
duration and attendance 
of AC meetings 
(§ 5.4.2.7) 
 Perceptions on the appropriateness of the scheduled date, 
time and duration of AC meetings  
 Commitment of AC members to attending AC meetings 
Minutes and action 
sheets of AC meetings 
(§ 5.4.2.8) 
 Administrative role of the company secretary 
 Role of the minutes of AC meetings 
 Role of the action sheets 
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5.4.2.1 Fiduciary role 
 
One of the AC participants was aware of and accepted his/her fiduciary role since 
he/she stated that “my role is that I need to look after the interests of the company” 
(P6:274). Another AC participant opined that an AC member should perform his/her 
responsibilities with thoroughness even if no remuneration is received (P8:94). The third 
AC participant felt differently, stating that “If you give someone less money, then they’ll 
spend less time on it” (P2:76). Arguably, it is submitted that this AC participant was of 
the opinion that if an AC member was not sufficiently compensated, he/she would fail to 
fulfil his/her fiduciary role, consequently facing possible legal action. This concern was 
reduced, however, when this participant went on to state that “I think in [the company’s] 
case, we are reasonably compensated” (P2:76) (§  5.4.1.1). Further research on this 
matter is suggested, as the relationship between the fulfilment of AC members’ fiduciary 
role and the compensation of AC members falls outside the scope of this study. Thus, 
all the AC participants reiterated their commitment to act diligently during the fulfilment 
of their responsibilities. This commitment is in line with section 76(3) of the Companies 
Act (RSA, 2009), scholarly literature (DeZoort et al., 2002:45) and the perspective of an 
accounting firm (Nkonki, 2014:5, 7). 
 
Section 77(2) of the Companies Act states that an AC member can be held personally 
liable if he/she fails to act diligently (RSA, 2009). One of the AC participants stressed 
that his/her fiduciary role is fulfilled by focusing on risks rather than cosmetic changes 
during AC meetings (P6:156) and that he/she was adequately prepared for AC 
meetings to avoid the risk of being held liable (P6:170, 172). Such preparation was 
done by reviewing the AC pack (§ 5.4.2.6) and holding pre-meetings with management 
and/or the external auditor (§ 5.4.3.1). 
 
In chapter 2 (§ 2.2.3.2), the researcher argued that AltX listed companies with the main 
goal of growing their businesses in the long term could achieve maximum growth and 
wealth by considering the interests of all stakeholders during the companies’ decision-
making processes and business operations. It was therefore expected that the AltX 
listed company is this study, which had a long-term vision to grow its business, as 
evidenced by its listing duration of 7.74 years (Maluleka, 2015) and the strategic 
practices reflected in its integrated report (ABC Limited, 2014a:7), would embrace 
stakeholder theory. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the researcher’s expectations, two 
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AC participants articulated that they were responsible to the shareholders of the 
company, which suggested that they perceived their fiduciary role to apply to the 
shareholders of the company only. This finding suggests that the AC added value to the 
company and its shareholders and not to its wider stakeholders. One AC participant had 
this to say in this regard: 
 
We’re there to protect the small shareholder, that’s our big role (P2:104). 
 
Another AC participant had a different insight, feeling that the AC is ultimately 
responsible to the board. The board then in turn has a responsibility towards the 
company and its shareholders (P8:166). King III also recommends that the AC should 
report to the board (IOD, 2009a:35, principle 3.10) and that the board remains 
responsible for the responsibilities delegated to the AC (IOD, 2009a:28, principle 2.23). 
This implies that the AC indirectly, through the board, added value to the company and 
its shareholders. Nevertheless, the company’s AFS and integrated report were public 
information which could be accessed by stakeholders. Publicly available company 
information could expose company practices to the potential detriment of stakeholders, 
resulting in the company not being regarded as a responsible corporate citizen. 
Arguably, this implies that the AC was indirectly also of value to the company’s 
stakeholders, as the AC would consider such stakeholders in terms of enlightened 
shareholder theory. Such consideration stems from the fact that possible legal action 
taken by a neglected stakeholder could decrease the company’s market value and 
threaten its continued existence. 
 
Responses obtained from participants on the fulfilment of AC members’ responsibilities 
through optimised activities (§§ 5.4.2.2–5.4.2.8) and by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers (§ 5.4.3) provided further 
evidence that AC members accepted their fiduciary role and acted in accordance with 
this role. 
 
5.4.2.2 Feedback to the board and shareholders 
 
At every board meeting an agenda item was included where feedback from the AC was 
required (P2:146; P8:110). The AC chairperson, on behalf of the AC, then reported 
“verbally” (P6:212; P7:60) to the board. This reporting procedure was also included in 
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the AC charter (ABC Limited, 2014f:6, par. 7.2) and is congruent with the literature 
offered by Nkonki (2014:14) and King III (IOD, 2009b:58, par. 19). Written feedback was 
also provided in the form of the “minutes of the AC meeting” (P8:114) which were 
included in the “board packs” (P3:18). A review of the AC charter confirmed this finding 
(ABC Limited, 2014f:6, par. 7.1). Feedback provided in the form of the minutes of AC 
meetings is acknowledged by Spira (1999b:269) and Nkonki (2014:10, 14). One AC 
participant stated that the board meeting was where the board was reassured that the 
AC was fulfilling its responsibilities (P8:111). Although none of the participants 
mentioned that the AC present a formal report every year for the board on its statutory 
responsibilities as well as those allocated to it by the board, this reporting procedure 
was included in the AC charter (ABC Limited, 2014f:6, par. 7.3).  
 
One non-AC participant commented on the level of trust (P3:30) between the board 
members (who did not serve on the AC, in particular the one board member who did not 
attend the AC meetings as an invitee (§ 5.3, table 5.2)) and AC members. This was 
linked to a unique characteristic of AltX listed companies, namely, the small number of 
board members in comparison with companies listed on the main board of the JSE. The 
level of trust between the board of the AltX listed company in this study and the AC was 
compared to a patient that trusts the feedback provided by his/her specialist. Like this 
patient-specialist relationship, the board trusted the feedback provided by the AC on the 
fulfilment of its responsibilities (P3:34). Although a number of media was used by the 
AC in providing feedback to the board, the trustworthiness of such feedback was 
enhanced by this trust relationship. In particular, the non-executive board member (who 
did not attend the AC meetings as an invitee but nevertheless was also one of the major 
shareholders of the company) stated that, owing to this trust relationship, he/she valued 
the AC feedback which assured him/her that his/her shareholding was adequately 
managed. Such a trust relationship also indirectly protects the minority shareholders of 
the company, who like this non-executive board member, were not involved in the 
management of the company and did not attend AC meetings. In other words, the non-
executive board member’s safeguarding of his/her majority shareholding indirectly 
improved the board’s accountability to the company’s minority shareholders. This 
finding is in keeping with Spira (1999a:253), who also found that feedback provided by 
the AC to the board enables the former to add value to the board by illustrating its 
accountability to the company’s shareholders. 
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Two media were used by the AC to communicate with the company’s shareholders. 
Firstly, the AC used the integrated report to report formally to shareholders on the 
fulfilment of its responsibilities (ABC Limited, 2014a:25–26). This is in line with the 
requirements of section 94(7)(f) of the Companies Act (RSA, 2009). Secondly, the AC 
chairperson attended the AGM where he/she interacted with shareholders by 
responding to questions (ABC Limited, 2014f:2:par. 2.7). Feedback by the AC 
chairperson at the AGM is also recommended by King III (IOD, 2009b:67, par. 84). As 
such, the AC’s feedback practices enabled it to add value to the company’s 
shareholders as they were given an opportunity to obtain information about the AC’s 
oversight responsibilities. 
 
As discussed in section 5.4.2.1 the company’s AFS and integrated report were public 
information which was available for perusal by the company’s stakeholders. Hence, this 
implies that ABC Limited also provided feedback to its stakeholders in terms of 
enlightened shareholder theory. 
 
The findings suggest that the media used by the AC to provide feedback to the board 
and the company’s shareholders were sufficient, as recommended by King III (IOD, 
2009a:35, principle 3.10). The AC’s feedback enabled it to add value to the board and 
the company’s shareholders as it illustrated that the AC’s responsibilities had been 
fulfilled. The company’s AFS and integrated report were also publicly available which 
could be accessed by its stakeholders in terms of enlightened shareholder theory. 
Furthermore, the relationship of trust between the board and the AC enabled the latter 
to add value to the board (in particular the non-executive board member who was a 
major shareholder and did not attend AC meetings), as it strengthened the 
trustworthiness of the feedback provided by the AC about the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities. 
 
5.4.2.3 Audit committee charter and work plan 
 
The existence of an AC charter was confirmed as the researcher was given a copy of 
this document during the data collection phase. The charter was also referred to as the 
AC’s terms of reference. These terms of reference cover areas relating to AC 
membership, attendance of meetings, frequency of meetings, authority, responsibilities, 
reporting procedures and the annual assessment process (ABC Limited, 2014f:1–6). 
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King III (IOD, 2009a:31, recommended practice 3.1.3), and the scholarly literature (e.g. 
Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993:36, 45; DeZoort et al., 2002:44, 55) supports the existence of 
an AC charter articulating the AC’s responsibilities. 
 
The AC charter was used to compile an annual AC work plan. This was presented in the 
form of a table in which the first column gave a description of the AC’s responsibility (in 
line with the responsibilities as stipulated by the Companies Act, the JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies and as recommended by King III (P1:8; P5:66; 
P6:170)) and the second column identified the person responsible for assisting the AC 
in carrying out the specific responsibility (ABC Limited, 2014g:1–6). The third column 
described the manner in which such assistance should be provided (e.g. verbal 
feedback, report, questionnaire) (ABC Limited, 2014g:1–6), while the last column stated 
the progress made by the AC in respect of fulfilling the specific responsibility (ABC 
Limited, 2014g:1–6). In the “Progress” column, the date of the AC meeting where such 
responsibility was dealt with was mentioned (ABC Limited, 2014g:1–6). Thus, at the end 
of the financial year, all responsibilities were dealt with by referring to either one of the 
four AC meetings in the “Progress” column. Accordingly, the annual work plan was 
described as being “structured and very formal” (P8:4), a tracking tool (P7:72) and of 
“great assistance” (P7:114), as it played a role in ensuring that the AC responsibilities 
required by the Companies Act and the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed 
companies, and recommended by King III were fulfilled (P7:114). It was also valuable in 
the sense that it was used to compile the agenda for AC meetings (§ 5.4.3.2). 
 
In the company being studied, the AC work plan was prepared by the company 
secretary (P1:258). In support of this practice, King III (IOD, 2009a:27, recommended 
practice 2.21.11) recommends that the company secretary should contribute to drafting 
a yearly work plan in line with the AC charter, whilst section 88(a) of the Companies Act 
(RSA, 2009) requires that the company secretary should support the AC in its 
responsibilities. The AC work plan was finalised after discussions and input from the AC 
and the CFO to ascertain that “everything is covered” (P5:84). In this case, the AC, the 
CFO and the company secretary worked together to finalise the plan (P2:86). King III 
(IOD, 2009a:32, recommended practice 3.2.4), the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC)14 
                                            
14
 The BRC issued its report and recommendations on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit 
committees in 1999 in the USA (Olson, 1999:1097). 
  
129 
(1999:27) and an AC guideline issued by Nkonki (2014:13) advocate that the AC should 
not accept responsibilities for which members are not qualified, or that fall outside the 
committee’s scope. In addition, the literature (Olson, 1999:1102; Nkonki, 2014:13) 
emphasises that the AC should not accept responsibilities that it does not have time to 
fulfil. However, none of these risks were highlighted during the interviews, as the AC 
was at that time involved in the finalisation of its work plan. Furthermore, as advocated 
by the literature (Nkonki, 2014:10), the practice of involving the AC in the finalisation of 
the work plan also provides it with an opportunity to clarify uncertainties with regard to 
the responsibilities assigned to it. Hence, by including fair and clear responsibilities in 
the AC work plan (DeZoort, 1997:222), the AC should be capable of fulfilling its 
responsibilities (§ 5.4.2, table 5.6) and adding value to the company and its 
shareholders. A non-AC participant explained the preparation and finalisation of the AC 
work plan as follows: 
 
… have a meeting with the CFO once a year … review the [AC work plan], whether it 
worked during that meeting, should it be moved to another meeting, … add extra 
items, items that’s specific to that company … . And then once a year, the [AC] will 
actually review this [AC work plan] and then make their amendments or adjustments 
or recommendations regarding this document (P5:80). 
 
Both an AC participant and a non-AC participant acknowledged that the contribution of 
the company secretary was valuable as he/she ensured that all legal requirements were 
adequately addressed in the AC work plan (P1:258; P6:232). King III also recommends 
(IOD, 2009a:27, recommended practice 2.21.8) that the company secretary accepts 
responsibility for ensuring that an AC work plan is kept up-to-date. Accordingly, the 
company secretary’s role in updating the AC work plan enabled him/her to indirectly add 
value to the company by ensuring that the latest AC responsibilities, in terms of legal 
requirements, were reflected in the plan. The company secretary was not a member of 
the AC, but in terms of this study, an information provider and an invitee at AC meetings 
who provided support for the AC (ABC Limited, 2014a:13, 16). 
 
The AC work plan was included in the pack which was circulated to AC members prior 
to AC meetings (§  5.4.2.6) (P1:14). Thus, the AC members were able to reflect on their 
responsibilities at least four times a year (AC meetings were conducted four times per 
annum) and accordingly knew what was expected of them. This practice of being 
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knowledgeable about what was expected of the AC is in line with what was uncovered 
by the BRC (1999:27). 
 
The findings suggest that the manner in which the AC work plan is compiled and 
distributed to the AC on a quarterly basis supports the AC in the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities, enabling it to add value to the company and its shareholders. The 
researcher reviewed both the AC charter and the AC work plan and is of the opinion 
that these documents addressed the AC’s responsibilities as required by the 
Companies Act and the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies and as 
recommended by King III. These documents were also found to be presented in a user-
friendly format. 
 
5.4.2.4 Annual assessments 
 
A review of the AC charter and work plan revealed that the AC’s activities and 
effectiveness were assessed on an annual basis (ABC Limited, 2014f:6, par. 8; ABC 
Limited, 2014g:6) as required by the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies 
(JSE Limited, 2014b:21.5(i)) and recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:28, principle 
2.22). Two assessments of the AC (which were not reviewed by the researcher owing to 
their confidential nature) had been carried out. In one assessment the board was 
requested to assess whether the AC added value to the board (P6:40), while the other 
assessment was carried out on an AC level (P6:40). Questionnaires for both 
assessments were prepared by the company secretary (P5:304; P7:24) as 
recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:28, recommended practice 2.21.13). The format 
of the questionnaire, which was administered on an AC level, was described as follows: 
 
… listing everything from the composition [of the AC] to the culture in the [AC] 
meeting itself, to obviously all the duties that [the AC has to] comply to and then they 
can rate themselves from one, being the lowest to four being highest and they also 
have a comment column for suggesting how to improve something … (P5:302). 
 
The process began with the questionnaire being “done independently by each [AC] 
member” (P2:9–10; P5:302; P6:34) where each AC member “anonymously” (P5:306) 
“assess themselves” (P2:9–10; P6:34; P7:25) and the other AC members (P6:34; 
P7:26). Such assessment of AC members was also completed by all the invitees to the 
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AC meetings (§  5.3, table 5.2) (P2:9–10; P6:40). This process was concluded with the 
calculation of “an average score that [the AC] receives based on those ratings” (P5:320; 
P6:34). These average scores were presented at the next AC meeting (P5:320; P7:28). 
The board was also notified of the outcome of the AC’s annual assessment process 
(ABC Limited, 2014f:6, par. 8; P5:330).  
 
The aim of the annual assessment process was to ascertain whether the AC was 
fulfilling its responsibilities, as well as the way in which its responsibilities were being 
fulfilled (P5:300). It also provided an opportunity to measure the individual AC member’s 
ability to add value to the company through his/her involvement during the AC meetings 
(P7:26). One AC participant had this to say: 
 
The main reason for [the annual assessment] is to measure whether the directors 
who are involved with the [AC] meeting, all have a reasonable contribution to the 
process in the AC [meeting] (P2:9). 
 
The annual assessment process also served as an indication of how well the AC had 
performed as well as highlighting areas for improvement (P5:320; P6:24; P7:24). 
Remedial actions taken to address areas for improvement, as highlighted by the annual 
assessment, increased the AC’s value to the company and its shareholders. An 
example of an area highlighted by the annual assessment process, where the AC has 
taken remedial action, was the issue of not having an internal audit department (P6:24). 
Compensating measures were subsequently put in place and are discussed in section 
5.4.3.1.  
 
A review of the company’s integrated report (ABC Limited, 2014a:11) revealed that a 
self-assessment of the AC was done and that the board will focus on areas for 
improvement. One AC participant acknowledged that the annual assessment process is 
“not mature” (P6:24), which may explain why the results of the self-assessment, as 
recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:28, recommended practice 2.22.4) and the 
integrated reporting framework (IIRC, 2013:25), were not included in the integrated 
report. 
 
In summary, the assessment of AC members’ performance uncovered areas for 
improvement. Consequently, remedial action taken to address these areas increased 
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the AC’s value to the company and its shareholders. However, the findings suggest that 
the annual assessment process was not mature, therefore an improved annual 
assessment process could arguably enhance the AC’s value for the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
5.4.2.5 Number of audit committee meetings 
 
The AC in this study met quarterly (ABC Limited, 2014b; ABC Limited, 2014c; ABC 
Limited, 2014d; ABC Limited, 2014e; ABC Limited, 2014g; P1:192). This holding of 
quarterly meetings is in line with the number of AC meetings held in rapidly growing 
New Zealand companies (Sharma et al., 2009:249), which meet on average 3.76 times 
per year. Thus, the perception of the researcher (ch 3, §  3.3.5) that rapidly growing AltX 
listed companies should meet at least four times annually was confirmed.  
 
Although the price-sensitivity of the company was highlighted in sections 5.4.1.3 and 
5.4.1.4, two of the AC participants stated that they preferred to meet four times per 
annum as opposed to the two meetings recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:31, 
recommended practice 3.1.4), because it resulted in shorter and more effective 
meetings, where AC members remained focused. The researcher is of the opinion that 
effective and focused meetings improve AC practices and enable the AC to add value to 
the company and its shareholders. One AC participant pointed out: 
 
… if you combine it in two meetings, firstly I don’t think you will get the job done 
properly. … I think the focus will not be there … there’s a work plan, it’s focused on 
specific things. The meetings are shorter, you get more buy-in and you get the work 
done (P6:204). 
 
An AC participant further stated that if only two annual AC meetings were held, it would 
limit the AC’s knowledge of the business and its insights into the company’s AFS. This 
lack of knowledge and insights would in turn hamper the AC in the fulfilment of its 
financial oversight responsibility (P2:82) and accordingly less value would be added to 
the company and its shareholders. Archambeault and DeZoort (2001:34, 46–47) share 
similar findings, as they found that an increase in the number of meetings held annually 
is associated with higher quality AFS. This participant mentioned: 
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Let me put it like this, any person that looks at a business twice a year would have no 
idea what the business is about (P2:80). 
 
The same AC participant further stressed that spending more time on AC 
responsibilities by attending more meetings reduces the risk of being held personally 
liable (§  5.4.2.1) (P2:82).  
 
The third AC participant was initially uncertain as to the reasons why four AC meetings 
were held. The participant later commented that conducting more than two meetings 
every year emanated from recent company acquisitions, new product launches and the 
product changes that had taken place (P8:66). These changes required the AC to meet 
more regularly than previously to ensure the successful implementation of these 
changes and consequently to enable it to add value to the company and its 
shareholders. This AC participant stated the following in this regard: 
 
… and because there are things that are being implemented all the time we wanna 
meet … more often until those things are ironed out (P8:68). 
 
A non-AC participant agreed with the AC participants’ views that two AC meetings a 
year would be insufficient. He/she stated that the AC has too many responsibilities to be 
able to deal with them in two meetings only. This is in agreement with Menon and 
Williams (1994:124), who found that an AC can only be of value if it meets regularly. 
The non-AC participant further stated that material risks could only be detected and 
addressed by the AC if it met regularly, that is, four times a year, and commented in this 
regard that with quarterly meetings: 
 
… quicker actions can be taken if there is really a risk in some of the issues that 
needs to be addressed (P1:192). 
 
Although the reasons justifying quarterly AC meetings differed, the findings suggest 
strong support for four AC meetings a year as this gives the AC more time to add value 
to the company and its shareholders. Quarterly meetings enable the AC to take better 
decisions because the meetings are more effective and focused, improve its knowledge 
of the company’s business and provide insights that increase the quality of the AFS, as 
well as ensure the successful implementation of changes by the company. Furthermore, 
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a sufficient number of meetings enabled the AC to fulfil its responsibilities and to detect 
and address material risks in a timely fashion. 
 
5.4.2.6 Information sent to audit committee members in advance of audit 
committee meetings 
 
Information sent to AC members and invitees in advance of AC meetings included “the 
minutes from the previous [AC] meetings” (P8:72) (§  5.4.2.8), “the annual work plan” 
(P1:26) (§  5.4.2.3), the “agenda” (P1:28; P8:72) (§ 5.4.3.2), the “action sheet” (P1:28) 
(§  5.4.2.8) and the feedback that was requested by the AC in terms of the action sheet 
(P8:73). The AC work plan further guided the choice of information included in the pack, 
which consisted mainly of financial information, audit planning and risk information (ABC 
Limited, 2014g:2–6; P2:61; P6:170). Some of the AC participants indicated that if 
additional information (other than the information already supplied in the pack) was 
required to prepare for the AC meeting, such a request was made prior to the meeting 
(P2:61; P6:176). As such, the company followed the practices advocated by Deloitte 
Development LLC (2012:5), which states that meeting material should include all the 
information that will be discussed at the AC meeting.  
 
The pack was prepared by the CFO with input from the AC chairperson, the external 
auditor and the company secretary (ABC Limited, 2014g:1–6; P1:258; P5:100; P7:80) 
which was supplied in a sound and concise manner (P4:214), and then sent to the AC 
members and invitees to the AC meeting approximately a week prior to the AC meeting 
(P1:14; P6:172). Spira (1999a:242), Nkonki (2014:11) and KPMG (2014:6) also support 
the notion that AC members should receive information prior to the AC meeting to 
enable them to prepare effectively for it. 
 
The researcher found it interesting to note that although the pack was circulated to AC 
members a week prior to the AC meeting, only a few hours were spent on reading and 
analysing the information in the pack, as evidenced by the responses provided by AC 
participants. One of the AC participants (who had been involved with the company for a 
number of years) indicated that although the information included in the pack “could be 
voluminous” (P2:61), he/she did not spend much time preparing for the meeting. The 
AC participant stated in this regard: “You probably have to spend two to three hours on 
it” (P2:68). The reason for this was probably the simplicity of the company’s business 
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(P2:76; P4:110; P8:20). The same participant indicated that the preparation time could 
be even further reduced to “an hour” (P2:68), depending on whether the pack showed 
that a risk area, which had been previously discussed, would be dealt with (P2:68). 
According to King III, the AC is responsible for overseeing the risk management 
processes within the company (IOD, 2009a:34, principle 3.8), specifically overseeing 
risks relating to financial reporting, fraud and IT (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended practice 
3.8.2). The researcher is of the opinion that the fulfilment of the AC’s risk oversight 
responsibilities is crucial, because in the event of risks not being adequately identified 
and addressed the continued existence of a company could be at risk. To this end, the 
focus on risks by the AC enabled it to add value to the company and its shareholders. 
The AC participant explained: 
 
… we have managed the [information included in the pack] carefully so that we focus 
on risks rather than to just rubber-stamp a whole lot of papers (P2:61). 
 
The same AC participant then explained that there is also a correlation between an AC 
member’s experience level (§ 5.4.1.4) and the time required to prepare for a meeting. 
The participant framed the situation as follows: 
 
So, my experience in [the company’s] industry, in my own business and of course, 
my background with [the company], the time that I spend may be a little less, 
because my intuition has grown a lot. So, my experience is much more. A “new” [AC] 
member … would probably spend more time … than I would (P2:68). 
 
When another AC participant was asked whether two full days were spent studying the 
information included in the pack, he/she responded categorically, “no” (P8:80). Although 
he/she did not say how long was spent, he/she did mention that it took a lot less time 
than that. 
 
The concern felt by the researcher regarding the limited time AC members spent 
preparing for meetings was reduced as evidence of their active participation during 
these meetings became apparent (§ 5.4.3.2), as well as on the basis of the opinions 
expressed by a few non-AC participants (who were also invitees to the AC meetings). 
For example, one non-AC participant noted: 
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I must say that’s the meeting [where] everybody is prepared (P1:100) … to the bare 
bone (P1:102). 
 
A non-AC participant further stated that when AC members were adequately prepared 
for meetings, the efficiency of such meetings improved (P5:224), which implies that 
when AC members are well prepared, the AC makes better informed decisions. Hence, 
this improved efficiency of AC meetings has enabled the AC to add value to the 
company and its shareholders and reduce the duration of AC meetings (§ 5.4.2.7).  
 
In summary, the researcher found that the information included in the pack enabled the 
AC members to be adequately informed about areas which fall within the AC’s scope of 
responsibilities. The researcher also found that although the pack was circulated to AC 
members a week prior to the AC meeting, only a few hours were spent on analysing the 
information it contained. Further, the information was analysed from a risk perspective 
which enabled the AC to add value to the company and its shareholders. The 
researcher consequently considered this preparation time to be sufficient based on the 
positive comments made by the invitees to the AC meetings and the AC members’ 
active participation during AC meetings. Finally, when AC members were adequately 
prepared for AC meetings, the efficiency of AC meetings increased, which again 
enabled them to add value to the company and its shareholders because better 
informed decisions could be made. 
 
5.4.2.7 Scheduled date, time, duration and attendance of audit committee 
meetings 
 
Quarterly AC meetings were conducted (§ 5.4.2.5), supported by the AC’s annual work 
plan (ABC Limited, 2014g:2–6), as highlighted in section 5.4.2.3. The AC guideline 
issued by Nkonki (2014:14) suggests that one AC meeting should be held before the 
commencement of the interim audit and another after the interim audit. The company in 
this study, however, met only once during the interim audit period, that is, before the 
board approved the interim financial results (ABC Limited, 2014f:2). Furthermore, 
Nkonki’s AC guideline (2014:14) states that another AC meeting should be held after 
the completion of the year-end audit and prior to reporting. By contrast, the company in 
this study met three times during the year-end audit and reporting period, that is, before 
the annual external audit commenced, after the annual external audit was completed 
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and before the board had approved the AFS and the integrated report (ABC Limited, 
2014f:2). The researcher supports the company’s scheduled AC meeting dates, 
because an AC’s responsibilities increase during the periods of interim financial 
reporting, the commencement and completion of the external audit, as well as prior to 
the release of the AFS and integrated report. Hence, these meeting dates were 
considered appropriate and enabled the AC to add value to the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
AC meetings were scheduled between two to seven days prior to the board meetings 
(P2:149; P6:214; P7:102; P8:104). One AC participant and some non-AC participants 
commented that such a “big gap” (P6:218) provided ample time for the responsible 
persons to amend documentation, as suggested during AC meetings, prior to it being 
presented at the board meeting. Arguably, the presentation of amended documentation 
at the board meeting could provide the board with a clear picture of the current state of 
affairs and allow it to make informed decisions. Accordingly, when the board can base 
its decisions on documentation presented by the AC that is reliable, value is added to 
both the company and its shareholders. This finding correlates with findings in the 
literature, which show that AC meetings should not be scheduled directly before board 
meetings (Spira, 1998:34–35; Spira, 1999a:246). One non-AC participant explained in 
this regard: 
 
… having that gap allows them to actually go and action and resolve questions on 
financials and get the disclosure out … especially when there’re results 
announcements coming out, have that sort of tied up and cleaned up and in a final 
form by the time the board meeting takes place to approve that (P4:256). 
 
The AC meetings were scheduled in the mornings, at the latest 11 o’clock (ABC 
Limited, 2014b; ABC Limited, 2014c; ABC Limited, 2014d; ABC Limited, 2014e). One 
AC participant maintained that having these meetings in the morning allowed the 
committee members, who were all employed by other companies, to manage their time 
wisely as they could still return to their workplace and work for the rest of the day 
(P8:96). 
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The duration of AC meetings varied between two to four hours (P1:198; P6:206). Such 
duration was regarded as sufficient to cover the items included in the agenda (P1:194). 
One AC participant had the following to say about this: 
 
… it’s long enough to get everything done … it’s not dragged out too long (P8:102). 
 
The reasons for not having longer meetings, as well as the value added to the company 
and its shareholders when shorter AC meetings are held, were dealt with in section 
5.4.2.5. The AC chairperson was also identified as being instrumental in ensuring that 
the duration of AC meetings was reasonable. Refer to section 5.4.1.2 where the 
leadership qualities of the AC’s chairperson are described. 
 
Apart from the participants being satisfied with the AC meetings’ dates, scheduled times 
and duration, an AC can only be of value to the company and its shareholders if its 
members and invitees attend these meetings. This is because AC meetings are 
regarded as the platform where the AC fulfils its responsibilities and where the collective 
input of all AC members and invitees enables the AC to improve the manner in which 
the committee fulfils its responsibilities (§  5.4.3.2).  A review of the company’s 
attendance registers for AC meetings held during the 2014 calendar year revealed that 
these meetings were well attended. Arguably, this good attendance was because both 
AC members and invitees were satisfied with the scheduled date, time and duration of 
the meetings. The attendance of AC meetings is summarised in table 5.8 (ABC Limited, 
2014b; ABC Limited, 2014c; ABC Limited, 2014d; ABC Limited, 2014e). 
 
Table 5.8 AC meetings: attendance by AC members and invitees 
 
 Meeting 1 Meeting 2 Meeting 3 Meeting 4 
AC member: 1 Present Present Present Present 
AC member: 2 Present Apology Present Present 
AC member: 3 Not yet member 
of the AC 
(Note 1) 
Present Apology Present 
Non-executive 
board member 
Present Apology Present Apology 
CEO Present Present Apology Present 
CFO Present Present Present Present 
External 
auditor: 
partner 
 
Present Present Present Apology 
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 Meeting 1 Meeting 2 Meeting 3 Meeting 4 
External 
auditor: 
manager 
Apology Present Present Present 
Company 
secretary 
Present Present Present Present 
Designated 
advisor 
Present Present Note 2 Present 
 
Note 1: The previous AC member did attend this meeting. 
 
Note 2: The company’s designated advisor could not attend the meeting, however the 
company which provided the company with the designated advisor services did send 
another representative to attend the meeting on his/her behalf. 
 
Overall, the researcher found that the quarterly AC meetings were conducted on dates 
when the AC’s oversight responsibilities increased. Also, the scheduling of the AC 
meetings a week prior to the board meetings enabled it to present reliable 
documentation to the board which would assist it to make informed decisions to the 
benefit of the company and its shareholders. AC members and invitees were satisfied 
with the scheduled date, time and duration of AC meetings which resulted in the 
meetings being well attended. Since meetings were well attended, the AC could in turn, 
with the input of all its members and invitees, fulfil its responsibilities to the benefit of the 
company and its shareholders. 
 
5.4.2.8 Minutes and action sheets of audit committee meetings 
 
As reported earlier (§  5.4.2.6), the minutes of the previous AC meeting were also 
included in the pack circulated to AC members and invitees prior to the meeting. This 
practice is in line with the thinking of Spira (1999a:242), King III (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.12) and the AC guideline issued by Nkonki (2014:14, 60), 
which support the notion that decisions taken at each AC meeting should be included in 
the minutes of the meeting. It was also in keeping with King III (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.12), which recommends that the minutes should be 
distributed to AC members in a timely fashion. 
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To ensure the validity of such minutes, all members present at the AC meetings were 
asked if they were satisfied with their content (P1:206; P5:180). Although the minutes 
were approved, their accuracy was further increased by the presence of a “strong 
company secretary” (P1:258), as he/she was responsible for compiling them (P5:56; 
P8:50). This responsibility of the company secretary is also required by section 88(d) of 
the Companies Act (RSA, 2009) and recommended by King III (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.12). One AC participant acknowledged how important it 
was for minutes to be a true reflection of meetings, as they demonstrate whether an AC 
member has acted diligently or not. As such, the AC meeting’s minutes could reveal 
instances where AC members failed to act diligently and could serve as proof to hold 
AC members personally liable (RSA, 2009:s 77). Therefore, the minutes of AC meetings 
could serve as an accountability tool, encouraging diligent behaviour and thus enabling 
the AC to add value to the company and its shareholders. This non-AC participant 
described the situation as follows: 
 
… there is [also] a great risk for the AC and its members to have incorrect information 
published in minutes that one day if there might be something standing up in court, 
your minutes is not complete so I must say [taking proper minutes] is very important 
(P1:258). 
 
The pack also contained an action sheet (matters arising from the previous meetings) 
(§ 5.4.2.6). One non-AC participant described an action sheet as follows: 
 
… action sheet information is what came out of the previous [AC] meeting that needs 
to be addressed, what needs to be changed, where do [the AC] require additional 
information (P1:28). 
 
The action sheet contained columns stating the date of the AC meeting where the 
action was requested (P1:110; P5:380), a reference to the agenda item that initiated 
such action (P5:382), a description of the action required (P1:110; P5:384), the 
responsible officer (P5:386) and an explanation of the action taken (P5:180). The AC 
expected these actions to be implemented before the following AC meeting and the 
responsible person was required to provide written feedback for inclusion in the pack for 
the next meeting and oral feedback at the meeting (P1:112; P8:74).  
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Two non-AC participants stated that the action sheets were taken seriously because 
they were acted upon (P4:152, 154; P7:58). Another non-AC participant remarked that 
action sheets were taken seriously because the AC chairperson was “strict” (P1:212). 
Thus, the researcher is of the opinion that the AC’s role was respected (§  5.4.3.3). To 
this end, the researcher supports the use of an action sheet because, like the minutes 
of AC meetings, it served as an accountability tool, encouraging diligent behaviour by 
AC members.  
 
However, in certain cases action was required immediately before the board meeting 
was held and before the following AC meeting. In such cases, an alternative process 
was followed where actions were approved via e-mail. One AC participant explained 
this alternative process as follows: 
 
If it’s a critical document that pertains to the financial information that has to go out, 
then we’ll have it fixed immediately. Then it has to happen within three days or within 
a week, maximum, so that we take a round robin, until everyone is happy with the 
document so that we can discuss it at the board meeting (P2:140). 
 
Overall, the researcher found that the minutes of AC meetings were properly recorded 
and were approved at the following meeting. Participants acknowledged the supportive 
role played by the company secretary in compiling accurate minutes. Matters requiring 
action were formally noted on an action sheet and both the minutes and the action 
sheets served as accountability tools for encouraging diligent behaviour on the part of 
AC members to the benefit of the company and its shareholders.  
 
5.4.3 The fulfilment of audit committee responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers 
 
As noted in chapter 3 (§  3.4), the AC’s relationship with the board and information 
providers should also be reflected on to conclude on whether it enabled the AC to add 
value to the company and its stakeholders. Information providers include, inter alia, 
management, and the internal and external auditors. Management, the internal and 
external assurance providers (which may include internal and external auditors) are 
referred to as the three lines of defence that provide assurance to the AC with regard to 
the risks faced by the company. These three lines of defence are advocated by the 
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combined assurance model of King III (ch 3, §  3.4) (IOD, 2009b:62, par. 46). Table 5.9 
provides a summary of the themes and categories that emerged from the analysis of the 
findings relating to the maintenance of healthy relationships with the board and 
information providers. 
 
Table 5.9 Themes and categories of the empirical findings related to the 
fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships 
with the board and information providers  
 
Themes Categories 
Informal interaction and 
ad hoc meetings with 
management and 
assurance providers 
(§ 5.4.3.1) 
 
 Reasons for not appointing an internal auditor 
 Compensating measures instituted to decrease the risk of not 
appointing an internal auditor 
 Good working relationship, interaction and synergy among the 
AC and management, and the AC and the external auditor 
 Open-door culture where informal interactions took place 
between the AC and management, and the AC and the 
external auditor 
 Meetings that were held prior to the AC meeting between the 
AC chairperson and management, and the AC chairperson 
and the external auditor 
 Meetings that were held after the AC meeting between the AC 
and management, and the AC and the external auditor 
 Separate meetings held by the AC with management and the 
external auditor respectively  
 
Agendas, tone of and 
procedures followed at 
AC meetings  
(§ 5.4.3.2) 
 Involvement of multiple parties when compiling the agenda of 
the AC meetings 
 Tone of and procedures followed at AC meetings 
 Value of management and external auditor being present at 
AC meetings 
 Role of the company secretary and designated advisor who 
also attend AC meetings 
Perception of the value 
of the AC 
(§ 5.4.3.3) 
 Understanding and respect for the role of the AC 
 
5.4.3.1 Informal interaction and ad hoc meetings with management and 
assurance providers 
 
The only way in which the AC can fulfil its responsibilities is to engage with and obtain 
combined assurance from management (Zanni & Terrel, 2002:54; KPMG, 2014:7, 9; 
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Nkonki, 2014:26) and assurance providers (Olson, 1999:1106; KPMG, 2014:7, 9; 
Nkonki, 2014:26). At the time of collecting the data, the AC was dependent on just one 
assurance provider, namely, the external auditor. Thus, to assist in fulfilling its 
responsibilities, the AC obtained assurance and information only from the external 
auditor and management (ABC Limited 2014g:2–6). The reasons for not appointing an 
internal auditor (who would then also act as an assurance provider) and the 
compensating measures instituted are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
When the issue of an internal auditor was raised, the price-sensitivity of the company 
(§§  5.4.1.3–5.4.1.4) was again reiterated, bearing in mind the company’s size and 
budget constraints (ABC Limited, 2014a:10; P5:284; P6:24; P7:88). Since these 
reasons are reflected in the company’s most recent integrated report (ABC Limited, 
2014a:10), the company accordingly followed King III’s apply or explain principle (IOD, 
2009a:6). One AC participant mentioned another reason for the company not using an 
internal auditor. He/she referred to management as being “hands-on” (P2:108) and felt 
strongly that the services of an internal auditor were not necessary. The AC participant 
framed the situation within the company as follows: 
 
Here we have a small company, where the financial department is extremely small, 
you can see everything in front of you, things are controlled immediately, and 
decisions are made immediately. So, there’s not really a big drive or economic 
justification to have an internal [auditor]. … the “hands-on” of management is 
actually so immediate and direct (P2:108). 
 
Nevertheless, one non-AC participant acknowledged that the lack of such an 
independent assurance function raised the risk of management manipulation (P3:51). In 
this AltX listed company, three of the four non-AC board members collectively hold most 
of the shares in the company, that is, 52.1%, as noted in section 5.3 (ABC Limited, 
2014a:27). One of these board members includes a member of management (CEO). 
Arguably, the AltX listed company’s management (in this case, the CEO), with the 
support of the other non-AC board members, might use their influence to manipulate the 
AC, to the potential detriment of minority shareholders. Such manipulation could result 
from providing a false sense of assurance over the effectiveness of the internal controls 
that address the risk areas in the company. The power wielded by the board, which 
could be to the potential detriment of minority shareholders, was also noted in section 
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5.4.1.4. However, during the interviews, none of the participants mentioned that the 
board had in any way exploited its power. 
 
This concern was further reduced by the company’s implementation of compensating 
measures to “fill that gap” (P6:24). One of these measures included a risk matrix 
compiled by the risk committee (the AC chairperson and one member of the AC also 
served on the risk committee) (ABC Limited, 2014a:10) based on the input provided by 
the company’s divisional heads or line managers (P6:122). This matrix was used by 
both the company’s financial department and the external auditor to test whether the 
controls relating to the major risks were effective. The results were then reported to the 
risk committee and the AC, which in turn compared the results of these reports, thus 
gaining assurance on the risks facing the company (P6:48, 50; P7:90). However, this 
compensating measure was confined to the financial risks faced by the company. Other 
risks (business and operational risks) were monitored by the AC through feedback 
provided by the risk committee (ABC Limited, 2014g:2). One non-AC participant 
acknowledged that the risk committee played a role in compensating for the lack of an 
internal auditor. However, he/she expressed concern about the way in which the risk 
committee identified the risks included in the risk matrix as follows: 
 
… it sort of leaves an opportunity for things to fall through the cracks if you do not 
have the internal audit process … and their risk assessment is still very fresh, very 
new, so it’s not been tested and tried (P5:280). 
 
Despite this opinion, the effectiveness of the company’s risk assessment had improved 
as risk training had been presented by the AC chairperson to all members of staff 
(P1:136). The monthly fee paid to members of the board implies that board members 
should add value to the company and its shareholders. Thus, the AC chairperson 
presented risk training as part of his/her “value-adding” initiative and was accordingly 
indirectly remunerated through his/her monthly board fee. Arguably, the rendering of 
this service by the AC chairperson could influence his/her independent status 
(§  5.4.1.1). However, none of the participants mentioned a lack of independence on the 
part of the AC chairperson during the interviews. 
 
This risk training was used as a platform to explain to staff the reasons for identifying 
risks and the impact and assessment of risks. Accordingly, the training contributed to 
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management increasing its appreciation of the role of the AC (§  5.4.3.3). The training 
also contributed to improving the risk committee’s risk assessment process and 
compiling a more accurate risk matrix. An AC participant explained: 
 
And you could clearly see once [the AC chairperson] did the training how the risk 
matrix actually changed because now [staff] understood what’s the impact of [the 
risks] (P6:128). 
 
Although the researcher previously reported that one participant had raised concerns 
about the immaturity of the risk management process, which was not tried and tested, 
the provision of risk training resulted in an improved risk matrix. Arguably, such an 
improved risk matrix enhanced the company’s risk management and accordingly 
assisted the AC in fulfilling its risk responsibilities (IOD, 2009a:33, recommended 
practice 3.5.1; IOD, 2009a:34, principle 3.8; IOD, 2009b:62, par. 48; ABC Limited, 
2014g:2). 
 
One non-AC participant further explained that another compensating measure instituted 
to decrease the risk of not appointing an internal auditor was to engage the services of 
an IT specialist to assist the company in improving its IT procedures and controls 
(P7:88, 96). As such, improved IT procedures and controls supported the AC in the 
fulfilment of its oversight responsibility relating to IT risk (IOD, 2009a:34, recommended 
practice 3.8.2.4; ABC Limited, 2014g:2). Although these services had been obtained, 
one of the AC participants acknowledged that there was still room for improving the 
company’s IT governance (P6:278). 
 
The literature (BRC, 1999:30; KPMG, 2014:5) points out that there should be a good 
working relationship, open channels of communication, and informal meetings between 
the AC and management, and the AC and assurance providers. These aspects all 
existed in ABC Limited because participants mentioned the good working relationships, 
interaction and synergy between the company’s AC and management, as well as AC 
and the external auditor. This is what a non-AC participant had to say: 
 
… [the AC] are very open in helping and contributing and giving their feedback and if 
not possible, they will also refer [the CFO] to someone that can help (P1:236). 
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Likewise, the working relationship between the AC and the external auditor was 
commendable. An AC participant articulated the following: 
 
… I have a good working relationship with the external auditor. …so far I’ve never 
received … any negative feedback where they can’t meet with me or they gonna 
charge extra for that … our relationship is strong (P6:166). 
 
Coupled with this open-door culture were the informal interactions that took place 
between the aforementioned individuals. All of the AC participants testified to the 
informal interaction with management (P8:80) that came in different forms, such as 
telephonic conversations (P6:138; P8:56, 84), communication via emails (P2:53) and 
informal meetings (P6:136, 140). This informal interaction with the AC was also 
confirmed by non-AC participants (P1:76, 78; P7:60). One AC participant also 
mentioned informal interaction with the external auditor through telephonic 
conversations (P6:144). Hence, these informal interactions enabled the AC to stay fully 
informed on matters affecting the fulfilment of its responsibilities. 
 
In addition to these informal discussions, there was also a tendency to have “one-on-
one” meetings between the AC chairperson and the CFO “two weeks or three weeks” 
(P1:20) prior to the AC meeting. One non-AC participant described such pre-meetings 
as being beneficial to both management and the AC, as they provided mentorship to 
management (§  5.4.1.2), and the AC chairperson could confirm that the AC pack was 
complete and the documents included in the AC pack complied with all the relevant 
requirements (P1:8, 18). Furthermore, these pre-meetings enabled the AC chairperson 
to identify, understand and prepare to discuss areas of concern at the AC meeting 
(P6:140, 172). This is in line with the literature which notes that pre-meetings enable the 
AC chairperson to plan for AC meetings (Nkonki, 2014:55) and limit unpleasant 
surprises at the meeting itself (CAQ et al., 2013:7; KPMG, 2014:14). As such, the time 
required by the AC chairperson to analyse the pack prior to the AC meetings was 
reduced (§ 5.4.2.6) and these pre-meetings resulted in more focused and shorter AC 
meetings (§ 5.4.2.7). This finding is in keeping with the AC guideline issued by Nkonki 
(2014:55) which states that pre-meetings enable the AC chairperson to steer AC 
meetings effectively (§ 5.4.1.2).  
 
  
  
147 
Responses provided by two members of the AC indicated that pre-meetings with the 
external auditor took place if there was “a problem that [the AC] wants to discuss [with 
the external auditor]” (P2:57) or “if [the AC chairperson does] have an issue in the 
[audit] report that [the AC chairperson] need[s] to specifically understand before the AC 
[meeting]” (P6:166). As a result, these pre-meetings did not happen as a rule, although 
“the opportunity exists” (P2:57) for scheduling such a meeting. An AC participant 
indicated that pre-meetings with the external auditor contributed to focused AC 
meetings as the AC chairperson was aware of all issues raised by the external auditor 
by the time an AC meeting commenced (P6:172). Like the benefit of pre-meetings 
between the AC and management, pre-meetings between the AC and the external 
auditor assisted the AC chairperson to plan for AC meetings (Nkonki, 2014:55) and limit 
unpleasant surprises (CAQ et al., 2013:7; KPMG, 2014:14). 
 
Meetings between the AC and management, and between the AC and the external 
auditor, were generally not scheduled after AC meetings (P1:32; P6:146). However, in 
certain cases a post-meeting was scheduled to unpack matters which were discussed 
during the AC meeting. For example, where the AC chairperson and a member of 
management agreed during the AC meeting on certain actions to be taken, a post-
meeting would be conducted to work out an action plan (P6:146). Another example 
referred to a post-meeting being conducted when a matter could not be resolved during 
the AC meeting. In this case, separate post-meetings were conducted, followed by an e-
mail to report back on the outcome. One AC participant commented as follows: 
 
… if it’s a matter that is contentious and it’s not going to be finished today [during the 
AC meeting] … we have a special meeting to discuss [the matter]. [The AC will] have 
certain people who’ll be nominated to say so-and-so and so-and-so will meet and 
discuss it and iron it out and then report back to [the AC] via e-mail to say this is what 
the conclusion was and then [the AC] all say we’re happy with it or not (P8:60). 
 
The researcher is of the opinion that these separate post-meetings ensured that the AC 
members remained focused during meetings, enabling them fulfil the AC’s 
responsibilities. 
 
During one of the quarterly AC meetings, private sessions with management and the 
external auditor were included in the agenda (ABC Limited, 2014g:6; P1:32; P2:132; 
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P7:66). This practice is consistent with recommended practice 3.1.5 of King III (IOD, 
2009a:31). “Openhearted” (P2:132) discussions among the AC and the external auditor 
(without the presence of management) enabled the AC to manage the relationship 
between management and the external auditor effectively (P1:50). It also allowed the 
external auditor to voice his/her concerns “if they feel management is restricting them” 
(P2:132) and when management failed to provide “all the relevant information that the 
auditors needed” (P1:54). Based on these concerns, the AC could either take the matter 
further if they considered it to be a valid concern or guide the external auditor in the right 
direction if the issues raised were minor. An AC participant asserted in this regard: 
 
If [the external auditor] say they need help, they don’t understand something, 
management is difficult with that, and it looks like a risk, and then [the AC will], … 
come in strong and tell management, but you can’t do that. You need to do it like this 
... If [the AC] feel[s] that the auditors are oversensitive or they don’t understand 
what’s going on, then [the AC] help[s] the audits in the right direction (P2:132). 
 
The process followed after these separate meetings were conducted was explained by 
an AC participant as follows: 
 
… [the AC will] get [management and the external auditor] together and explain to 
everyone in a proper manner, this is what happened, this is the dynamics, and this is 
how we go forward (P2:132). 
 
The exchange of confidential information (P6:144) in separate meetings with 
management and the external auditor is also advocated in the literature published by 
Gendron et al. (2004:166) and Nkonki (2014:46). Arguably, this exchange of confidential 
information could contribute positively to the effectiveness of the external audit process. 
Hence, a more effective external audit process improves the quality of the AFS (BRC, 
1999:33; KPMG, 2014:8). 
 
Overall, the researcher found that the AC used management and the external auditor to 
assist it in fulfilling its responsibilities. As explained previously, an internal auditor had 
not been appointed owing to the company’s size, budget constraints and management 
being “hands-on” regarding risks and controls. Nevertheless, management’s “hands-on-
approach” could create an opportunity for manipulation, to the potential detriment of the 
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minority shareholders. This risk of abuse of power on the part of management was not 
voiced by the participants during the interviews, however. Compensating measures 
instituted were, for example, the AC chairperson providing risk training for the 
company’s employees to improve the risk matrix. Arguably, the provision of risk training 
could impair the AC chairperson’s independence. However, this was not mentioned 
during the interviews. An improved risk matrix enhanced the company’s risk 
management and accordingly assisted the AC in fulfilling its risk oversight 
responsibilities. Informal interactions, meetings held both prior to and after the AC 
meetings, as well as separate meetings held by the AC with management and the 
external auditor, provide evidence that healthy interactions and relationships were 
maintained which assisted the AC to stay informed about matters affecting its 
responsibilities and contributed to their diligent fulfilment. Such diligence enabled the 
AC to add value to the company and its shareholders.  
 
5.4.3.2 Agendas, tone of and procedures followed at audit committee meetings 
 
The agenda for the individual AC meetings was drawn up from the AC’s annual work 
plan (§ 5.4.2.3) (P1:26, 28; P2:88; P5:72; P6:220, 228) by the company secretary 
(P1:258; P2:104; P7:66) with input from the AC chairperson (P6:226), the CEO and 
CFO (P6:226; P8:116). The involvement of these people in preparing the agenda is in 
agreement with the literature (Spira, 1999a:242), whilst King III also recommends the 
involvement of the AC chairperson to finalising the agenda (IOD, 2009a:32, 
recommended practice 3.3.2). Attendees of the AC meeting received the agenda (which 
were included in the AC pack) a week in advance (P2:90) giving them the opportunity to 
add and/or remove points to and from the agenda before the meeting (P8:123, 124).  
 
AC meetings follow a “structured” (P4:236) process: the chairperson welcomes all 
attendees (P5:180; P7:66; P8:126); receives apologies (P5:180; P8:126), and confirms 
that a quorum is present (P5:180; P8:126) (a quorum referred to the majority of AC 
members being present in person or via telecommunication facilities (ABC Limited, 
2014f:1)). Once the AC meeting commences, attendees are given another opportunity 
to add and/or remove points from the agenda (P1:206; P5:118, 180; P8:126); this is 
followed by the adoption of the agenda (P1:206; P5:180; P7:66; P8:126). Items added 
to the agenda can be included in the work plan if they are regarded as a permanent 
agenda item that should be dealt with annually. Alternatively, if they are a once-off, they 
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are added to the agenda under “general matters” (P5:118, 120, 122). As reported in 
section 5.4.2.7, the time allocated for AC meetings is sufficient to cover all items 
included in the agenda. This is in keeping with Spira’s (1999a:242) suggestion that 
agendas should not be too lengthy in relation to the time allocated for the meeting. The 
majority of the shares (52.1%) of the AltX listed company in this study were held by the 
non-AC board members, specifically the non-executive chairperson of the board, a non-
executive member and the CEO (§  5.3) (ABC Limited, 2014a:27). Owing to their lack of 
independence, it was therefore imperative that the agenda should not be set by these 
board members (KPMG, 2012:12, 14). In this company’s case, the AC helped to finalise 
the agenda, which reduced the risk as highlighted in findings by KPMG (2014:12, 14) 
that an agenda set by the management of the company could hamper the AC in 
focusing on important areas to the potential detriment of the minority shareholders. 
 
After the adoption of the agenda, all attendees declare whether or not they have an 
interest in the company (§  5.4.1.1) (P7:66; P5:180; P8:126). The minutes of the 
previous AC meeting are then approved (§  5.4.2.8) (P1:206; P5:180; P7:66). At that 
point, attendees are requested to report back on matters for which they are responsible 
that emerge from the minutes of the previous meeting (P1:206; P5:180; P7:66). The 
points included in the agenda are then addressed (P1:206; P5:184, 188; P7:66). 
Finally, the meeting adjourns with a confirmation of the next meeting date (P5:188; 
P7:66). 
 
The external auditor and management were committed to attending AC meetings as 
indicated in table 5.8 (§  5.4.2.7). The attendance figures cited in this table provide 
evidence to show that management and the external auditor discharge their 
responsibilities towards the company. The majority of AC and non-AC participants 
indicated that AC meetings were conducted in a serious and rigorous manner where the 
AC did not hesitate to challenge management and/or the external auditor to provide 
detailed explanations. Hence, a standard checklist of questions was not used, which 
was consistent with what is suggested by the BRC (1999:42–43, principle 4). The tone 
of AC meetings was also in line with what has been highlighted by other authors (e.g. 
Sommer, 1991:91; Nkonki, 2014:11, 26). AC participants described the tone of AC 
meetings as follows: 
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The culture that [the AC] created is that [the AC meeting is] serious (P2:39). 
 
I think the [CFO] and the [CEO] are put under a lot of pressure all the time and for 
obvious reasons … we challenge [management] all the time to make sure that every 
single top process is being driven properly and being thought about. And all angles 
are being thought about before any decision is being made (P6:240). 
 
One non-AC participant acknowledged that management’s input during AC meetings 
contributed to reducing the risk of AC members being held liable for not acting diligently 
(§  5.4.2.1) (P1:88). Furthermore, both an AC participant and a non-AC participant 
highlighted the fact that management’s role in attending AC meetings is to provide AC 
members with more “insight” (P1:86) into the financial documents distributed in the 
packs and to provide management with an opportunity to respond to the 
recommendations of the AC. One AC participant stated: 
 
… they can give feedback to [the AC] and [management] can answer the questions 
that [the AC] raise where [the AC] look at the financials and say what happened here? 
… [Management is] there to discuss it, talk about it, and iron it out [at the AC 
meetings] (P8:30). 
 
During meetings management assisted the AC by responding to its questions and 
commenting on the feasibility of its recommendations, as mentioned above. On the 
other hand, the AC assisted management by giving guidance. One AC participant 
commented: 
 
… it’s a mutually beneficial relationship. So they [management] come to us [AC] for 
guidance, we [AC] go to them for questions, we work together to make it all work 
(P8:36). 
 
The external auditor’s contribution during AC meetings focused on the external audit 
process which resulted in improving the quality of the AFS. This is consistent with the 
AC guideline issued by Nkonki (2014:26) and the recommendation of the BRC 
(1999:33), which emphasise that the responses provided by the external auditor could 
be used to assess the quality of the AFS. An AC participant stated in this regard: 
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…. So [the external auditor will] come and [the external auditor] will bring their 
comments and recommendations about this is what [the external auditor] picked up 
in the financials, this is what [the external auditor] recommend (P8:34). 
 
During the interviews, participants pointed out that apart from management and the 
external auditor, the attendance of the company secretary and the designated advisor at 
AC meetings (§  5.4.2.7, table 5.8) assisted the AC to fulfil its responsibilities. As the 
company secretary and the designated advisor were external parties, it can be argued 
that they also contributed to AC independence. The role played by the company 
secretary encompasses more than merely providing the AC with administrative support, 
as he/she also reviewed the AC pack prior to the AC meeting from a compliance point 
of view (P5:226; P7:114). This enabled him/her to provide input during AC meetings on 
compliance with legislation and areas of CG (P1:258; P2:72, 106; P5:162). The 
company secretary’s role in making the AC aware of laws affecting the company is in 
keeping with section 88(b) of the Companies Act (RSA, 2009). In addition, the company 
secretary’s guiding role in terms of CG is also supported by King III (IOD, 2009a:27, 
recommended practice 2.21.7). Apart from providing input during AC meetings, the 
company secretary also played an advisory role outside AC meetings (P5:162). 
Accordingly, an AC participant remarked: 
 
… [he’s/she’s] always open to say if there’s anything [the AC] don’t understand from a 
governance point of view please talk to me. I can guide you through it (P8:144). 
 
The strong “guiding” (P5:215) and “advisory” (P5:156) roles played by the company 
secretary were supported by the company secretary’s qualifications and experience. 
He/she has a BCom Law, as well as a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degree and is an 
admitted attorney of the High Court (P5:6). He/she has also acted as company 
secretary for a number of listed companies (ABC Limited, 2014a:14). The statutory duty 
included in section 88(b) of the Companies Act, requiring the company secretary to 
keep the directors updated on legislative changes (RSA, 2009), further clarifies the 
strong advisory role played by the company secretary as he/she could “be held 
personally liable” (P5:174) if he/she fails to comply with this statutory duty. 
 
In terms of the working relationship between the AC and the designated advisor, the 
designated advisor primarily dealt with management outside the AC meetings (P4:156). 
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He/she would only go “around management” (P4:168), directly to the AC, if the 
company was a “troubled company” (P4:170) where “business rescue” (P4:168) 
proceedings or “applications for liquidation” (P4:168) had been instituted. In the case of 
this company, the designated advisor had no reason to bypass management and 
approach the AC directly (P4:160). As such, the AC and the designated advisor only 
engaged at AC meetings. Many participants indicated that the designated advisor was 
not a “silent-attendee” during AC meetings (P1:266; P2:104; P7:128; P8:154), but 
acted as an “additional set of brains” (P1:268) and an “advisor” (P4:84) who provided 
support for “CG requirements” (P4:62), as well as compliance with and updates on the 
JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies which affected the AC’s 
responsibilities (P1:266; P2:104; P6:232; P7:126). Such an advisory role is in keeping 
with the JSE listing requirements (JSE Limited, 2014b: par. 21.5(iii)). The participants’ 
views pertaining to the fact that the designated advisor was a valuable source of 
information are supported by the fact that this person is a CA(SA) (P4:56) who is 
familiar with the company because at the time of the study he/she had been appointed 
for approximately six years (P4:50). Furthermore, he/she was providing services to 
about five other AltX listed companies at the time of the interview (P4:52). Accordingly, 
the designated advisor’s experience and input during AC meetings were highly 
regarded. 
 
The findings presented in this section suggest that the agendas of the AC meetings 
were not too lengthy in relation to the time allocated for meetings. Hence, agendas were 
manageable which enabled the AC to remain focused. Many participants, including the 
AC chairperson, were involved in compiling the agenda, which prevented a scenario in 
which the agenda could be manipulated by management, leading to the omission of 
important matters to the potential detriment of the minority shareholders. Such a 
detailed agenda laid the platform for an effective AC meeting where robust discussions 
took place and the external auditor was challenged. Consequently, the input provided 
by management and the external auditor enabled the AC to fulfil its responsibilities 
diligently, without following a standard checklist approach. These AC meetings also 
enabled the AC to add value to management by providing guidance. Many participants 
further agreed that the company secretary and designated advisor supported the AC in 
the fulfilment of its responsibilities in terms of legislation, the JSE listing requirements 
for AltX listed companies and CG recommendations. 
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5.4.3.3 Perception of the value of the audit committee 
 
The support from the board was referred to by an AC participant as the “make or break 
of the AC” (P2:167). One non-AC participant acknowledged that the AC “[does] add 
value with advice to the board” (P3:2). This acknowledgement correlates with the AC 
guideline issued by Nkonki (2014:5) and the recommendations of King III (IOD, 
2009a:5) which state that the board should not view the AC as a liability formed only in 
order to comply with legislation. Another non-AC participant characterised the AC as a 
“good solid AC” (P7:60) that made “the right decisions” (P7:60).  
 
A non-AC participant also perceived the AC as a valuable committee as it assisted the 
board in fulfilling its responsibilities to the letter. This is what the participant had to say: 
 
I must say our [AC] is really adding value and giving their feedback and to assist me 
in presenting the correct stuff, to ensure compliance, to know that all the risk is 
identified and also that helps to mitigate my risk as [an] executive director (P1:250). 
 
The following words of an AC participant confirm management’s respect for the role of 
the AC: 
 
And you could see that [management] really respect the need for an AC and 
understand why there’s an AC and they use their AC to its fullest extent (P6:152). 
 
One non-AC participant emphasised the excellent problem-solving abilities of the AC 
with the following words: 
 
[The AC] don’t wanna drag on about nonsense. They wanna get to the crux of the 
issue and deal with it and sort out the root of the issue, not try to just put a Band-Aid 
on the problem, so they, sort of, very efficient in identifying the problem, then finding 
a way to mitigate the risk (P5:242). 
 
From the above, it would seem that the non-AC participants respected and valued the 
role of the AC. Such a positive view of the value of the AC was a result of its ability to 
provide the board with assurance on the fulfilment of its responsibilities and its 
assistance in fulfilling management’s responsibilities. The AC was also viewed as 
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having good decision-making and problem-solving abilities. The literature (Nkonki, 
2014:5) states that respect for the role of the AC would result in communication and 
interaction between the AC and information providers being strengthened. In this study, 
the AC’s informal interaction, ad hoc meetings (§  5.4.3.1) and interaction at AC 
meetings (§  5.4.3.2) with information providers were recognised by the research 
participants which could be the result of information providers’ understanding and 
respect for the AC’s role. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to report on the findings of the current study. These 
findings were related to the purpose of the study, namely, to understand the way in 
which the AC of an AltX listed company, as an example of a high-growth potential, small 
to medium-sized listed company, adds value to the company and its stakeholders. The 
data were obtained by conducting individual semi-structured interviews with the AC 
members, a board member, members of management, the company secretary and the 
designated advisor. The researcher’s field notes and the company’s integrated report, 
attendance registers of AC meetings, the AC charter and the AC work plan were 
studied. 
 
The interpretation and reporting style followed in this chapter were described in section 
5.2. Section 5.3 discussed the observations made during the interviews while section 
5.4 described the findings within the context of the theoretical framework, which 
consisted of the attributes influencing the value added by an AC, as explained in 
chapter 3. This theoretical framework relates firstly to the characteristics of AC 
members, secondly, to the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through optimised activities 
and, finally, to the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships 
with the board and information providers.  
 
In terms of the first component of the theoretical framework, namely, the characteristics 
of AC members, a number of findings came to light. AC members were independent 
and such independence was regarded as important by participants as they reported on 
the advantages of this (§  5.4.1.1). Participants acknowledged that the AC chairperson’s 
leadership qualities made a positive contribution to the company and to the 
development of management’s skills (§  5.4.1.2). Findings indicate that the AC members 
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were adequately qualified which enabled them to add value to the company, the board 
and the company’s shareholders. However, one participant claimed that AC members 
lacked legal and IT qualifications, which hampered them in adding value in areas 
concerning law and IT. This lack of legal expertise was compensated for by the support 
provided by the company secretary and the designated advisor (§  5.4.1.3). The findings 
suggest that the experience levels of individual AC members were adequate as 
participants acknowledged that their full-time occupations, involvement in other 
companies’ boards and/or ACs, the fact that they serve on other committees of ABC 
Limited besides the AC, their attendance of formal training programmes and the 
informal training they received increased their experience which, in turn, enabled them 
to add value to the company, its management and its shareholders. Participants also 
perceived the collective experience of the AC to be adequate, as a “new” AC member 
had been recently appointed which resulted in a combination of “established” and “new” 
AC members serving on the AC. Such collective experience enabled the AC to add 
value to the company and its shareholders. As the non-AC members on the board held 
the majority of shares in the company, the researcher argued that the board may use its 
power when appointing and re-electing AC members. Accordingly, the board could 
undermine the role and power of the AC to the potential detriment of the minority 
shareholders. However, the risk of the board abusing its power was not raised by the 
participants during the interviews (§ 5.4.1.4). It would also seem that the number of 
members serving on the AC can be deemed adequate in relation to the size of the 
board (§  5.4.1.5). 
 
In terms of the second component of the theoretical framework, namely, the fulfilment of 
AC responsibilities through optimised activities, the AC fulfilled its responsibilities (as 
required by the Companies Act, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies, 
and recommended by King III) diligently as all members acknowledged the fiduciary role 
they play within the company and acted in accordance with this role. The researcher 
predicted that the AltX listed company in this study would embrace stakeholder theory. 
The opposite was found, as the AC accepted its fiduciary role in terms of the 
shareholders of the company, accordingly fulfilling its responsibilities so as to enable it 
to add value to the company and its shareholders. However, since the company’s AFS 
and integrated report were public information which could be accessed by stakeholders, 
it implies that the AC would consider its wider stakeholders, in terms of enlightened 
shareholder theory (§  5.4.2.1). The AC used a number of media to provide feedback on 
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the fulfilment of its responsibilities. Such feedback enabled it to add value to both the 
board, shareholders and its stakeholders (in terms of enlightened shareholder theory) 
as it enabled them to ascertain whether its responsibilities had been fulfilled (§  5.4.2.2). 
These responsibilities were met with the assistance of an AC charter and work plan (§  
5.4.2.3). The annual AC assessment process, despite being regarded as immature, was 
used to highlight areas for improvement. Such areas were subsequently targeted for 
remedial action (§  5.4.2.4). The number of AC meetings held (§  5.4.2.5), the 
information sent to AC members and invitees in advance of AC meetings (§  5.4.2.6) 
and the scheduled date, time, duration and attendance of AC meetings (§  5.4.2.7) were 
sufficient to enable the AC to fulfil its responsibilities diligently. Meetings were minuted 
and suitable action sheets drawn up after each meeting; these minutes and action 
sheets serving as accountability tools for promoting diligent behaviour on the part of AC 
members to the benefit of the company and its shareholders (§  5.4.2.8).  
 
In terms of the third component of the theoretical framework, namely, the fulfilment of 
AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships with the board and information 
providers, a number of findings were reported. Participants claimed that management 
and the external auditor assisted the AC in the fulfilment of its responsibilities. An 
internal auditor was not appointed due to the company’s size and budget constraints, as 
well as management being “hands-on” regarding risks and controls. Management’s 
influence creates a risk of management manipulation regarding the company’s risks and 
controls, to the potential detriment of the minority shareholders. This risk of 
management’s abuse of their power was not brought to the fore by the participants 
during the interviews. Other compensating measures were instituted, for example the 
AC chairperson provided risk training to the company’s employees to improve risk 
management. Arguably, the provision of risk training could impair the AC chairperson’s 
independence. The risk of the influence on the AC chairperson’s independence was 
also not highlighted by participants during the interviews.  
 
Participants acknowledged that they maintained good working relationships with 
management and the external auditor through informal interactions and formal 
meetings. Such a good working relationship assisted the AC to stay informed about 
matters affecting its responsibilities and contributed to the diligent fulfilment of its 
responsibilities. The diligence shown by the AC during the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities enabled it to add value to the company and its shareholders (§  5.4.3.1). 
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The agendas of the AC meetings were manageable which enabled the AC to remain 
focused. Many participants, including the AC chairperson, were involved in compiling 
the agenda for the meetings. Accordingly, this prevented a scenario where the agenda 
could be manipulated by the management of the company where important matters to 
be considered would not be included, to the potential disadvantage of the minority 
shareholders. Such a thorough agenda laid the platform for an effective AC meeting 
where robust discussions took place and the external auditor was challenged. The input 
provided by management and the external auditor during the AC meetings enabled the 
AC to fulfil its responsibilities. These meetings also enabled the AC to add value to 
management as it provided guidance to management.  
 
Many participants agreed that the company secretary and designated advisor supported 
the AC in the fulfilment of its responsibilities that are affected by legislation, JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies as well as CG recommendations (§  5.4.3.2). 
The board and the AC’s information providers respected the role of the AC and 
acknowledged the value that resulted from informal interaction, ad hoc meetings and 
interactions at AC meetings (§  5.4.3.3). 
 
The next chapter presents an overview of the study and the research conclusions 
following the findings reported in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 5 presented the empirical findings of the study within the context of the 
theoretical framework, which consisted of the attributes influencing the value added by 
an AC. 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the study (§  6.2). Conclusions are made relating 
to the value being added by an AltX listed company’s AC (§  6.3) and the limitations of 
the study (§  6.4) are described. The chapter concludes by making a number of 
recommendations for further research (§  6.5) as well as supporting the importance of 
the study (§  6.6). 
 
6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
As indicated in chapter 1, an AC is a “critical component in the overall corporate 
governance process” (KPMG, 2005:1). Accordingly, it would seem that if an AltX listed 
company has an ineffective AC it would not be able to enhance the company’s CG 
practices or provide the company and stakeholders groups with the protection they 
require. The following purpose statement was consequently formulated for this study: 
To understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed company, as an example of a 
high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed company, adds value to the 
company and its stakeholders.  
 
On the basis of this statement, the following objectives were identified for this study: 
 
 to investigate the characteristics of AC members that enable them to add value 
 to investigate the way the AC fulfils its responsibilities through optimised activities 
 to investigate the way the AC fulfils its responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers 
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Chapter 2 provided an overview of CG. As this study focused on the way in which the 
AC adds value, this overview provided some background on the CG practices of which 
an AC forms part. The researcher argued that an AltX listed company with the primary 
goal of creating maximum shareholder wealth in the short term would embrace 
enlightened shareholder theory. Where AltX listed companies have the main goal of 
growing their businesses in the long term, it was argued that these companies would 
adopt stakeholder theory. Chapter 2 further highlighted the fact that the board’s 
implementation of CG practices may be influenced by the group that holds the majority 
of the company’s shares, which could hamper the implementation of CG practices to the 
potential detriment of the minority shareholders. The researcher also argued that an 
AltX listed company with a short-term goal of growing its business may be more price-
sensitive and therefore less inclined to implement CG practices, whilst an AltX listed 
company which intends to grow its business in the long term may be less price-sensitive 
and therefore willing to invest more in implementing good CG practices. Whatever the 
case, good CG practices would be of benefit to all AltX listed companies and its 
stakeholders. 
 
Chapter 2 furthermore described CG and AC practices in South Africa by referring to 
legislation, codes and reports, as well as listing requirements. The ACs of AltX listed 
companies must comply with the provisions of the Companies Act and the JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies, as well as apply the King III principles. This 
legislation, the listing requirements and the recommendations of King III were used to 
develop a theoretical framework consisting of the attributes that influence the value 
added by an AC. 
 
Chapter 3 provided such theoretical framework consisting of the attributes that influence 
the value added by the AC of an AltX listed company, the three components being the 
characteristics of AC members, the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through optimised 
activities and the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy relationships 
with the board and information providers. 
 
Chapter 4 described the research design and approach, as well as the method applied 
to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed company adds value. In this 
study, a qualitative, explorative research design and case study approach were applied. 
Accordingly, an AltX listed company and research participants were selected on the 
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basis of predetermined selection criteria. Data were collected using semi-structured 
individual interviews, field notes made by the researcher and company documents. Ten 
participants were initially identified, although only eight agreed to participate. These 
participants included three AC members, the chairperson of the board, the CEO, the 
CFO, the company secretary and the designated advisor, who were all interviewed 
individually. On concluding these interviews, it was deemed unnecessary to interview 
anyone else, as data saturation had been reached.  
 
Interviews took between 14 and 68 minutes each and were audio recorded. These 
interviews in total amounted to 379 minutes of conversation, which subsequently formed 
192 transcribed pages. The transcribed data, field notes and company documents were 
analysed using open descriptive coding techniques. In addition, Atlas.ti was used to 
improve the coding of the transcribed data and as a repository for the transcribed 
interviews. This chapter also discussed the measures applied to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the results and made reference to the ethical principles adhered to.  
 
The following section describes the conclusions of the study with respect to the way in 
which the AC of an AltX listed company adds value to the company and its 
stakeholders, based on the analysis and discussion of the findings reported in 
chapter 5.  
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS ON THE VALUE ADDED BY THE AUDIT COMMITTEE OF 
THE ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY 
 
The conclusions on the way in which the AC adds value will be presented within the 
context of the theoretical framework of attributes influencing the value added by an AC, 
namely, the characteristics of AC members, the fulfilment of AC responsibilities through 
optimised activities and the fulfilment of AC responsibilities by maintaining healthy 
relationships with the board and information providers.  
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6.3.1 Conclusions on the characteristics of AC members 
 
All the members serving on the AC were independent. This attribute enabled them to 
add value to the company, its management, the external auditor and the shareholders, 
as the AC monitored information prepared by management and guided management in 
running the company. The AC also provided the external auditor with an opportunity to 
openly express his/her views and concerns regarding management. The AC further 
demonstrated its independence by recommending that an external auditor with a good 
reputation be appointed and reduced AFS fraud by increasing the quality of the AFS. 
 
The AC chairperson’s leadership qualities enabled him/her to add value to the manner 
in which AC meetings were conducted because he/she ensured that attendees were 
properly prepared for meetings, controlled the meetings efficiently and effectively and 
encouraged all members to participate in a disciplined and structured manner. The 
disciplined way in which the AC meetings were handled had a positive influence on the 
AC’s work and ultimately the way it fulfilled its responsibilities. The chairperson’s 
leadership qualities also enabled him/her to interact effectively with information 
providers and may be a reason why he/she provided training and guidance to 
management on technical and soft skills. Although King III recommends that directors 
who lack adequate experience should be assigned to a mentorship programme, this 
recommendation was not implemented by the AltX listed company in this case study. As 
an alternative, mentorship was provided by the chairperson of the AC. The researcher is 
of the opinion that this mentorship role of the AC chairperson is not usually associated 
with ACs and is unique to the AltX listed company in this study. 
 
AC members were suitably qualified which enabled them to add value to the company, 
the board and the company’s shareholders, as was evidenced by the AC’s fulfilment of 
its responsibilities, the members’ active participation in AC meetings and the unmodified 
audit opinion that was issued on the AFS. The AltX listed company in this study had a 
long-term vision to grow its business as evidenced by its listing duration of 7.74 years 
and the strategic practices reflected in its integrated report. Prior to conducting the data 
collection phase, the researcher was of the opinion that AltX listed companies with a 
long-term vision to grow their business and create wealth would be less price-sensitive. 
However, the findings of this research contradicted this initial opinion, as the company’s 
price-sensitivity resulted in it not appointing AC members with a legal or IT background. 
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Although the number of members serving on the AC was sufficient compared to the size 
of the company’s board, an increase in the number of AC members (with a legal or IT 
background) could increase AC efficiency and result in an improvement in the manner 
in which the AC fulfilled its legal and IT-related responsibilities. Nevertheless, the lack of 
legal expertise was compensated for by the support provided by the company secretary 
and, to a lesser extent, the designated advisor. 
 
AC members had extensive experience as a result of their full-time occupations, 
involvement in other companies’ boards and/or ACs, and knowledge of the company’s 
business. As such, the AC members’ experience enabled the AC to add value to the 
company, management and shareholders, as it was able to apply the good practices 
followed by other companies to the AltX listed company in this study and provide 
management with quality guidance. Furthermore, AC members’ involvement in the risk 
committee enabled them to add value through the fulfilment of the AC’s risk oversight 
responsibilities. In addition, the members’ individual experience levels also enabled the 
AC to view matters from various perspectives, which resulted in probing questions being 
asked and strenuous debates occurring at meetings. Lastly, AC members’ business 
knowledge was enhanced by both formal and informal training; further improving the 
manner in which they fulfilled their responsibilities. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, because the company was price-sensitive the AC members took 
responsibility for their own training needs. 
 
The AC in this study consisted of two “established” and one “new” AC member. The AC 
members’ collective experience enabled the AC to add value to the company and its 
shareholders as the “new” member was more careful and critical about fulfilling the AC’s 
responsibilities, whilst “established” AC members had better knowledge of the 
company’s risk areas and challenged management and the external auditor in this 
regard. Although the “new” AC member was appointed through a formal appointment 
process, the influence of individual board members, as the major shareholders of the 
company, was highlighted as a potential risk. This potential risk implies that the board 
may use its power and make biased appointments which could influence the quality of 
the activities carried out by the AC, as well as the independence of the newly appointed 
AC member. This potential risk was also present when re-electing AC members. Hence, 
the influence of the individual board members (as the major shareholders of the 
company) on the AC may undermine the role and authority of the latter to the potential 
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detriment of the minority shareholders. However, the risk of abuse of power by the 
board was not mentioned by the participants during the interviews. The AC itself 
consisted of three members, which was deemed adequate in relation to the size of the 
board. 
 
6.3.2 Conclusions on the fulfilment of audit committee responsibilities through 
optimised activities 
 
The company complied with the AC responsibilities required by the Companies Act and 
the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies. The company also applied the 
AC responsibilities recommended by King III. The study found that the AC fulfilled these 
responsibilities diligently as all members acknowledged and accepted their fiduciary 
role. It was expected that the AltX listed company in this study, which had a long-term 
vision to grow its business, as evidenced by its listing duration of 7.74 years and the 
strategic practices reflected in its integrated report, would embrace stakeholder theory. 
Quite the reverse was found, however, as the AC accepted its fiduciary role in terms of 
the shareholders of the company, accordingly fulfilling its responsibilities so as to enable 
it to add value to the company and its shareholders. However, since the company’s AFS 
and integrated report were public information which could be accessed by stakeholders, 
it implies that the AC would consider its wider stakeholders, in terms of enlightened 
shareholder theory, and therefore act as a responsible corporate citizen. 
 
The AC feedback practices enabled it to add value to the company’s board, 
shareholders and its stakeholders (in terms of enlightened shareholder theory) as it 
used various media to provide feedback on the fulfilment of its responsibilities. A 
relationship of trust was found to exist between the non-AC members serving on the 
board and the AC. Although a number of media were used by the AC to provide 
feedback to the board, the trustworthiness of such feedback was enhanced by this trust 
relationship. In particular, the non-executive board member (who was one of the major 
shareholders of the company but did not attend the AC meetings) valued the feedback 
provided by the AC resulting from this trust relationship, as it assured him/her that 
his/her shareholding was being adequately managed. This trust relationship also 
indirectly protected the minority shareholders, who, like this non-executive board 
member, were not involved in the management of the company and did not attend AC 
meetings. Hence, the non-executive board member’s safeguarding of his/her majority 
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shareholding indirectly improved the board’s accountability to the company’s minority 
shareholders. 
 
The AC work plan was compiled in a transparent and thorough manner as a result of 
the AC and company secretary’s involvement. The AC’s involvement ensured that the 
responsibilities included in the AC work plan were clear and fair, while the company 
secretary’s involvement meant that the work plan was in line with the latest legal 
requirements. The drafting of the AC agendas based on the AC work plan and the 
distribution of the work plan prior to the quarterly AC meetings supported the AC in 
fulfilling its responsibilities and helped it to add value to the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
In the company, a formal annual assessment is performed to ascertain whether the 
composition of the AC, the tone of AC meetings, the fulfilment of the AC’s 
responsibilities, the manner in which AC responsibilities were fulfilled, as well as AC 
members’ involvement in AC meetings are all to the benefit of the organisation. This 
assessment also highlighted areas for remedial action to enable the AC to increase its 
value for the company and its shareholders. However, the results of the annual 
assessment were not included in the integrated report, which prevented the AC from 
revealing its value to the company and its shareholders. Furthermore, because the 
annual assessment process was regarded as immature, an improved annual 
assessment could enable the AC to increase its value to the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
Although the price-sensitivity of the company was highlighted, quarterly AC meetings 
were preferred as it enabled the AC to take better decisions because meetings were 
effective and focused. Quarterly AC meetings also improved the AC’s knowledge of the 
company’s business and gave insights to increase the quality of the AFS. It further 
enabled the AC to monitor recent company acquisitions, new launches and product 
changes, reduced AC members’ risk of being held personally liable and assisted the AC 
in detecting and addressing risks at an early stage. The wide range of AC 
responsibilities also necessitated four annual AC meetings. In other words, quarterly AC 
meetings enhanced the diligent fulfilment of AC responsibilities to the benefit of the 
company and its shareholders. Furthermore, the packs sent to the AC members and 
invitees prior to AC meetings included sufficient and relevant information to prepare for 
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the meetings. Because the AC members and invitees were well prepared in this regard, 
they could take better informed decisions to the advantage of both the company and its 
shareholders.  
 
AC meetings were conducted at times when the AC’s oversight responsibilities 
increased. Also, the scheduling of the AC meetings a week prior to the board meetings 
allowed the AC to present reliable information to the board and enabled it to add value 
to the company and its shareholders as the board could make informed decisions. The 
scheduled date, time and duration of AC meetings were adequate which resulted in 
them being well attended by both members and invitees. Since meetings were well 
attended, the AC could, with the input of members and invitees, fulfil its responsibilities 
to the benefit of the company and its shareholders. Minutes of AC meetings and action 
sheets served as accountability tools which encouraged diligent behaviour by AC 
members to the benefit of the company and its shareholders. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusions on the fulfilment of audit committee responsibilities by 
maintaining healthy relationships with the board and information providers 
 
The AC used management and the external auditor to assist it in fulfilling its 
responsibilities. An internal auditor was not appointed owing to the company’s size and 
budget constraints, as well as management being “hands-on” regarding risks and 
controls. Management’s “hands-on-approach” creates an opportunity for manipulation, 
to the potential detriment of the minority shareholders. This risk of management’s 
misuse of their power was not articulated by the participants during the interviews. In 
order to compensate, significant risks that were included in the risk matrix were tested 
by both the finance department and the external auditor. Also, the AC chairperson 
provided employees with risk training to improve the company’s risk matrix. An 
improved risk matrix enhanced risk management and assisted the AC in the fulfilment of 
its risk oversight responsibilities.  
 
The AC had a good working relationship with management and the external auditor, in 
terms of which an open-door culture existed and informal interactions took place. Pre-
meetings between the AC and the CFO enabled the AC chairperson to mentor the CFO, 
whilst the AC chairperson could determine if the AC pack distributed before meetings 
was complete. These pre-meetings also enabled the AC chairperson to identify areas of 
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concern to be discussed at the AC meetings and thereby steer them effectively; thus 
reducing the time needed by the AC chairperson to prepare for the meeting. These also 
resulted in shorter and more focused AC meetings. If necessary, pre-meetings were 
also held between the AC and the external auditor so that the AC chairperson was 
aware of all audit-related issues by the time the meeting commenced.  
 
Post-meetings between the AC and management, as well as the AC and the external 
auditor, did not generally happen. If necessary, post-meetings were scheduled to 
unpack matters which were raised during the AC meeting which enabled the AC to 
remain more focused and make better decisions regarding its responsibilities. Separate 
meetings held between the AC and management, and the AC and the external auditor, 
allowed the AC to manage its relationship with these parties. These meetings also 
permitted the external auditor to raise his/her concerns if he/she felt that management 
restricted him/her or failed to provide him/her with information. This exchange of 
confidential information contributed positively to the effectiveness of the external audit 
process and, in turn, a more effective external audit process improved the quality of the 
AFS. All in all, these informal interactions and ad hoc meetings provided evidence that 
healthy relationships were being maintained which helped the AC to stay informed on 
matters which affected its responsibilities and contributed to the diligent fulfilment of its 
responsibilities. Such diligence enabled the AC to add value to the company and its 
shareholders.  
 
The agendas of the AC meetings were manageable which enabled the AC to remain 
focused. Many participants, including the AC chairperson, were involved in compiling 
the agenda for the AC meetings, which prevented a scenario where the agenda could 
be manipulated by the management of the company. Such things could include, for 
example, omitting important matters to be considered which could be to the potential 
detriment of minority shareholders. A detailed agenda laid the basis for effective AC 
meetings where robust discussion took place and management and the external auditor 
were challenged. The fact that management and the external auditor attended AC 
meetings provided evidence of them discharging their responsibilities towards the 
company. In addition, management’s input during AC meetings assisted the AC by 
giving insight into the financial affairs of the company and acting as a sounding board 
for the AC to ascertain the feasibility of its recommendations. The external auditor, on 
the other hand, assisted the AC in providing assurance on the quality of the AFS. 
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Hence, the input provided by management and the external auditor during AC meetings 
enabled the AC to fulfil its responsibilities diligently, to the benefit of the company and 
its shareholders, without following a standard checklist approach. These AC meetings 
also enabled the AC in turn to add value by providing guidance to management. Many 
participants further agreed that the company secretary and designated advisor 
supported the AC in the fulfilment of its legislative responsibilities, JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies and CG recommendations. 
 
The board perceived the AC as a value-adding component of CG, as it provided 
assurance to the board regarding the fulfilment of the AC’s allocated responsibilities. 
Similarly, management perceived the AC as valuable as it assisted management in the 
fulfilment of its responsibilities. The AC was also applauded for its effective decision-
making and problem-solving abilities. The AC’s informal interactions, ad hoc meetings 
and interaction at AC meetings with information providers were found to be 
commendable, which could be due to the information providers’ understanding and 
respect for the AC’s role. 
 
6.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
In this study, non-probability sampling was performed in terms of which the specific AltX 
listed company and the research participants were selected on the basis of 
predetermined selection criteria. Accordingly, the AltX listed company and its research 
participants are not representative of all high-growth potential, small to medium-sized 
listed companies and, for this reason, the findings may not be applicable to other high-
growth potential, small to medium-sized listed companies. 
 
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
On the basis of the analysis of the findings of the current study, the researcher has 
identified areas for further research. 
 
As of 30 September 2014, the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies have 
been amended, which resulted in only the application or explanation (in the case of non-
application) of AC principles relating to boards and directors in terms of King III being 
mandated. Further investigation into the effect of this amendment relating to AC 
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practices on business development and the South African economy could be a possible 
area for further research. 
 
In this research the researcher did not analyse historical company documents. Thus it is 
proposed that further research should study historical company documents, identifying 
the development of company processes and systems as they relate to the AC and 
investigating whether or not these developments affected the value of the AC. In other 
words, a longitudinal study of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed 
company’s AC is suggested where the AC’s changing role in a growing company is 
explored. 
 
Some participants revealed that there was a direct relationship between the following: 
the remuneration paid to AC members and their independence, the remuneration paid 
to AC members and the time AC members spend on preparing for AC meetings, the 
remuneration paid to AC members and their fulfilment of their fiduciary role, as well as 
the remuneration paid to AC members and the AC members’ ability to engage in robust 
discussion during AC meetings. Hence an exploration of these relationships is an area 
for possible further research. 
 
At the time of the interviews, the JSE listing requirement that, in AltX listed companies, 
a designated advisor should be invited to and should attend AC meetings had recently 
changed. This change implies that it is no longer mandatory for a designated advisor to 
attend AC meetings, which in turn means that he/she would no longer act as an advisor 
at such meetings. To this end, it is recommended that further research be carried out on 
the effect of this change in the JSE listing requirements for AltX listed companies on the 
AC’s fulfilment of its responsibilities. 
 
One of the limitations of the current study is that the in-depth descriptions of the AltX 
listed company provided by the research participants cannot be generalised to the value 
added by the ACs of other high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed 
companies. Further research could therefore be conducted on other high-growth 
potential, small to medium-sized listed companies to investigate the value added by 
these companies’ ACs. 
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Finally, it is suggested that future research could include a comparison of the 
characteristics and the fulfilment of responsibilities by the AC of a specific AltX listed 
company and the AC of a company listed on the main board of the JSE.  
 
6.6 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The current study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the ACs of high-
growth potential, small to medium-sized listed companies, as a component of CG 
practices. The study set out to apply the attributes influencing the value added by an AC 
to understand the way in which the AC adds value to high-growth potential, small to 
medium-sized listed companies, such as AltX listed companies, and its stakeholders. In 
addition, the study could inform the Directors Induction Programme, which could benefit 
from this study by using the AC practices followed by the AltX listed company in this 
study to develop best practice guidelines for ACs of AltX listed companies for inclusion 
in their training material, or alternatively to develop a separate induction programme 
specifically for AC members. The inclusion of this additional training material or a 
separate induction programme may contribute to the development of members serving 
on the ACs of AltX listed companies. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Guided by the objectives of the study, an overview of the study and the conclusions of 
the study were described in this chapter. The overview of the study highlighted the fact 
that a theoretical framework consisting of attributes influencing the value added by an 
AC was developed. These attributes were derived from legislation, JSE listing 
requirements for AltX listed companies, codes and reports, and scholarly literature.  
 
The study set out to understand the way in which the AC of an AltX listed company, as 
an example of a high-growth potential, small to medium-sized listed company, adds 
value to the company and its stakeholders. Thus, by presenting the study’s conclusion 
within the context of the theoretical framework, consisting of the three components 
influencing the value of an AC, this study provided rich descriptions that revealed that 
the AC of the specific AltX listed company possessed attributes which enabled it to add 
value to the company and its stakeholders in terms of enlightened shareholder theory. 
This final chapter also highlighted the limitations of the study, made recommendations 
for further research and discussed the importance of the study.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
PRE-POPULATED QUESTIONS LINKED TO THE ATTRIBUTES INFLUENCING THE VALUE ADDED BY AN AC 
Attributes 
influencing the 
value added by 
an AC (refer to 
key below the 
table) 
Main questions Sub-questions 
A
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 c
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15 1. Tell me about your qualifications and previous 
experience. 
      x x 
4 2. Tell me about your previous experience as an AC 
member. 
 x x      
4 3. Describe the appointment process of an AC 
member. 
  x*  x x   
9 4. Describe the performance assessment process of 
the AC and its individual members. 
 x x  x  x  
4 5. Tell me about the training provided to AC members.  x x  x    
17 6. How does the AC add value to the company?  x x x x x x x 
17  7. How does this differ from other 
companies and why? 
x x x x x x x 
13, 16 8. How do you perceive the buy-in from the external 
auditor and management with regards to the AC (i.e. 
is the governance and advisory roles of the AC 
taken seriously)? 
 x x x x x x x 
13  9. How are the recommendations of 
the AC dealt with? 
x x x x x x x 
14 10. How would you describe the AC’s relationship with 
the board/management/external auditor/company 
secretary/designated advisor? 
 x x      
14 11. How would you describe your relationship with the 
AC? 
   x x x x x 
14  12. Is there an open-door policy 
where you feel comfortable to 
contact the board/management/ 
external auditor/company 
secretary/designated advisor if 
the need arises? 
x x      
1
9
8
 
  
 
Attributes 
influencing the 
value added by 
an AC (refer to 
key below the 
table) 
Main questions Sub-questions 
A
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 c
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14  13. Is there an open-door policy 
where you feel comfortable to 
contact the AC if the need 
arises? 
  x x x x x 
14  14. Do you meet informally with the 
board/management/external 
auditor/company secretary/ 
designated advisor? 
x x      
14  15. Do you meet informally with the 
AC? 
   x x x x 
14 16. Tell me about your meetings, apart from the AC 
meetings, with the AC/management/external 
auditor. 
 x x  x x   
14   17. How often are pre-meetings held 
with the AC/management/ 
external auditor (i.e. meetings 
before the AC meetings)? 
x x  x x   
14  18. Describe the value and purpose 
of these pre-meetings. 
x x  x x   
14  19. How often are meetings held 
with the AC/management/ 
external auditor after the AC 
meeting? 
x x  x x   
14  20. Describe the value and purpose 
of these meetings which are 
conducted after an AC meeting. 
x x  x x   
14  21. How would you describe the 
type of questions asked by the 
AC during the pre-meetings (i.e. 
challenging questions)? 
   x x   
14  22. Are you of the opinion that the 
AC members/management/ 
external auditor are well 
x x  x x   
1
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Attributes 
influencing the 
value added by 
an AC (refer to 
key below the 
table) 
Main questions Sub-questions 
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 c
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prepared for your meetings with 
them? 
2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 
15, 17 
23. Describe the manner in which the AC carries out its 
assigned governance responsibilities (with 
reference to the AC meetings). 
 x x  x x x x 
12  24. How often do you attend AC 
meetings? 
   x x  x 
12, 15  25. How does your presence at 
these AC meetings impact the 
proceedings of the AC meeting? 
   x x x x 
10  26. How many meetings will be held 
for the February 2015 financial 
year? (based on the prior year’s 
integrated report, it seems like 
one every quarter) 
x x      
10  27. King III recommends at least 
twice a year, why do you exceed 
this number of meetings? 
x x      
11  28. How often does the AC request 
information from you? 
   x x   
11  29. How often do you request 
information from management 
and the external auditor? 
x x      
11  30. Do you advise management and 
the external auditor on the type, 
format, extent and due date of 
information required by the AC 
and do these aforementioned 
parties meet these 
requirements? 
x x      
11  31. Describe the manner in which 
the pack is distributed to AC 
members and invitees to AC 
     x  
2
0
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Attributes 
influencing the 
value added by 
an AC (refer to 
key below the 
table) 
Main questions Sub-questions 
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 c
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meetings. 
11  32. How much time on average do 
you spend to study the 
information provided? 
x x      
15  33. How do you prepare for AC 
meetings? 
     x x 
11  34. Are you of the opinion that AC 
members attending the AC 
meetings are well prepared? 
   x x x x 
15  35. Are you of the opinion that the 
AC members and invitees 
attending the AC meetings are 
well prepared? 
x x      
11  36. Do you believe that your 
remuneration is sufficient to 
cover the work involved? 
x x      
11  37. Would you put in more effort if 
the compensation was better? 
x x      
12  38. How do you feel about the 
appropriateness of the date, time 
and duration of AC meetings? 
x x      
15  39. Describe the process followed 
for the compilation of the agenda 
for the AC meetings. 
x x    x  
15  40. Describe the proceedings at the 
AC meetings. 
x x  x x x x 
2  41. Describe the role played by the 
chairperson of the AC. 
 x  x x x x 
15  42. Who else, other than 
management and the external 
auditor assists you in fulfilling 
your responsibilities (i.e. 
advisory and supportive role 
x x      
2
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Attributes 
influencing the 
value added by 
an AC (refer to 
key below the 
table) 
Main questions Sub-questions 
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 c
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played by the company 
secretary and the designated 
advisor)? 
15  43. How would you describe the 
type of questions asked by the 
AC during the AC meetings (i.e. 
challenging questions)? 
   x x x x 
15  44. How are disagreements during 
the AC meeting dealt with? 
x x      
17  45. How does the non-existence of 
an internal audit department 
effect the fulfilment of the AC’s 
responsibilities? 
x x      
4  46. A new AC member was recently 
appointed. Describe the impact 
of this new member on the AC?  
x x*   x x   
15  47. Tell me about the seating 
arrangement at AC meetings 
and does it have an impact on 
the manner in which AC 
meetings are conducted? 
x x   x x x x 
8 48. How does the AC demonstrate its assigned 
governance responsibilities to the board?  
   x     
6 49. Do you believe that you have any responsibilities to 
the public apart from your responsibilities to 
shareholders? 
 x x      
17 50. What else can the AC do to increase the value 
being added to the company and its stakeholders? 
 x x x x x x x 
17 51. Is there anything else that you want to add 
regarding the value of the AC? 
 x x x x x x x 
  
2
0
2
 
  
 
Key: 
1 Independence (ch 3, § 3.2.1) 
2 Leadership (ch 3, § 3.2.2) 
3 Qualifications (ch 3, § 3.2.3) 
4 Experience (ch 3, § 3.2.4) 
5 Number of AC members (ch 3, § 3.2.5) 
6 Fiduciary role (ch 3, § 3.3.1) 
7 Feedback to the board and stakeholders (ch 3, § 3.3.2) 
8 AC charter and work plan (ch 3, § 3.3.3) 
9 Annual assessments (ch 3, § 3.3.4) 
10 Number of AC meetings (ch 3, § 3.3.5) 
11 Information sent to AC members in advance of AC meetings (ch 3, § 3.3.6) 
12 Scheduled date, time, duration and attendance of AC meetings (ch 3, § 3.3.7) 
13 Minutes and action sheets of AC meetings (ch 3, § 3.3.8) 
14 Informal interaction and ad hoc meetings with management and assurance providers (ch 3, § 3.4.1) 
15 Agenda, tone of and procedures followed at AC meetings (ch 3, § 3.4.2) 
16 Perception of the value of the AC (ch 3, § 3.4.3) 
17 General question linked to one or more of the attributes listed above 
x* Question only posed to the new AC member 
 
2
0
3
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APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – AC CHAIRPERSON 
 
1. Tell me about your previous experience as an AC member. 
 
2. Describe the performance assessment process of the AC and its individual 
members. 
 
3. Tell me about the training provided to AC members. 
 
4. How does the AC add value to the company?  
- How does this differ from other companies and why? 
 
5. How do you perceive the buy-in from the external auditor and management 
with regards to the AC (i.e. is the governance and advisory roles of the AC 
taken seriously)? 
- How are the recommendations of the AC dealt with?  
 
6. How would you describe the AC’s relationship with the board, 
management, the external auditor, the company secretary and the 
designated advisor? 
- Is there an open-door policy where you feel comfortable to contact these 
aforementioned parties if the need arises? 
- Do you meet informally with these aforementioned parties?  
 
7. Tell me about your meetings, apart from the AC meetings, with 
management and the external auditor. 
- How often are pre-meetings held with management and the external 
auditor (i.e. meetings before the AC meetings)? 
- Describe the value and purpose of these pre-meetings.  
- How often are meetings held with management and the external auditor 
after the AC meeting?  
- Describe the value and purpose of these meetings which are conducted 
after an AC meeting.  
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- Are you of the opinion that management and the external auditor are well 
prepared for your meetings with them? 
 
8. Describe the manner in which the AC carries out its assigned governance 
responsibilities (with reference to the AC meetings). 
- How many meetings will be held for the February 2015 financial year? 
(based on the prior year’s integrated report, it seems like one every 
quarter)  
- King III recommends at least twice a year, why do you exceed this number 
of meetings?  
- How often do you request information from management and the external 
auditor? 
- Do you advise management and the external auditor on the type, format, 
extent and due date of information required by the AC and do these 
aforementioned parties meet these requirements? 
- How much time on average do you spend to study the information 
provided? 
- Are you of the opinion that the AC members and invitees attending the AC 
meetings are well prepared?  
- Do you believe that your remuneration is sufficient to cover the work 
involved?  
- Would you put in more effort if the compensation was better? 
- How do you feel about the appropriateness of the date, time and duration 
of AC meetings?  
- Describe the process followed for the compilation of the agenda for the AC 
meetings.  
- Describe the proceedings at the AC meetings. 
- Who else, other than the external auditor and management, assists you in 
fulfilling your responsibilities (i.e. advisory and supportive role played by 
the company secretary and the designated advisor)? 
- How are disagreements during the AC meeting dealt with? 
- How does the non-existence of an internal audit department effect the 
fulfilment of the AC’s responsibilities?  
- A new AC member was recently appointed. Describe the impact of this 
new member on the AC? 
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- Tell me about the seating arrangement at AC meetings and does it have 
an impact on the manner in which AC meetings are conducted? 
 
9. Do you believe that you have any responsibilities to the public apart from 
your responsibilities to shareholders?  
 
10. What else can the AC do to increase the value being added to the company 
and its stakeholders?  
 
11. Is there anything else that you want to add regarding the value of the AC? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
THE VALUE OF AN AUDIT COMMITTEE AT A HIGH-GROWTH POTENTIAL, SMALL 
TO MEDIUM-SIZED LISTED COMPANY 
 
Dear Prospective Participant 
 
My name is Madeleine la Grange, a lecturer in the College of Accounting Sciences at 
the University of South Africa (UNISA). I am pursuing a Master’s degree to understand 
how the audit committee (AC) of an Alternative Exchange (AltX) listed company is 
adding value to the company and its stakeholders. Before you decide whether or not to 
participate, it is important to explain what the study will involve. 
 
WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
 
The company has been selected to participate in the study. Approval was obtained from 
the Chief Executive Officer to conduct the study. You were selected to participate in the 
study since you conform to the qualifying criterion, namely, you formed part of the AC 
and/or you have a relationship with the AC. Hence, individuals invited to participate 
include individuals from the following categories: AC members, board members, major 
shareholder(s), executive management, the external auditor, the company secretary, 
and the designated advisor. Your contact details have been obtained from the office of 
the Chief Financial Officer.  
 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY/WHAT DOES THE 
RESEARCH INVOLVE? 
 
This study involves a single one hourly semi-structured individual interview. Depending 
on the category of research participant being interviewed, research questions will 
attempt to understand participants’ perceptions about some/all of the following: 
 
- Characteristics of AC members. 
- Purpose of the AC. 
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- Status of the AC. 
- Relationships between the AC and management, as well as between the AC and the 
assurance provider. 
- AC meetings. 
- Fulfilment of the AC’s responsibilities. 
- Suggested improvements to the characteristics of the AC and the fulfilment of its 
responsibilities. 
 
The interview is semi-structured and therefore the questions covering the 
aforementioned topics form a basic guideline for the interview. Other questions may be 
asked as the discussion evolves. The interview will be digitally voice-recorded to ensure 
the factual accuracy and completeness of the data. However, interviews will only be 
recorded after written consent is obtained from you, under the precondition that you may 
request for the voice recorder to be switched off at any time. 
 
CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY? 
 
Participating in this study is entirely voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent 
to participate. Should you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign a written 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason or being 
prejudiced. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
 
This will be the first study that attempts to understand the way in which the AC of an 
AltX listed company adds value to the company and its stakeholders. Hence, the results 
of this study will add to the existing body of knowledge on the AC as an important 
component of corporate governance (CG) practices. 
 
Executive and non-executive directors of AltX listed companies are required to attend a 
Directors Induction Programme to improve their knowledge regarding aspects such as 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange listing requirements for AltX listed companies, CG 
practices and the Companies Act. The findings of this study could be used to inform the 
Directors Induction Programme and therefore contribute to the development of AC 
members. 
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WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED INCONVENIENCE OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
 
It is understood that visiting your workplace during working hours may be inconvenient 
to you. I will provide you with as much notice as would be reasonably possible and be 
flexible in terms of the interview venues, dates and times. 
 
WILL WHAT I SAY BE KEPT ANONYMOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL? 
 
Your name will not be recorded anywhere and no one will be able to connect you to the 
answers you give. You will be given a fictitious participant number and you will be 
referred to in this way in the data, any publications, or other research reports. The 
persons transcribing and co-coding the interviews will sign a confidentiality clause to 
ensure that the data remain strictly confidential.  
 
HOW WILL INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED? 
 
Data obtained will be stored for a period of five years on a password protected 
computer. Information will be permanently deleted after the five-year period has expired. 
 
HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL? 
 
The study has received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of 
the College of Accounting Sciences, UNISA. Should you need more information you 
may contact my supervisors Prof EM Odendaal, e-mail: odendem@unisa.ac.za, Tel: 
+27 12 429 4363 or Dr B Ackers, e-mail: ackerb@unisa.ac.za, Tel: +27 12 429 8993. 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
Madeleine la Grange 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
 
I …………………………………………………… (Name) hereby give Madeleine la 
Grange consent to use the information obtained from the interview in her study as part 
of her Master’s degree. 
 
 I understand that the information I provide will be treated confidential and 
anonymity will be maintained.  
 
 I confirm having participated under informed consent. 
 
 I confirm that I am aware that I may at any point during the interview cease to 
participate without being adversely affected. 
 
 
Participant’s signature ………………………………………………. 
 
Date ………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ABC LIMITED − COMPANY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 
 
ABC Limited and its subsidiaries. 2008. Annual financial statements for the year ended 
29 February 2008.  
 
ABC Limited. 2010. Annual Report 2010. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014a. Integrated report for the year ended 28 February 2014.  
 
ABC Limited. 2014b. Meeting of the audit committee held on Tuesday 04 February 2014 
at 10H00. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014c. Meeting of the audit committee held on Wednesday 21 May 2014 
at 11H00. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014d. Meeting of the audit committee held on Tuesday 22 July 2014 at 
09H00. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014e. Meeting of the audit committee held on Thursday 30 October 2014 
at 08H00. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014f. Terms of reference of audit committee. 
 
ABC Limited. 2014g. Audit committee work plan: Progress report as at 23 October 2014 
for the period 1 March 2014 to 28 February 2015 (financial calendar). 
 
